Filed 9/8/26 Acevedo v. Country Lake MHC CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
HECTOR ACEVEDO et al.,
E085572
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
(Super.Ct.No. CVRI2306954)
v.
OPINION
COUNTRY LAKE MHC, GP, LLC,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Chad W. Firetag, Judge.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part with directions.
Wasson & Associates and David B. Wasson for Defendant and Appellant.
Allen, Semelsberger & Kaelin, James C. Allen, David Semelsberger and Adrian
M. Paris for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
1
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs and respondents are residents who reside within a mobilehome park
owned or operated by defendant and appellant Country Lake MHC, GP, LLC. This
appeal arises from the denial of four separate motions to compel arbitration brought by
defendant. Each motion purportedly sought to compel arbitration as to similarly situated
plaintiffs, but our review of the record leads us to conclude that there are at least six
different arbitration agreements at issue in this case, as well as a group of plaintiffs for
whom no arbitration agreement was ever produced by defendant.1
We affirm the order denying arbitration as to the eight plaintiffs for whom no
arbitration agreement was produced by defendant. We further conclude that the order
denying arbitration as to the remaining plaintiffs must be reversed, but for different
reasons specific to different plaintiffs. As to these plaintiffs, we will remand the matter
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
II. BACKGROUND
According to the operative complaint, plaintiffs are 49 current and former
residents of mobilehomes located in Country Lake Mobile Home Community (the Park),
a mobilehome park owned by defendant. Plaintiffs assert nine causes of action arising
out of defendant’s alleged acts and omissions in the operation and management of the
1 Apparently, the parties themselves cannot identify how many plaintiffs are
actually subject to the various motions such that they should be considered respondents in
this appeal. Defendant contends that there are 46 respondents to this appeal, while the
respondent’s brief contends there are 45 respondents. Our own review of the record
indicates that only 43 plaintiffs are identified in the notices of motion filed by defendant,
and the trial court’s order denying arbitration identified only 43 plaintiffs.
2
Park. The causes of action include: (1) nuisance, (2) breach of contract, (3) breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (4) negligence, (5) breach of statutes, (6) breach
of warranty of habitability, (7) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment, (8) violation of the
unfair competition law, and (9) a request for declaratory and injunctive relief.
In March 2024, defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration against all
plaintiffs. However, the trial court concluded that the manner in which the motion was
made rendered it “impossible to tell which [p]laintiffs have arbitration agreements and/or
what evidence [d]efendant relies on to assert each [p]laintiff is subject to an arbitration
agreement.” The trial court denied defendant’s motion without prejudice and suggested
that defendant file separate motions for each set of plaintiffs who shared common
arbitration agreements.
In response, defendant then filed four separate motions to compel arbitration.
However, defendant apparently ignored the trial court’s admonition and continued to
include plaintiffs who were admittedly not similarly situated into single motions.
Collectively, the four motions sought to compel arbitration against 43 named plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs opposed all of the motions on various grounds. The trial court conducted a
single hearing on all of defendant’s motions and denied arbitration as to 43 named
plaintiffs in single order. In denying arbitration, the trial court identified different
reasons applicable to specific plaintiffs, including: (1) defendant’s failure to prove the
existence of an arbitration agreement as to some plaintiffs; (2) some arbitration
agreements were void as against public policy; and (3) some arbitration agreements were
3
unconscionable. Defendant appeals from the order denying its motions to compel
arbitration.
III. DISCUSSION
A. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“California statutes create a ‘summary proceeding’ for resolving petitions or
motions to compel arbitration. [Citation.] ‘The petitioner bears the burden of proving the
existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence, and a
party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence any fact necessary to its defense. [Citation.] In these summary proceedings, the
trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other
documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court’s discretion, to
reach a final determination.’ ” (Chambers v. Crown Asset Management, LLC (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 583, 590 (Chambers).)
“ ‘ “There is no uniform standard of review for evaluating an order denying a
motion to compel arbitration. [Citation.] If the court’s order is based on a decision of
fact, then we adopt a substantial evidence standard. [Citations.] Alternatively, if the
court’s denial rests solely on a decision of law, then a de novo standard of review is
employed.” ’ ” (Chambers, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 591; Fleming v. Oliphant
Financial, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 13, 18.) And where a trial court’s decision rests
solely on facts that were not in dispute, we review that matter de novo. (Fleming, at
p. 18.)
4
Based upon our review of the record, we perceive at least seven groups of
differently situated plaintiffs. Thus, we must necessarily discuss each group separately in
order to determine the correctness of the trial court’s order denying arbitration.
Additionally, when reviewing an order denying a motion to compel arbitration, “[w]e are
not bound by the trial court’s reasoning and ‘may affirm the denial on any correct legal
theory supported by the record.’ ” (Collie v. The Icee Co. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 477,
481; Ramos v. Westlake Services LLC (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 674, 686.) As we explain,
we affirm the trial court’s order denying arbitration as to eight plaintiffs. As to the
remaining plaintiffs, we reverse the order denying arbitration, and we remand the matter
for further proceedings.
B. Denial of Arbitration for Failure To Produce an Agreement
With respect to eight plaintiffs, the trial court denied arbitration on the ground that
defendant failed to produce any arbitration agreements.2 We conclude that any claim of
error with respect to the trial court’s denial of arbitration as to these plaintiffs has been
forfeited on appeal and further conclude that, even in the absence of forfeiture, the trial
court did not err in denying arbitration as to these plaintiffs.
The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that the “first principle” that
disputes regarding arbitration is that “[a]rbitration is strictly ‘a matter of consent.’ ”
2 Specifically, the trial court found that defendant had not produced any
arbitration agreement for Constance Prisco, Genevieve Diaz Lopez, Debbie Odoardi,
Regina R. Thompson, Teresa Cassidy Darmody, Timothy Darmody, George Eckmann or
Carol Lineberger. Defendant named these plaintiffs in different motions but apparently
failed to produce any agreements bearing these plaintiffs signatures.
5
(Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters (2010) 561 U.S. 287, 299; Lamps Plus, Inc.
v. Varela (2019) 587 U.S. 176, 184.) Thus, “the threshold question presented by every
petition to compel arbitration is whether an agreement to arbitrate exists.” (Trinity v. Life
Ins. Co. of North America (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1120.) And the burden to prove
the existence of such an agreement rests with the party seeking to compel arbitration.
(Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55
Cal.4th 223, 236 (Pinnacle).)
Here, the opening brief has not raised any claim of error with respect to the trial
court’s ruling denying arbitration for failure to produce an arbitration agreement
pertaining to these plaintiffs. While our review of whether an arbitration agreement
exists is de novo when the facts are undisputed (Mar v. Perkins (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th
201, 211), “ ‘[e]ven when our review on appeal “is de novo, it is limited to issues which
have been adequately raised and supported in [the appellant’s opening] brief. [Citations.]
Issues not raised in an appellant’s brief are deemed waived or abandoned” ’ ” (Golden
Door Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 467,554-555).
Having failed to address this aspect of the trial court’s order in its opening brief, we
conclude defendant has forfeited any claim of error and affirm the order denying
arbitration as to the eight plaintiffs for whom the court concluded no arbitration
agreement was produced.
Additionally, even in the absence of forfeiture, we would find no error. Defendant
concedes on appeal that “there was an issue whether arbitration agreements . . . were
produced,” and argues only that, “[o]n remand, the parties will have the opportunity to
6
produce all of the ADR Agreements.” We accept defendant’s concession on this point.
Thus, even in the absence of forfeiture, we would affirm the trial court’s order denying
arbitration as to these eight plaintiffs on the ground that defendant failed to show the
existence of an agreement to arbitrate.3
C. Denial of Arbitration for “Group 1” Plaintiffs
With respect to 12 plaintiffs (Group 1 Plaintiffs), the trial court denied arbitration
on the ground that the agreements were void as against public policy.4 We conclude the
trial court erred in denying the motion to compel arbitration with respect to the Group 1
Plaintiffs on this ground.
1. Additional Background
With respect to the Group 1 Plaintiffs, defendant submitted the declaration of Aric
Resnicke in support of the motion to compel arbitration. The declaration stated that
3 To the extent defendant expresses the view that the failure to meet its initial
burden as to these eight plaintiffs can be remedied upon remand, we observe that “Code
of Civil Procedure section 1008 prohibits a party from filing repetitive motions for the
same relief” (National Grange of Order of Patrons of Husbandry v. California Guild
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 706, 716, fn. 10) and, unless the requirements of section 1008 are
satisfied, “any action to reconsider a prior interim order must formally begin with the
court on its own motion (Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1108, italics
omitted). Further, the issues the trial court may address upon remand are limited to those
specified in this court’s directions. (Ruegg & Ellsworth v. City of Berkeley (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 258, 264.) Because we conclude that the trial court’s order denying
arbitration as to these plaintiffs should be affirmed, we have no occasion to remand for
reconsideration of any matters pertaining to these plaintiffs.
4 Specifically, the trial court identified “Group 1” plaintiffs as Brenda Harris,
Joanne Clark, Joyce Miller, John Wagner, Patsy Shewach, Teresa Boneau-Montes,
Joseph Maselli, Jr., Rosalinda Stuart, Daniel Pospisil, Traci Pospisil, Janet Womack and
Patricia Huerta.
7
Resnicke was “an authorized agent of the Defendant, THE BOAVIDA GROUP, in this
matter,” but did not otherwise explain what this entity was or how this entity was
connected with defendant or its operations at the Park. Resnicke made various statements
pertaining to the nature of the Park, the manner in which services were provided by
defendant at the Park, and the general circumstances surrounding the entry of lease
agreements by residents at the Park.
The declaration was also accompanied by lease agreements pertaining to each of
the Group 1 Plaintiffs. The attached lease agreements took different forms but all
contained arbitration provisions in all capital, bold, typed font. The arbitration
agreements included the following provisions:
(1) “any dispute” “shall be resolved solely by mediation and arbitration”;
(2) a party must demand arbitration within the same statute of limitations
applicable to bringing the claim in court;
(3) the prevailing party would be entitled to reasonable attorneys fees and costs;
(4) the cost of arbitration shall be borne by the non-prevailing party;
(5) each party to arbitration was required to deposit one-half of the estimated
arbitration costs prior to arbitration and the failure to do so would result in the
forfeiture of the right to defend or prosecute a claim;
(7) arbitration shall be conducted pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
1283.05;
(8) actions for injunctive relief are exempt from arbitration; and
(9) acceptance of the arbitration provisions is voluntary.
8
The trial court concluded that, as to Group 1 Plaintiffs, defendant had failed to
establish that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempted California law with respect to
the applicable arbitration agreements. The trial court then concluded that under
California law, the arbitration agreements were void as against public policy because they
violated Civil Code5 sections 1953 and 798.87.
2. Defendant Failed To Establish FAA Preemption as to Group 1 Plaintiffs
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by concluding that the FAA did
not apply to the arbitration agreements involving Group 1 Plaintiffs. We disagree.
“The FAA reflects a ‘ “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,
notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.” ’ [Citation.]
‘To ensure that arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms, “the FAA
pre-empts state laws which ‘require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which
the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.’ ” ’ ” (Tuufuli v. West Coast
Dental Administrative Services, LLC (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1053 (Tuufuli),
review granted Mar. 25, 2026, S295323.) Generally, the FAA applies where an
agreement to arbitrate expressly provides that the FAA will apply or where the contract
evidences interstate commerce. (Victrola 89, LLC v. Jaman Properties 8 LLC (2020)
46 Cal.App.5th 337, 355.) A contract “has the requisite connection to interstate
commerce when the subject matter of a contract containing an arbitration agreement
either involves a channel or instrumentality of interstate commerce or otherwise has a
5 Undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code.
9
substantial relationship to interstate commerce.” (Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc. (2016)
245 Cal.App.4th 227, 240-241.)
However, “[t]he party asserting the FAA applies to an arbitration agreement bears
the burden to ‘ “demonstrate FAA coverage by declarations and other evidence.” ’ ”
(Tuufuli, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at p. 1054; Lane v. Francis Capital Management LLC
(2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 676, 688; Woolls v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 197,
213 [Merely arguing the issue of federal preemption is not sufficient where petitioner
“did not submit any declarations to show the instant transaction involves interstate
commerce.”].) And on appeal, “[w]e review the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts
for substantial evidence, but where there is no disputed extrinsic evidence considered by
the trial court, we review its arbitrability decision de novo.” (Tuufuli, at p. 1054.)
