Filed 7/13/26 Acosta v. Guntupalli CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
JOSHUA ACOSTA, B337932, B337955
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20STCV48320)
v.
NAGESWARA R. GUNTUPALLI,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEALS from a judgment and order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Christian Gullon, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.
Law Office of Colleen O’Hara and Colleen O’Hara for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Cole Pedroza, Kenneth R. Pedroza, Nayri Jilizian;
Law+Brandmeyer, Kent T. Brandmeyer and Bradley C. Clark for
Defendant and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Employees of a psychiatric hospital restrained Joshua
Acosta, a minor, when he had a physical outburst during a
telephone call with his mother. After the incident, Acosta
suffered subconjunctival hemorrhages in both eyes, chest and
jawline bruises, and red “pinprick” marks on his skin. Acosta
filed suit alleging Nageswara R. Guntupalli, M.D., a psychiatrist
at the hospital who was not present for the incident, violated the
Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (CANRA) (Pen. Code,
§ 11164 et seq.) by failing to report the incident as child abuse.
The trial court granted Guntupalli’s motion for summary
judgment, and Acosta now appeals.1 We conclude Acosta raised a
triable issue of material fact. We therefore reverse the summary
judgment and subsequent award of costs. We remand for further
proceedings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Underlying Incident
On August 7, 2018, 17-year-old Acosta was admitted to
Aurora Charter Oak Hospital (Aurora), a psychiatric hospital in
Covina.2 Around 8:00 p.m., Rizwana B. Hussain, M.D., conducted
a physical examination of Acosta. Hussain did not record any
issues with Acosta’s eyes or skin and noted “no exudate or
hemorrhages.”
A nursing progress note by B. Mushili, R.N., written at
11:42 p.m. that night, states that Acosta asked to call his mother.
While on the telephone, he began “cursing at mother and banging
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2 All dates are in 2018 unless otherwise stated.
2
the phone against the wall. Continued to yell ‘get me the fuck
out of here, I am not staying here tonight, I will fight my way out
if I have to or kill myself tonight.’ ” The note states “MD
notified,” and Acosta was given medication at 9:30 p.m. The note
continued: “Dose was effective, was able to calm down, escorted to
OR for closer monitoring and safety.”
The next morning, August 8, Guntupalli completed a
psychiatric evaluation of Acosta. His corresponding report stated
it was based on his interview with Acosta and his review of
Acosta’s admission papers. The report notes that Acosta’s eye
contact was poor, and he was irritable and easily agitated. The
report also stated that “patient is motivated and in good physical
health.” The report detailed what Acosta told Guntupalli about
his thoughts, how he was feeling, and why he was in the hospital.
It did not mention any allegation of a beating, choking, or other
harm the night before.
That afternoon at 1:00 p.m., Acosta attended a social
services group session. The record regarding his attendance
indicates he participated by identifying healthy and unhealthy
boundaries. It does not indicate that he shared that he had been
harmed the night before.
Around 2:00 p.m., K. Saldua, R.N., evaluated Acosta and
reported he was cooperative, socializing, and “able to make needs
known with staff.” Saldua stated Acosta was attending groups
and participating in treatment, so no one-on-one care was
needed. There was no mention of Acosta reporting any harm by
staff the night before.
At 3:00 p.m., Acosta attended a “chemical dependency
group” and participated by identifying his most important
3
boundaries. The related record does not mention him stating he
had been harmed or mistreated the night before.
At 5:41 p.m., a case manager entered a progress note
stating the case manager had contacted Acosta’s mother and
scheduled a family session for August 10. There was no reference
to any alleged harm or abuse.
On August 9 at 11:20 a.m., Guntupalli recorded a
“Psychiatric Progress Note (Dictation)” stating that he had
spoken to staff and interviewed Acosta, who was “irritable,”
“isolative[,] and withdrawn.” Acosta told Guntupalli he was
trying to “participate in the groups and verbalize the concerns.”
He also said his mother had visited him the night before, and the
visit was “okay.” Guntupalli’s report does not mention any harm
or injuries.
At 11:40 a.m., Sadhna Dhand, M.D., checked Acosta for
redness in both eyes. He reported that Acosta was complaining of
“redness in both eyes” and “some blurring of vision at times for
the last two days.” Dhand diagnosed Acosta with subconjunctival
hemorrhages in both eyes, gave him a medication to prevent
infection, and advised him to see an ophthalmologist after
discharge. Dhand’s report does not mention that Acosta was
harmed by another person or intentionally injured.