Here, none of the arbitration agreements pertaining to the Group 1 Plaintiffs
expressly provide for application of the FAA. Thus, in order to meet its burden to show
FAA preemption, it was incumbent upon defendant to submit declarations or other
evidence to establish the requisite connection to interstate commerce.
However, the only declaration submitted by defendant stated that the declarant
was an “an authorized agent of the Defendant, THE BOAVIDA GROUP, in this matter.”
This entity is not named as a defendant in the operative complaint, is not listed as a
moving party seeking to compel arbitration in defendant’s motion, and the declarant
offered no explanation of how this entity is related to defendant. Thus, the declaration
fails to establish foundation for any of the representations made by the declarant with
respect to defendant, defendant’s relationship with the Group 1 Plaintiffs, or the basis
10
upon which the declarant claims to have personal knowledge of any matters within the
Park. The declaration fails to establish that any transaction between defendant and the
Group 1 Plaintiffs had the requisite connection to interstate commerce for the FAA to
apply.6 It was defendant’s burden to show preemption by way of competent declarations
and evidence and, in the absence of any such evidence, the trial court did not err in
concluding that defendant failed to meet this burden.7
6 The required showing differs from that necessary to establish the existence of an
agreement to arbitrate. With respect to the existence of an agreement, the moving party
need only make an initial prima facie showing by “ ‘attaching to the [motion or] petition
a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party’s] signature’ ”;
“ ‘it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication’ ”; and
if “the opposing party does not dispute the existence of the arbitration agreement, then
nothing more is required.” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021)
72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.) Thus, the submission of purported arbitration agreements was
sufficient for this purpose even without proper authentication because the record does not
show the Group 1 Plaintiffs disputed the existence of the arbitration agreements.
7 The trial court also expressed the belief that the FAA did not apply because the
arbitration agreements at issue specified that arbitration would be conducted pursuant to
the Code of Civil Procedure. However, when the parties include a choice-of-law clause
broad enough to include state law on the subject of arbitrability, a court must still
“determine whether the particular provision of state law in question is one that reflects a
hostility to the enforcement of arbitration agreements that the FAA was designed to
overcome. If so, the choice-of-law clause should not be construed to incorporate such a
provision, at least in the absence of unambiguous language in the contract making the
intention to do so unmistakably clear.” (Mount Diablo Med. Ctr. v. Health Net of Cal.
(2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 711, 724.) Without such specific language, the general choice of
law provisions should be read “ ‘not to include special rules limiting the authority of
arbitrators.’ ” (Ibid.; Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown (2012) 565 U.S. 530, 533
[“ ‘[W]hen state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the
analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA.’ ”].) Thus, if
defendant had shown the FAA applied to the agreements at issue, the parties’ choice of
law provision could not be construed as incorporating substantive California statutes
rendering arbitration agreements void as against public policy. Nevertheless, “ ‘[w]e do
not review the trial court’s reasoning, but rather its ruling,’ ” and we affirm “ ‘if correct
[footnote continued on next page]
11
3. The Agreements Were Not Against Public Policy
While we find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that defendant failed to
establish FAA preemption as to the Group 1 Plaintiffs, we conclude the trial court erred
by denying arbitration on the ground that the entire arbitration agreement was void as
against public policy. The trial court reasoned that the arbitration agreements were void
as a matter of public policy because sections 1953 and 798.87 barred arbitration for
certain types of disputes. However, as we explain, neither statute provides authority for
the blanket denial of arbitration as to Group 1 Plaintiffs.
With respect to section 1953, there is nothing in the record to indicate that this
statute applies to the parties in this case. The statute provides in pertinent part: “Any
provision of a lease or rental agreement of a dwelling by which the lessee agrees to
modify or waive [specified rights] shall be void as contrary to public policy . . . .”
(§ 1953, subd. (a), italics added.) However, “[o]rdinarily, mobilehome park tenants own
their homes but rent the spaces they occupy.” (SC Manufactured Homes, Inc. v. Canyon
View Estates, Inc. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 663, 673; Cacho v. Boudreau (2007)
40 Cal.4th 341, 349 [In the context of a mobilehome park, rent is compensation for use of
the land and common areas.].) And there was no evidence in this case that the leases here
deviated from this ordinary, common practice. Thus, the leases do not pertain to rental
“of a dwelling,” and section 1953 does not apply.
on any theory, even if the trial court’s reasoning was not correct.’ ” (J.R. v. Electronic
Arts Inc. (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1107, 1114-1115.)
12
Plaintiffs do not contest that their leases are not leases for dwellings but argue that
there is no such limitation on the application of section 1953, relying on Rich v. Schwab
(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 803 (Rich). In Rich, the Court of Appeal concluded that section
1942.5, which codifies the common law doctrine prohibiting retaliatory eviction, is not
limited to lease agreements pertaining to the rental of dwellings. (Rich, at pp. 810-811.)
It reached this conclusion by purportedly examining section 1942.5 “in the context of the
entire statutory scheme” and concluding that section 1942.5 grants a right of action to any
lessee without limitation. (Rich, at p. 812.) Rich has not been widely cited for this
proposition, and we have discovered no published authorities that have examined the
reasoning of its conclusion in the quarter century that has passed since its publication.8
Upon examination of the issue, we respectfully disagree with the conclusion
reached in Rich. Sections 1942.5 and 1953 both appear in Chapter 2 of Division 3 of the
Civil Code pertaining to the hiring of real property. (§§ 1942.5, 1953.) However, the
Legislature expressly provided for the scope of Chapter 2’s application in section 1940,
which unambiguously provides that “this chapter shall apply to all persons who hire
dwelling units located within this state.” (§ 1940, subd. (a), italics added.) Section 1940
goes on to provide that “ ‘[d]welling unit’ means a structure or the part of a structure that
is used as a home, residence, or sleeping place by one person who maintains a household
or by two or more persons who maintain a common household.’ ” (§ 1940, subd. (c).)
8 Banuelos v. LA Investment, LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 323 cites to Rich for
this proposition but did not examine or independently evaluate the strength of the
reasoning set forth in Rich. (Banuelos, at p. 330.)
13
The opinion in Rich did not address the Legislature’s express provision stating that the
statutes at issue apply to “persons who hire dwelling units,” and it did not acknowledge
the Legislature’s express definition of “dwelling unit” for purposes of these statutes.