At 7:00 p.m., T. Bridges, R.N., examined Acosta’s eyes and
spoke with his mother. The related note states Acosta’s eyes “are
evident of scleral red discoloration; denies pain; blurred vision to
the right eye . . . .” “Patient reports two versions of how bleeding
occurred, telling this writer, ‘Nothing happened. It just appeared
yesterday’; told Dr Guntupalli, ‘It happens all the time when I get
upset’; told his mother ‘somebody choked me[.]’ Verified with
mother that she has not seen this happen before and is
4
requesting patient be discharged to her for treatment. Writer
informed [the] mother that patient was on a 5250 and we can call
the medical doctor for further treatment. Dr Guntupalli notified,
stating he is aware of [patient’s] ‘subconjunctival hemorrhage’
and though he feels emergency services are not necessary said
call the medical doctor. Dr Solomon notified and gave order to
send Joshua to the ER for further evaluation.” Acosta was
transported to Queen of the Valley Hospital by ambulance.
At 11:15 p.m., Acosta was evaluated at the Queen of the
Valley Hospital for “bilateral eye redness.” Acosta told the
“attending ED provider” that he was “being belligerent on
Wednesday when he was placed on a 52-85. Patient states he
was fighting and straining and that is when they noticed the
redness to his eyes. Patient denies any pain. Patient was sent
into the ER because he was complaining of some mild blurry
vision in the right eye. Patient denies any blurry vision in his
eyes now. . . . Patient denied any trauma to his eyes.” After
“severity,” the attending provider wrote, “mild.” The provider
diagnosed Acosta with “bilateral subconjunctival hemorrhages,”
and noted they would resolve on their own. A triage
questionnaire completed by a nurse at the emergency room
states: “Blood shot eyes after he got very upset.” After the
question, “Is physical abuse/neglect suspected?” the nurse wrote,
“N.” Acosta was discharged back to Aurora that night.
On August 10 at 8:00 a.m., a nursing progress note by M.
Sowa, R.N., stated that Acosta was “irritable, anxious and
restless,” and “focused on discharge.” “His eyes continue to be
bright red in the inner and outer portion,” but he “denies
pain/discomfort.”
5
At 10:00 a.m., Guntupalli spoke with staff and interviewed
Acosta. Guntupalli’s corresponding psychiatric progress note
reported that Acosta’s mother was concerned about his
subconjunctival hemorrhage, and that Acosta was reporting both
that it occurs “whenever he gets upset or tends to get anxious,”
and that the hemorrhage occurred because “someone was holding
him too tight.” Guntupalli noted that the bleeding in Acosta’s
eyes was resolving.
At 12:30 p.m., Guntupalli wrote that he and others met
Acosta’s mother, who reported that Acosta “is now telling her
that someone choked him when he was restrained, and as a
result[,] mother, Veronica is requesting a discharge.” The note
states: “House supervisor and attending DON, Mimi explained to
mother a step by step and probability of how Joshua may have
perceived the events of the take down.” “Mother was receptive to
the information provided and was content requesting to continue
visiting,” and asked to bring Acosta’s unofficial therapy dog.
That evening, Guntupalli wrote orders for several
medications for Acosta, as well as “ice pack to both eyes as
needed for discomfort.”
At 10:08 p.m., a nurse entered a “wound documentation”
report stating that there were “yellow bruises on chest wall, not
present prior to admit.”
On August 11, at 8:50 a.m., Guntupalli wrote that he had
spoken to staff and interviewed the patient, who was motivated
for treatment, and that his hemorrhages were resolving. Acosta
was not anxious, not presenting with threats of harm to himself
or others, and the plan was to discharge Acosta for outpatient
follow-up.
6
Lawsuit and Summary Judgment
In December 2020, Acosta filed suit against Guntupalli and
his alleged employers. Acosta filed the operative third amended
complaint in January 2023. After a successful demurrer, only
one cause of action remained against Guntupalli: a claim that he
violated CANRA by failing to report child abuse or neglect as a
mandatory reporter, under section 11166. The third amended
complaint alleged that Acosta was injured by someone holding
him too tight, yet Guntupalli failed to report this as child abuse.
Guntupalli moved for summary judgment. He argued that
under the objective facts known to him at the time, a reasonable
psychiatrist would not have suspected child abuse or neglect,
and, therefore, he did not breach any mandatory duty to report
under CANRA.
Among other evidence, Guntupalli supported his motion
with Acosta’s patient records from Aurora and Queen of the
Valley Hospital, and Acosta’s deposition testimony. At his
deposition, Acosta explained that he was on the phone with his
mother, “cursing at her, arguing with her, telling her if she didn’t
pick me up I’m going to leave.” He then “hit the phone on the
table” and “was immediately tackled and put to the floor by two
to three male staff. They beat me. They—they had their knees
on my back. [¶] Shortly, shortly after, I was put in a choke hold.
I was being strangled. I was being beaten.” Regarding the
subconjunctival hemorrhages, Acosta denied telling anyone at the
hospital that he had previously experienced a similar issue with
his eyes before. However, he admitted that he did not tell anyone
about the incident other than his mother and his attorney.
Guntupalli also submitted a declaration from Joseph I.
Sison, M.D., a psychiatrist with a specialty in child and
7
adolescent psychiatry. Sison had reviewed Acosta’s complaint,
relevant sections of CANRA, records from the Los Angeles Police
Department, medical records, depositions of Acosta and his
mother, Veronica Gallegos, and Guntupalli’s curriculum vitae.
Sison concluded Guntupalli’s care and treatment “complied with
the standard of care.” He further opined that there were “no
facts in any of the medical records and deposition testimony”
indicating that Guntupalli, “in his professional capacity,” had
“knowledge of or observed a child whom he knows, or reasonably
suspects has been the victim of child abuse or neglect.”
To form his opinions, Sison considered that Acosta did not
tell anyone at Aurora that he had been attacked or strangled;
medical doctors provided Acosta’s medical care, not Guntupalli, a
psychiatrist; Acosta told the emergency room staff that he was
being belligerent on August 7, and he was fighting and straining
“when they notice[d] the redness to his eyes”; an emergency room
nurse reported that physical abuse or neglect was not suspected;
and Acosta told Guntupalli that when he gets upset or anxious,
he gets a subconjunctival hemorrhage, and also that someone
was holding him too tight. Sison concluded these facts did not
support a child abuse finding and did not require Guntupalli to
report that Acosta was, or may have been, a victim of child abuse.
Sison further noted that Guntupalli and hospital
supervisors met with Acosta’s mother and explained to her the
“step by step” or “take down,” and how Acosta may have
perceived it. Sison also cited the evidence that Acosta had been
improving and was released; three physicians treated Acosta
between August 7 through August 9 and none noted any
suspicion of child abuse; medical providers in the emergency
department did not note any suspicion of child abuse; and Acosta
8
admitted in his deposition that he did not tell anyone at Aurora
he had been harmed or choked. Sison concluded that “no medical
facts support a child abuse finding,” and, as a result, “the
standard of care did not require Dr. Guntupalli to report that
plaintiff Acosta had been, or may have been, the victim of child
abuse as a result of being held [too] tightly.”
Acosta opposed summary judgment. He challenged Sison’s
declaration on numerous grounds and argued that, because of the
declaration’s deficiencies, Guntupalli failed to meet his burden as
the moving party. Acosta also contended there were triable
issues of material fact.
Acosta submitted a declaration from Gallegos stating that
when she asked Aurora hospital employees about her son’s
injuries, one worker said she was not allowed to discuss it,
another said maybe Acosta’s eyes “ ‘popped’ ” because he was
upset, and another said he had pink eye. Gallegos further
declared that the hospital told her there was no incident report,
she asked “workers to notify DCFS and the authorities,” and she
asked that Acosta receive medical care. She also took photos of
Acosta on the evening of August 9, showing bruising, bleeding in
his eyes, and “red pinprick marks on his face, neck, and upper
chest.” The photos were attached to her declaration. Gallegos
further stated she told Guntupalli that Acosta had reported an
“attack[].” She told other Aurora employees that she would
inform the media that Acosta had been attacked if the hospital
did not discharge him, after which Guntupalli “promptly”
authorized Acosta’s release.