Our Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that statutory interpretation should
“ ‘begin by examining the statute’s words “ ‘because they generally provide the most
reliable indicator of legislative intent,’ ” ’ ” and “ ‘ “[i]f the statutory language is clear
and unambiguous our inquiry ends.” ’ ” (Lopez v. Sony Electronics, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th
627, 634; Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1164, 1190.)
“ ‘ “ “ ‘If the language is clear, [we] must generally follow its plain meaning unless a
literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not
intend.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (Brown v. City of Inglewood (2025) 18 Cal.5th 33, 40.) Here, section
1940 makes clear that the statutory scheme of which section 1953 is a part applies
expressly to persons who hire dwelling units. Nor does interpreting the clear language of
the statute in this manner produce an absurd result,9 such that we should depart from the
clear language of the statute. Thus, we conclude that section 1953 does not render the
arbitration provisions invalid as against public policy.
9 We observe that the Legislature has expressly enacted an entirely different
statutory scheme to regulate the landlord tenant relationships in the context of
mobilehome parks. As this court explained in Greening v. Johnson (1997)
53 Cal.App.4th 1223, “the Legislature enacted the Mobilehome Residency Law . . . ,
which extensively regulates the landlord-tenant relationship between mobilehome park
owners and residents . . . . ‘[I]t is apparent that the Legislature intended to make it very
clear that mobile home tenancies are different from the ordinary tenancy and that
landlord-tenant relations involving mobile homes are to be treated differently . . . .’ ” (Id.
at p. 1226.) It is not absurd for the Legislature to provide different statutory schemes to
govern the different types of leases.
14
Unlike section 1953, section 798.87 clearly applies to the parties in the case. The
statute is part of the Mobilehome Residency Law ((MRL); § 798 et seq.) and provides in
pertinent part: “[t]he substantial failure of the management to provide and maintain
physical improvements in the common facilities in good working order and condition
shall be deemed a public nuisance. . . . [T]his nuisance may only be remedied by a civil
action or abatement.” (§ 798.87, subd. (a).) However, on its face, section 798.87 applies
only to claims seeking to remedy an ongoing nuisance. And as applicable here, nuisance
is only one of nine separate causes of action alleged in the operative complaint. The
California Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that in such circumstances, “when a
suit contains both arbitrable and inarbitrable claims, the arbitrable claims should be
severed from those that are inarbitrable and sent to arbitration.” (Broughton v. Cigna
Healthplans (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1066, 1088; McGill v. Citibank, N.A. (2017) 2 Cal.5th
945, 966.) Our high court has further advised that courts should apply this same principle
even where there are “not . . . distinct arbitrable and inarbitrable claims, but . . . arbitrable
and inarbitrable remedies derived from the same statutory claim.” (Broughton, at
p. 1088.)
Thus, while section 798.87, subdivision (a), precludes arbitration of the Group 1
Plaintiffs’ claim seeking an order of abatement for public nuisance, the statute does not
operate to invalidate the entire arbitration agreement between the parties. To the extent
any claim for public nuisance is inarbitrable, the trial court was required instead to
“ ‘sever the cause of action, order the arbitrable portion to arbitration, and stay the
inarbitrable portion pending the completion of arbitration.’ ” (Vaughn v. Tesla, Inc.
15
(2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 208, 226; Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4.) The trial court erred to the
extent that it concluded section 798.87 rendered the entire arbitration agreement void as
against public policy and unenforceable.
4. The Error Requires Remand for Further Proceedings
Because the trial court determined that the arbitration agreements involving Group
1 Plaintiffs were void as against public policy, it never reached other issues relevant to
whether arbitration should be ordered against the Group 1 Plaintiffs.
The trial court did not consider or make factual findings related to the Group 1
Plaintiffs’ unconscionability arguments. (Gurganus v. IGS Solutions LLC (2025)
115 Cal.App.5th 327, 334 [On the issue of unconscionability, “[w]e review the [trial]
court’s findings of disputed facts for substantial evidence and its finding of
unconscionability based on those facts de novo.”].) Similarly, even if found
unconscionable, the trial court has discretion to determine whether severance is an
appropriate remedy. (Alberto v. Cambrian Homecare (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 482, 495
[“Unlike our de novo review of [unconscionability], the decision on whether to sever
unconscionable terms from an agreement ‘ “is reviewed for abuse of discretion
. . . .” ’ ”].) Finally, even if the trial court concludes that some of the claims asserted by
the Group 1 Plaintiffs are subject to arbitration, the trial court has discretion to refuse to
order the matter to arbitration under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, subdivision
16
(c),10 in light of our conclusion that the order denying arbitration against some plaintiffs
should be affirmed. (Nixon v. AmeriHome Mortgage Co., LLC (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th
934, 952 [A trial court’s choice of remedies under the third-party litigation exception is
reviewed for abuse of discretion.].)
The appellate record is not sufficiently developed as to any of these issues, and we
decline to resolve any of these issues in the first instance on appeal. Instead, we believe
the appropriate remedy is to remand the matter for further proceedings in order to permit
the trial court to make factual findings and exercise its discretion in the first instance.
D. Denial of Arbitration for “Group 2” Plaintiffs
With respect to 11 plaintiffs (Group 2 Plaintiffs), the trial court also denied the
motion to compel arbitration on the ground that their arbitration agreements were void as
against public policy.11 We conclude the trial court erred in denying the motion to
compel arbitration with respect to the Group 2 Plaintiffs on this ground.
10 Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 provides in pertinent part: “[T]he court
shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines
that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: . . . (c) A
party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special
proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related
transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or
fact.” (Ibid.) Under such circumstances, the trial court “(1) may refuse to enforce the
arbitration agreement and may order intervention or joinder of all parties in a single
action . . . ; (2) may order intervention or joinder as to all or only certain issues . . . ; (3)
may order arbitration among the parties who have agreed to arbitration and stay the
pending court action . . . ; or (4) may stay arbitration pending the outcome of the court
action . . . .” (Ibid.)