Acosta submitted his own declaration. He declared that
before the “attack,” he was on the phone with his mother. When
he slammed the phone down in frustration, two or more men
9
tackled him. His head hit the floor “with extreme force,” and the
men choked and strangled him. He sustained bruising to his
face, neck, and body; pink dots; scratches; his eyes were red and
bloody; he had trouble seeing; and his voice was hoarse. Since
workers from Aurora accompanied him to the emergency room,
he was scared to tell the emergency room medical providers about
the attack. Acosta further declared that when he met with
Guntupalli, he had already been attacked, so Guntupalli was able
to see the bruising, red pin pricks, scratches, and bleeding in his
eyes, and hear that his voice was hoarse.
Acosta additionally submitted a declaration from Avery J.
Knapp, Jr., M.D., a neuroradiologist, and Amber O’Malley, a
forensic nurse examiner. Neither declaration mentioned CANRA
or child abuse. Neither opined that the evidence suggested child
abuse or that someone in Guntupalli’s professional capacity or
scope of employment would have had knowledge of or reasonably
have suspected child abuse.
Knapp interpreted an MRI image of Acosta’s brain taken in
May 2019. Knapp concluded that a “[c]hokehold caused vessels
in eye to pop on 8/2018.” This was based on Knapp’s observation
of a “few scattered predominantly subcortical white matter zone
hyperintensities,” or brain lesions, seen in the MRI report, which
“could have been caused by trauma.”
O’Malley has training and experience with strangulation of
the neck. After reviewing the photographs Gallegos took on
August 9, she concluded they indicated strangulation by a
forearm chokehold and that the related pressure could have
caused Acosta’s subconjunctival hemorrhages. She wrote that
the “photographs of Joshua Acosta depict no visible external
bruising to the neck. However, there are visible green contusions
10
to both sides of his face along the right jawline and along/under
the left jawline. The lack of neck bruising with the bruising at
and under the jawline, are consistent with his report of a
chokehold by a forearm.”
Finally, Acosta submitted evidence purporting to show that
Sison was biased, and the court should therefore reject his
declaration.3 Acosta additionally proffered evidence he claimed
demonstrated that Guntupalli obstructed Acosta’s efforts to
depose Sison. The evidence related to the scheduling of Sison’s
deposition and Guntupalli’s counsel’s objections during the
deposition.
In February 2024, the trial court granted Guntupalli’s
motion for summary judgment. The court described the issue
before it as whether Guntupalli knew facts from which a
reasonable person in a like position would have suspected Acosta
had been abused. The court concluded that the evidence Acosta
proffered was insufficient to refute Guntupalli’s evidence that no
reasonable psychiatrist would have suspected child abuse. The
trial court overruled all of Acosta’s evidentiary objections. On
March 1, the trial court issued a further ruling to address
3 Because we do not address Acosta’s bias argument, we deny
his related request for judicial notice of documents filed with the
Secretary of State purporting to show that Sison and Guntupalli
worked for hospitals that were part of the same corporate entity.
(OneTaste Inc. v. Netflix, Inc. (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 174, 194;
Save Lafayette Trees v. East Bay Regional Park Dist. (2021) 66
Cal.App.5th 21, 29, fn. 2 [denying request for judicial notice of
documents “not necessary to resolve this appeal”].) We also deny
Acosta’s request to file a reply to Guntupalli’s opposition to his
request for judicial notice.
11
additional evidentiary arguments Acosta raised during the
hearing in response to the trial court’s tentative ruling.
Acosta filed two timely appeals, one from the original
judgment and one from a post-judgment order awarding costs.4
We granted Acosta’s motion to consolidate the appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Summary Judgment Standard of Review
A defendant moving for summary judgment has the initial
burden to make a prima facie showing that the plaintiff cannot
establish one or more elements of his or her challenged causes of
action or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (f)(1), (o), (p)(2); Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850–851.) If the
defendant meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to produce evidence showing that a genuine issue of
material fact exists, based on specific facts. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, at p. 850.) “A triable issue of
material fact exists ‘ “ ‘if, and only if, the evidence would allow a
reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the
party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable
standard of proof.’ [Citation.]” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Padron
v. Osoy (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 677, 689.)
We review a summary judgment ruling de novo,
“ ‘ “ ‘considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and
opposing papers except that to which objections were made and
sustained.’ ” [Citation.]’ ” (Gonzalez v. Mathis (2021) 12 Cal.5th
29, 39.) “In evaluating whether there is a triable issue of
4 The costs order was incorporated into an amended
judgment. Acosta does not make any argument of error
regarding the costs award.
12
material fact, we must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the opposing party by ‘strictly constru[ing]’ the
evidence of the moving party, ‘liberally constru[ing]’ that of the
opposing party, and resolving any doubts against summary
judgment.” (McHenry v. Asylum Entertainment Delaware, LLC
(2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 469, 479.)
II. CANRA
CANRA requires a mandatory reporter, which includes a
psychiatrist (§ 11165.7, subd. (a)(21)), to make a report to a law
enforcement agency or a county welfare department when he or
she knows of or suspects child abuse (§ 11165.9). The version of
section 11166, subdivision (a), in effect in August 2018 provided
in relevant part: “[A] mandated reporter shall make a report to
an agency specified in Section 11165.9 whenever the mandated
reporter, in his or her professional capacity or within the scope of
his or her employment, has knowledge of or observes a child
whom the mandated reporter knows or reasonably suspects has
been the victim of child abuse or neglect.”
CANRA defines child abuse as non-accidental injury and
harm: “[T]he term ‘child abuse or neglect’ includes physical injury
or death inflicted by other than accidental means upon a child by
another person, sexual abuse as defined in Section 11165.1,
neglect as defined in Section 11165.2, the willful harming or
injuring of a child or the endangering of the person or health of a
child, as defined in Section 11165.3, and unlawful corporal
punishment or injury as defined in Section 11165.4.” (§ 11165.6.)
The statute defines “ ‘the willful harming or injuring of a child or
the endangering of the person or health of a child’ ” as “a
situation in which any person willfully causes or permits any
child to suffer, or inflicts thereon, unjustifiable physical pain or
13
mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any child,
willfully causes or permits the person or health of the child to be
placed in a situation in which his or her person or health is
endangered.” (§ 11165.3.)
“CANRA employs an objective standard for evaluating the
reasonableness of a mandated reporter’s suspicion.” (Doe v.
Lawndale Elementary School Dist. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 113,
138 (Lawndale Elementary).) “Reasonable suspicion” means
“that it is objectively reasonable for a person to entertain a
suspicion, based upon facts that could cause a reasonable person
in a like position, drawing, when appropriate, on the person’s
training and experience, to suspect child abuse or neglect.
‘Reasonable suspicion’ does not require certainty that child abuse
or neglect has occurred nor does it require a specific medical
indication of child abuse or neglect; any ‘reasonable suspicion’ is
sufficient.” (§ 11166, subd. (a)(1).) This objective standard is
limited to facts “known to the person.” (Lawndale Elementary, at
p. 140.)
Failure to make a required report under CANRA is a
misdemeanor. (§ 11166, subd. (c).) However, a mandated
reporter may also face civil liability when a breach of the duty to
report child abuse causes the minor to be injured.5 (Roe v.
Hesperia Unified School Dist. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 13, 32;
Lawndale Elementary, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 138.)
III. Acosta Raised a Triable Issue of Material Fact
Most of Acosta’s briefing on appeal argues that Guntupalli
failed to meet his initial burden to show that Acosta cannot
5 Guntupalli did not seek summary judgment on the ground
that Acosta could not show that any breach of Guntupalli’s
reporting obligation caused Acosta to be injured.
14
establish one or more elements of the CANRA cause of action.
However, we need not address Acosta’s numerous arguments on
this point, because, even assuming Guntupalli met his initial
burden, Acosta raised a triable issue of material fact.
Guntupalli offered evidence to establish a reasonable
person in a like position would not suspect child abuse. It is
undisputed that Acosta was subjected to a “take down” procedure
after he had a verbal and physical outburst while on the
telephone with his mother. It is also undisputed that he did not
tell anyone at Aurora, including Guntupalli, that he had been
beaten, strangled, or assaulted. The hospital records established
that Acosta told Guntupalli and others that when he gets upset
or anxious, he gets a subconjunctival hemorrhage, and also that
someone was holding him too tight. The same records further
established that several medical professionals evaluated Acosta
and did not indicate any suspicion of child abuse. The Sison
declaration opined that “Dr. Guntupalli was not required to
report that plaintiff Acosta had been, or may have been, the
victim of child abuse by being held [too] tightly, because no
medical facts support a child abuse finding.”