11 Our reference to the Group 2 Plaintiffs pertains only to Hector Acevedo,
Elizabeth Maynez, Eilene Hamann, Maurice Hamann, Helen Terri Mason, Frederick
[footnote continued on next page]
17
1. Additional Background
In support of the motions to compel arbitration, defendant again submitted a
declaration by Aric Resnicke. This time, Resnicke declared he was an authorized agent
of the defendant and was familiar with defendant’s mobilehome park operations and
management. Resnicke declared that individual mobilehomes in the Park are owned by
the individual residents and, thereafter, residents enter into a lease agreement for the
space upon which the mobilehome sits. Resnicke made general assertions regarding the
manner in which prospective purchasers and tenants entered into transactions with
defendant, without specific reference to any specific plaintiff Finally, Resnick explained
that (1) the cost of utilities such as electricity and gas were included in the rent; (2) the
rates for these utilities are set by the Public Utilities Commission; (3) electricity is
provided by Southern California Edison; and (4) natural gas is provided by Southern
California Gas Company.
The declaration was also accompanied by lease agreements pertaining to each of
the Group 2 Plaintiffs. The attached lease agreements took different forms, but all
contained arbitration provisions. The arbitration agreements included the following
provisions:
Altenburg, Shara Altenburg, Christina L. Morreale, Mirna Suppenbach, Brian Lintz, and
Judith Soares. Defendant initially included six additional plaintiffs in the same motion
with the Group 2 Plaintiffs. However, the trial court concluded that defendant had failed
to produce arbitration agreements for these six additional plaintiffs. And we affirm the
order denying arbitration as to these six plaintiffs as already discussed earlier in this
opinion in Part III(B).
18
(1) any disputes will be submitted to binding arbitration conducted under the
provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 1280 et. seq.;
(2) claims for injunctive relief, including pursuant to section 798.87, are not
subject to arbitration;
(3) claims brought outside of a one-year limitations period are deemed waived;
(4) parties in arbitration are entitled to full and complete discovery;
(5) parties in arbitration are entitled to all procedural protections they would
otherwise be entitled to in superior court;
(6) each party to arbitration was required to deposit one-half of the estimated
arbitration costs prior to arbitration and the failure to do so would result in the
forfeiture of the right to defend or prosecute a claim;
(7) the prevailing party is entitled to attorneys fees associated with compelling
arbitration, abating any actions during arbitration, confirming arbitration awards,
and to the extent specifically required by statute;
(8) costs will generally be borne by each party separately; and
(9) acceptance of the agreement to arbitrate is voluntary.
The trial court concluded that, as to the Group 2 Plaintiffs, defendant had failed to
establish that the FAA preempted California law with respect to the applicable arbitration
agreements. Similar to the Group 1 Plaintiffs, the trial court concluded that under
California law, the arbitration agreements were void as against public policy because they
violated sections 1953 and 798.87.
19
2. Defendant Failed To Establish FAA Preemption
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by concluding that the FAA did
not apply to the arbitration agreements involving the Group 2 Plaintiffs. We disagree.
As with the agreements pertaining to the Group 1 Plaintiffs, none of the arbitration
agreements pertaining to the Group 2 Plaintiffs expressly provided for the application of
the FAA. Thus, in order to meet its burden to show FAA preemption, it was incumbent
upon defendant to submit declarations or other evidence to establish the requisite
connection to interstate commerce. (Victrola 89, LLC, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 355.)
The trial court expressly found that defendant had failed to make this evidentiary
showing, and “ ‘ “when the trier of fact has expressly . . . concluded the party with the
burden of proof did not carry the burden and that party appeals, . . . ‘ “the question for a
reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the
appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the
appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such
character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was
insufficient to support a finding.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (Kinder v. Capistrano Beach Care Center,
LLC (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 804, 811; West v. Solar Mosaic LLC (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th
985, 993.)
In this case, the only evidence proffered by defendant to suggest that the Group 2
Plaintiffs’ leases involve interstate commerce was the Resnicke declaration. On appeal,
defendant contends this was sufficient because it showed that defendant charged
plaintiffs for utilities such as electricity and gas. While the provision of utilities can in
20
some cases implicate interstate commerce,12 the Resnicke declaration stated only that
payment for utilities was collected by defendant as part of the rent. The declaration made
clear that defendant did not set the rates to be collected for any utilities and did not
actually provide any utilities. Nor did the declaration offer any additional facts to explain
how defendant’s collection of rent could impact a channel or instrumentality of interstate
commerce or otherwise have a substantial relationship to interstate commerce.
(Carbajal, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 240-241.) In our view, this was simply not
evidence of such character and weight as to compel a finding in defendant’s favor on this
issue. As such, there is no basis to conclude the trial court erred in its factual finding
regarding FAA preemption.13
12 As recognized by the United States Supreme Court: “It is only in Hawaii and
Alaska and on the ‘Texas Interconnect’—which covers most of that State—that
electricity is distributed entirely within a single State. In the rest of the country, any
electricity that enters the grid immediately becomes a part of a vast pool of energy that is
constantly moving in interstate commerce.” (New York v. FERC (2002) 535 U.S. 1, 7.)
“ ‘[E]nergy flowing onto a power network or grid energizes the entire grid, and
consumers then draw undifferentiated energy from that grid.’ . . . As a result, . . . any
activity on the interstate grid affects the rest of the grid.” (Id. at p. 7, fn. 5, italics
omitted; see Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Public Utilities Com. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th
1303, 1310.)
13 Defendant also briefly argues that the requisite connection to interstate
commerce exists because defendant is engaged in business transactions that involve out
of state entities or persons. However, the arbitration agreements at issue in this case are
part of the leases between plaintiffs and defendant. There are no out of state entities
listed as parties to the lease transaction. Thus, there is no basis to conclude that the
specific transaction subject of the arbitration agreement implicates these other entities or
persons or other aspects of defendant’s business unrelated to the leases at issue here.
21
3. The Agreements Were Not Void as against Public Policy
Similar to the motion to compel arbitration against the Group 1 Plaintiffs, the trial
court denied the motion to compel arbitration against the Group 2 Plaintiffs on the ground
that the arbitration agreements were unenforceable as against public policy in violation of
sections 1953 and 798.87. However, as we explained in part III(C)(3) of this opinion,
that conclusion was erroneous because section 1953 does not apply and section 798.87
cannot be relied upon to conclude that the entire arbitration agreement is void as against
public policy. The same reasoning applies here and requires reversal of the trial court’s
order denying arbitration as to the Group 2 Plaintiffs.
As with the Group 1 Plaintiffs, the trial court never reached the issue of
unconscionability, severance of claims pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
1281.4, and the potential third-party exception to enforcement of arbitration set forth in
Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2. Accordingly, the appropriate remedy is to
remand the matter for further proceedings to permit the trial court to make factual
findings and exercise its discretion in the first instance on these issues as to the Group 2
Plaintiffs.
E. Denial of Arbitration for the “Group 3” Plaintiffs
With respect to seven plaintiffs (Group 3 Plaintiffs),14 the trial court concluded
that their arbitration agreements were subject to the FAA but denied arbitration on the
14 Specifically, the Group 3 Plaintiffs include Beverly Wilkins, Edmund Dieter
Giese, Oshrit Appelboim Giese, Esperanza Stewart, Michael Stewart, Jamie Urrutia, and
Leyda Urrutia.
22
ground that the agreements were permeated with unconscionable provisions such that it
could not cure any unfair provisions by severing them from the agreements. We
conclude the trial court erred because the agreements actually at issue did not contain any
unfair provisions to support a finding of unconscionability.
1. Additional Background
In support of the motion to compel arbitration, defendant submitted the lease
agreements pertaining to each of the Group 3 Plaintiffs. The attached lease agreements
took different forms but all contained arbitration provisions. The arbitration agreements
included the following provisions:
(1) “Arbitration applies to all claims for personal or bodily injury; and, claims for
property damage and any claimed loss or expense whatsoever”;
(2) “Arbitration shall be under the Federal Arbitration Act”;
(3) “State laws shall not apply”;
(4) The “Arbitrator shall determine costs based on ability to pay”;
(5) “No party shall recover their attorney’s fees in arbitration”;
(6) “Discovery permitted as per federal law”; and
(7) “[P]unitive damages are allowed up to ten percent of compensatory damages if
any.”
The trial court found that the FAA applied to these arbitration agreements based
upon the express provisions of the agreements. However, it denied arbitration on the
ground that the agreements were unconscionable. The trial court found procedural
unfairness based upon the economic imbalance of power between the parties and the
23
adhesive nature of the agreements. It also found substantively unfair provisions
“including limiting statutory remedies”; “not allowing the recovery of attorney’s fees that
might otherwise be permitted”; and the fact that “the agreement states that the arbitrator
determines who pays costs.” The trial court also stated in a conclusory manner that it
was unable to sever any unconscionable terms of the agreements.
2. The Agreements Were Not Unconscionable
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding arbitration agreements
applicable to the Group 3 Plaintiffs unconscionable. We agree.
“ ‘The general principles of unconscionability are well established.’ ” (Fuentes v.
Empire Nissan, Inc. (2026) 19 Cal.5th 93, 102.) Unconscionability includes both
“ ‘procedural and substantive elements.’ ” “The procedural element concerns ‘the
circumstances of contract negotiation and formation,’ particularly ‘oppression or surprise
due to unequal bargaining power.’ [Citation.] The substantive element . . . concerns ‘the
fairness of an agreement’s actual terms,’ i.e., whether those terms ‘are overly harsh or
one-sided.’ ” (Id. at p. 103.) “ ‘Both procedural and substantive elements must be
present to conclude a term is unconscionable, but these required elements need not be
present to the same degree.’ [Citations.] Courts ‘apply a sliding scale analysis under
which “the more substantively oppressive [a] term, the less evidence of procedural
unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable,
and vis versa.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
Here, we need not address the parties’ arguments regarding the procedural element
of unconscionability. Even assuming that the procedural element has been met, none of
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the terms cited by the trial court are unfair or one-sided to meet the substantive element
of unconscionability. (Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 899, 915
[“ ‘[A] finding of procedural unconscionability does not mean that a contract will not be
enforced, but rather that courts will scrutinize the substantive terms of the contract to
ensure they are not manifestly unfair or one-sided.’ ”].) The proper interpretation of the
terms of a written arbitration agreement is an issue of law we review de novo. (Nixon v.
AmeriHome Mortgage Co., LLC (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 934, 946.) As we explain, the
trial court misconstrued the scope of various provisions in the arbitration agreements in
concluding that the provisions were unfair or one-sided.
Here, the plain language of the agreements specifically provide that only claims of
bodily injury, property damage, and claimed losses and expenses are subject to
arbitration. Thus, the arbitration agreements do not apply to claims seeking nonmonetary
relief such as orders of abatement, injunctive relief, or specific performance of any
statutory or regulatory obligations. Notably, plaintiffs identify only the right to recover
attorneys fees and punitive damages pursuant to sections 798.85 and 798.86 as the
statutory remedies improperly limited. However, the right to recover these statutory
remedies is based upon actions authorized under the MRL (§§ 798.85, 798.86), and the
actions authorized under the MRL are actions for an order of abatement (§ 798.87) and
injunctive relief to enforce a rule or regulation (§ 798.88). Since neither claim is subject
to arbitration under the plain wording of the agreements, the agreements cannot be
construed as improperly limiting any statutory remedies that the Group 3 Plaintiffs might
be entitled to recover pursuant to such claims. Given the clear language of the arbitration
25
agreements, the trial court erred in concluding that the agreements unfairly limited any
statutory remedies or attorney’s fees.
The only other basis relied upon by the trial court to find substantive unfairness in
the arbitration agreements was the provision stating that “the arbitrator determines who
pays costs,” which the trial court construed as subjecting indigent plaintiffs to pay unduly
harsh arbitration fees. However, the provision at issue actually states that the arbitrator
“shall determine costs based on ability to pay.” (Italics added.) It is unclear why the trial
court ignored the second clause of this sentence. Regardless, a plain reading of the
provision in context clearly limits any arbitration fees based upon a party’s ability to pay.
As such, there is no basis to conclude that the cost provision requires any party to pay
more than that party can afford, and the arbitration agreements cannot be deemed unduly
harsh on this basis.
Absent any terms which are actually unfair, unduly harsh, or one-sided, there is no
basis to conclude that the substantive element of unconscionability has been met in this
case. And, if the substantive element is not met, it is error to refuse enforcement of the
arbitration agreements as unconscionable. (Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016)
62 Cal.4th 1237, 1243 [“ ‘ “[P]rocedural and substantive unconscionability] must both be
present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or
clause under the doctrine of unconscionability.” ’ ”].) Thus, we conclude the trial court
erred in denying the motion to compel arbitration as to the Group 3 Plaintiffs on this
ground.