Acosta, however, relied on portions of Guntupalli’s evidence
which, if true, established that by August 9, Gallegos had told at
least one nurse at Aurora that Acosta said someone had choked
him. Further, Guntupalli’s August 10 notes reflect that Gallegos
told him Acosta was reporting that someone choked him while he
was being restrained.6 Acosta contends this was sufficient to
6 Although Guntupalli objected to portions of Gallegos’s
declaration, he did not object to the portion in which Gallegos
asserted she told Guntupalli that Acosta was attacked. Further,
Guntupalli’s evidence in support of summary judgment included
15
cause a reasonable person in Guntupalli’s position to have a
reasonable suspicion that Acosta was the victim of child abuse.
Neither Guntupalli’s evidence nor his legal arguments
conclusively refuted this contention. (Doe v. Good Samaritan
Hospital (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 653, 662 [defense burden is to
show there is no factual basis for relief on any theory reasonably
contemplated by plaintiff’s pleadings]; Brantley v. Pisaro (1996)
42 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1597 [cause of action cannot be established
if the defendant’s facts disprove the plaintiff’s allegations as a
matter of law].) “Choking” suggests the willful harming or
injuring of a child. There was no evidence categorically
indicating that Gallegos’s report that Acosta said someone at
Aurora choked him was insufficient to cause a reasonable person
in Guntupalli’s position to suspect Acosta was subjected to willful
or non-accidental physical injury. Although Sison opined that
there were no “medical facts” indicating child abuse,
section 11166, subdivision (a)(1), provides that “ ‘[r]easonable
suspicion’ does not require . . . a specific medical indication of
child abuse or neglect; any ‘reasonable suspicion’ is sufficient.”
Further, the Sison declaration twice mentions Gallegos’s
report, but fails to discuss why the information she provided
would not indicate to a reasonable psychiatrist that Acosta was,
or may have been, a victim of child abuse. Instead, the Sison
declaration appears to implicitly conclude that Guntupalli could
reasonably reject Gallegos’s information, since it conflicted with
Acosta’s direct statements and the medical records. Yet there is
no explanation for this implicit opinion. “[A]n opinion
unsupported by reasons or explanations does not establish the
his note that Gallegos reported that Acosta was “telling her that
someone choked him when he was restrained . . . .”
16
absence of a material fact issue for trial, as required for summary
judgment. . . . [A]n expert opinion is worth no more than the
reasons upon which it rests.” (Kelley v. Trunk (1998) 66
Cal.App.4th 519, 524; Zaragoza v. Adam (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th
113, 119 [moving defendant’s burden to show the absence of
triable issues not satisfied “ ‘by an expert declaration consisting
of ultimate facts and conclusions that are unsupported by factual
detail and reasoned explanation, even if it is admitted and
unopposed’ ”].)
Guntupalli’s summary judgment motion argued merely
that “based on the objective facts known to [him], no reasonable
psychiatrist would ‘. . . entertain a suspicion . . . to suspect child
abuse or neglect.’ ” Yet, the motion, as well as Sison’s opinion,
failed to directly address the fact that Gallegos told Guntupalli
that Acosta said he had been choked. When determining whether
there is a triable issue of material fact, we must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party by
strictly construing the moving party’s evidence and resolving any
doubts against summary judgment. In the absence of evidence
about how a reasonable psychiatrist would evaluate a patient’s
claims of suffering physical abuse, a reasonable factfinder might
conclude that a patient’s claim that he was choked during a “take
down,” accompanied by the patient’s visible injuries, would cause
a reasonable person in a like position to suspect the non-
accidental infliction of physical injury or the willful harming of a
child.7
7 Guntupalli offered no evidence explaining the “take down”
procedure or suggesting that choking is a legitimate part of a
take down.
17
We reject Guntupalli’s contention that to establish a triable
issue of fact, Acosta was required to provide expert testimony to
refute Sison’s conclusion and opine that a reasonable psychiatrist
would have suspected child abuse. Guntupalli argues that the
“threshold question is not just what Dr. Guntupalli saw, but
whether those observations would create a reasonable suspicion
of abuse requiring a CANRA report based on professional
standards, which is beyond common knowledge.”
In some cases, an expert opinion may be necessary to
evaluate whether a person with the mandated reporter’s training
and experience would entertain a suspicion of child abuse or
neglect based on the facts presented. For example, in People ex
rel. Eichenberger v. Stockton Pregnancy Control Medical Clinic,
Inc. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 225, 240, the court reasoned that
whether the detection of a sexually transmitted disease in a child
under 14 “creates a reasonable suspicion of reportable child abuse
will depend in many instances on application of the health
practitioner’s training and experience, as [CANRA] expressly
directs. It may well be that some sexually transmitted diseases
are so commonly transmitted by those over age 14 that the
presence of such a disease in a minor under age 14 would, in the
absence of any other information, trigger a reasonable suspicion
of child abuse.”