26
Despite our conclusion that the trial court erred by denying arbitration as to the
Group 3 Plaintiffs on the ground of unconscionability, remand for further proceedings is
necessary. As with the Group 1 Plaintiffs and Group 2 Plaintiffs, the trial court never
reached the issue of the severance of claims not subject to the arbitration; stay of
proceedings for claims that rely on the same resolution of factual disputes; and the
potential third-party exception to enforcement of arbitration. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§§ 1281.2, 1281.4.) Accordingly, the appropriate remedy is to remand the matter for
further proceedings to permit the trial court to exercise its discretion in the first instance
on these issues.
F. Plaintiffs Diane Aguilar and Edward De La Cruz15
1. Additional Background
In support of its motion to compel arbitration against Diane Aguilar and Edward
De La Cruz, defendant submitted a declaration by Aric Resnicke. The declaration
contained the same substantive facts asserted in support of defendant’s motion to compel
arbitration as to Group 2 Plaintiffs. Defendant also submitted a signed arbitration
agreement that included the following provisions:
15 Apparently, ignoring the trial court’s prior admonition to bring separate
motions to compel arbitration with respect to each type of arbitration agreement at issue,
defendant filed a single “Motion to Compel Arbitration of Group 4 Plaintiffs,” while
admitting that each of the plaintiffs actually named in this motion needed to be addressed
separately because the terms of their respective arbitration agreements “are not
sufficiently similar to warrant a collective adjudication for all . . . plaintiffs.” The
plaintiffs named in this motion have little in common, and it is unclear why defendant
chose to group them all together in a single motion. As such, we are required to
separately address each of the plaintiffs identified in this motion.
27
(1) any disputes will be submitted to mediation, then reference, then arbitration
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1280 et. seq.;
(2) disputes involving injunctive relief are specifically excluded from arbitration;
(3) “failure to make any deposit [of arbitration costs] when demanded is not a
forfeiture of prosecution or defense”;
(4) the alternate dispute resolution shall not be construed to waive any right to a
“ ‘civil action’ under Civil Code § 798.87”; and
(5) acceptance of the alternate dispute provision is optional.
The agreement contained no provisions pertaining to discovery, procedures of
arbitration, or award of costs and attorneys fees. The trial court denied the motion as to
these plaintiffs as void against public policy based upon the same reasoning it relied upon
to deny arbitration with respect to the Group 1 Plaintiffs and the Group 2 Plaintiffs.
2. Application
With respect to Diane Aguilar and Edward De La Cruz, defendant’s showing
regarding the application of the FAA was identical to that proffered in support of its
motion to compel arbitration as to the Group 1 Plaintiffs and the Group 2 Plaintiffs.
Thus, for the reasons set forth in part III(C)(2) of this opinion, we conclude the trial court
did not err when it found the FAA did not apply.
As with the Group 2 Plaintiffs, we conclude that the trial court erred by relying on
sections 1953 and 798.87 to conclude that the entire arbitration agreement was void as
against public policy. The reasoning set forth in part III(C)(3) of this opinion equally
applies here. In fact, the agreement specific to Diane Aguilar and Edward De La Cruz
28
explicitly exempts from arbitration claims for injunctive relief and claims brought
pursuant to section 798.87. Thus, even though we held that section 798.87 applies to the
parties in this case, that statute cannot render the arbitration agreement pertaining to
Diane Aguilar and Edward De La Cruz void as against public policy because the
arbitration agreement specific to these plaintiffs expressly exempts any such claims from
arbitration.
As with the Group 1 Plaintiffs and the Group 2 Plaintiffs, the trial court never
reached the issue of severance of claims not subject to the arbitration; stay of proceedings
for claims that rely on the same resolution of factual disputes; and the potential third-
party exception to enforcement of arbitration. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1281.2, 1281.4.)
Accordingly, the appropriate remedy is to remand the matter for further proceedings to
permit the trial court to make factual findings and exercise its discretion in the first
instance on these issues as to Diane Aguilar and Edward De La Cruz.
G. Plaintiffs James Snodgrass and Eura Johnson
1. Additional Background
In support of its motion to compel arbitration against James Snodgrass and Eura
Johnson, defendant submitted a declaration by Aric Resnicke. The declaration contained
the same substantive facts asserted in support of defendant’s motion to compel arbitration
as to the Group 2 Plaintiffs. Defendant also submitted a signed arbitration agreement that
included the following provisions:
(1) “[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or related to this agreement” will be
submitted to arbitration;
29
(2) claims for injunctive relief are exempt from arbitration;
(3) the mobilehome park owner will advance all arbitration fees but is entitled to
recover the fees as costs if it is ultimately deemed the prevailing party;
(4) the prevailing party in arbitration is entitled to an award of costs and attorneys
fees pursuant to statute; and
(5) acceptance of the arbitration agreement is voluntary.
The agreement contained no provisions pertaining to discovery or the procedures
for conducting arbitration. The trial court denied the motion as to these plaintiffs on the
same ground that it denied the motions with respect to the Group 1 Plaintiffs and the
Group 2 Plaintiffs.
2. Application
With respect to James Snodgrass and Eura Johnson, defendant’s showing
regarding the application of the FAA was identical to that proffered in support of its
motion to compel arbitration as to the Group 1 Plaintiffs and the Group 2 Plaintiffs.
Thus, for the reasons set forth in part III(C)(2) of this opinion, we conclude the trial court
did not err when it found the FAA did not apply.
As with the Group 2 Plaintiffs, we conclude that the trial court erred by relying on
sections 1953 and 798.87 to conclude that arbitration agreements were void in their
entirety and unenforceable as against public policy. The reasoning set forth in part
III(C)(3) of this opinion equally applies here.
As with the Group 1 Plaintiffs and the Group 2 Plaintiffs, the trial court never
reached the issue of severance of claims not subject to the arbitration; stay of proceedings
30
for claims that rely on the same resolution of factual disputes; and the potential third-
party exception to enforcement of arbitration. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1281.2, 1281.4.)
Accordingly, the appropriate remedy is to remand the matter for further proceedings to
permit the trial court to make factual findings and exercise its discretion in the first
instance on these issues as to James Snodgrass and Eura Johnson.