Here, however, Guntupalli has not demonstrated that
specialized professional expertise is necessary to determine
whether it was objectively reasonable to suspect abuse in
connection with Gallegos’s direct statement that Acosta said he
had been choked, after he had suffered visible injuries and had
himself told Guntupalli that he had been held too tightly.
Guntupalli cites no legal authority or evidence to support the
18
conclusion that, based on professional experience and training, an
adolescent psychiatrist would necessarily and reasonably fail to
suspect abuse when an adolescent patient, or the patient’s
parent, informs the psychiatrist that the adolescent has disclosed
the non-accidental infliction of physical injury. To the extent
Guntupalli contends that Sison’s declaration expressed that
opinion, and therefore required an expert opinion in response, we
disagree due to the insufficiency of the Sison declaration as
discussed above.
Guntupalli also contends that Acosta did not refute Sison’s
conclusion that “given the[] conflicting accounts” of what
happened to Acosta “and the absence of any direct report,” “the
standard of care did not require Dr. Guntupalli to report” that
plaintiff Acosta had been, or may have been, the victim of child
abuse as a result of being held too tightly because no medical
facts support a child abuse finding. This appears to be an
argument that Guntupalli could reasonably reject the conflicting
account suggesting Acosta had suffered abuse. Yet, at least one
court has rejected the argument that under a similar mandatory
reporting statute, a defendant is “permitted to apply her
professional expertise to resolve any . . . suspicion [of abuse]—
that is, if she determined that the allegation of abuse was
unfounded, based on her experience and training, she did not
entertain a reasonable suspicion and therefore had no duty to
report the incident as suspected abuse.” (People v. Davis (2005)
126 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1426 (Davis).)
In Davis, the court considered a defendant’s reporting
obligation under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil
Protection Act, which contains mandatory reporting
requirements analogous to CANRA. (Davis, supra, 126
19
Cal.App.4th at p. 1427, fn. 7.) The defendant, a licensed
administrator at a private skilled nursing facility providing
psychiatric care, argued she was not required to report abuse
after learning that an employee had a physical altercation with a
19-year-old dependent adult and resident at the facility. The
employee choked the victim. (Id. at pp. 1423–1424.) The
defendant took the position that because the statute defined
“ ‘reasonable suspicion’ as ‘an objectively reasonable suspicion
that a person would entertain, based upon facts that could cause
a reasonable person in a like position, drawing when appropriate
upon his or her training and experience, to suspect abuse,’ she
was not required to report the incident as possible abuse because
a person with her training and expertise as a licensed nursing
home administrator and with her knowledge of the individuals
involved in the incident would have reasonably concluded that
[the employee’s] conduct did not constitute physical abuse.” (Id.
at p. 1431.)
The court rejected the argument, relying in part on
analogies to CANRA. The court concluded the relevant statutes
“provide for an objective standard, and . . . they do not permit the
application of a mandated reporter’s expertise to allow the
reporter to determine whether abuse occurred. Rather, if the
circumstances give rise to an objective basis for suspecting that
abuse occurred, reporting is mandatory.” (Davis, supra, 126
Cal.App.4th at p. 1426.) Similarly, here, Guntupalli could not
defeat Acosta’s claim at the summary judgment stage with
Sison’s conclusory opinion that Guntupalli was not required to
report abuse because he could rely on his unspecified training
and expertise to reject Acosta’s indirect claim of abuse as
unfounded.
20
In sum, there was evidence that Guntupalli knew Acosta
said he had been choked while at Aurora. This created a triable
issue of material fact as to whether an objectively reasonable
person in Guntupalli’s like position in possession of this
information would suspect child abuse. Guntupalli failed to
sufficiently address this evidence, either by expert opinion or
otherwise. He therefore was not entitled to summary judgment.
Because we accordingly reverse the judgment, we must also
reverse the order awarding Guntupalli costs.
21
DISPOSITION
The judgment and order are reversed and the matter is
remanded for further proceedings. Appellant is awarded his costs
on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
HANASONO, J.
22