H. Plaintiff James Lineberger16
1. Additional Background
In support of its motion to compel arbitration against James Lineberger, defendant
submitted a declaration by Aric Resnicke. The declaration contained the same
substantive facts asserted in support of defendant’s motion to compel arbitration as to the
Group 2 Plaintiffs. Defendant also submitted a signed arbitration agreement that
included the following provisions:
(1) “all ‘qualified disputes’ will be arbitrated”;
(2) “qualified disputes” include disputes respecting common area maintenance,
repair, renovation operation, utilities and compliance with laws or regulations;
(3) “[t]his agreement is governed by the [FAA], not state law”;
(4) the arbiter “shall split advance costs between the parties equitably so as not to
cost lessee more than comparable court litigation”;
(5) the prevailing party is entitled to costs;
(6) no attorneys fees are to be awarded to either side;
16 At one point in its written ruling, the trial court appears to have mistakenly
referred to this plaintiff as “John Lineberger.”
31
(7) the arbiter may order specific relief, injunctive relief, and “punitive damages
per applicable law”;
(8) “[d]iscovery is permitted as allowed by the arbiter for good cause and . . .
under applicable federal rules”; and
(9) acceptance of the arbitration agreement is voluntary.
In opposition to the motion to compel arbitration, several declarations were
submitted by other named plaintiffs. However, there was no declaration submitted by
James Lineberger.17 The trial court denied arbitration as to James Lineberger on the
ground that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable “as with the Group 3
Plaintiffs” because it required cost sharing, prohibited the recovery of attorney’s fees, and
limited discovery only for good cause as determined by the arbiter.
2. Application
Here, we conclude the trial court erred in finding the arbitration agreement
pertaining to James Lineberger unconscionable. However, unlike the unconscionability
analysis pertaining to the Group 3 Plaintiffs, we conclude that the record does not support
the procedural element necessary to find the arbitration agreement unconscionable. The
record shows that there was no declaration by James Lineberger submitted in opposition
to defendant’s motion. Thus, the issue of whether the circumstances surrounding James
Lineberger’s execution of an arbitration agreement is subject to our de novo review, as
17 Counsel for plaintiffs purported to attach a declaration by James Lineberger in
opposition to the motion to compel. However, an examination of the record indicates that
counsel actually attached a second declaration executed by James Snodgrass instead of
the purported declaration by James Lineberger.
32
there is no conflicting evidence to review. (Jenkins v. Dermatology Management, LLC
(2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 633, 641 (Jenkins) [The trial court’s rulings on procedural and
substantive unconscionability are subject to de novo review [when] they are based on
undisputed facts.].) Absent a declaration, there was no basis upon which the trial court
could weigh the relative bargaining power of the parties or ascertain the circumstances
under which James Lineberger executed the arbitration agreement submitted by
defendant.18 Nor can we reasonably infer that the circumstances surrounding James
Lineberger’s execution of an arbitration agreement were similar to any of the
circumstances attested to by other plaintiffs in opposition to defendant’s motions, as the
agreement purportedly pertaining to James Lineberger was uniquely different from any of
the other arbitration agreements submitted in this matter.
The party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving unconscionability.
(Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 247.) Thus, James Lineberger
has not met his burden to show unconscionability where no evidence is submitted to
explain any of the circumstances surrounding his execution of the arbitration agreement
at issue. Because there was no evidence to support the procedural element necessary to
find the arbitration agreement unconscionable, we need not discuss the parties’ arguments
18 Plaintiff Carol Lineberger submitted a declaration in opposition to the motion
to compel arbitration but claimed that she never executed the arbitration agreement
produced by defendant. Thus, her declaration offered no insight into the circumstances
under which James Lineberger may have reviewed or executed the arbitration agreement
at issue.
33
with respect to the substantive element of unconscionability as to James Lineberger’s
arbitration agreement. (Jenkins, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 641.)
Despite our conclusion that the trial court erred by denying arbitration as to James
Lineberger on the ground of unconscionability, remand for further proceedings is
necessary. As with the Group 3 Plaintiffs, the trial court never reached the issue of
severance of claims not subject to the arbitration agreement; stay of proceedings for
claims that rely on the same resolution of factual disputes; and the potential third-party
exception to enforcement of arbitration. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1281.2, 1281.4.)
Accordingly, the appropriate remedy is to remand the matter for further proceedings to
permit the trial court to exercise its discretion in the first instance on these issues.
IV. DISPOSITION
With respect to plaintiffs Constance Prisco, Genevieve Diaz, Debbie Odoardi,
Regina R. Thompson, Teresa Cassidy Darmody, Timothy Darmody, George Eckmann or
Carol Lineberger, the order denying arbitration is affirmed.
With respect to plaintiffs Brenda Harris, Joanne Clark, Joyce Miller, John Wagner,
Patsy Shewach, Teresa Boneau-Montes, Joseph Maselli, Jr., Rosalinda Stuart, Daniel
Pospisil, Traci Pospisil, Janet Womack, Patricia Huerta, Hector Acevedo, Elizabeth
Maynez, Eilene Hamann, Maurice Hamann, Helen Terri Mason, Frederick Altenburg,
Shara Altenburg, Christina L. Morreale, Mirna Suppenbach, Brian Lintz and Judith
Soares, Diane Aguilar, Edward De La Cruz, James Snodgrass and Eura Johnson, the
order denying arbitration is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.
As to these plaintiffs, the trial court is directed on remand to hold a hearing and
34
determine: (1) whether the arbitration agreements pertaining to these specific plaintiffs
are unenforceable under the doctrine of unconscionability; (2) whether any purported
unconscionability can be cured by severance of specific provisions of the arbitration
agreements pertaining to these specific plaintiffs; (3) whether any specific claims are not
arbitrable on public policy grounds other than those this court has determined are not
applicable; (4) whether, in the exercise of its discretion, the trial court should sever and
stay any claims that are not covered under the arbitration agreements specific to these
plaintiffs pending arbitration; and (5) whether, in the exercise of its discretion, the third-
party exception to arbitration as set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2
should apply to these plaintiffs.
With respect to plaintiffs Beverly Wilkins, Edmund Dieter Giese, Oshrit
Appelboim Giese, Esperanza Stewart, Michael Stewart, Jamie Urrutia, Leyda Urrutia and
James Lineberger the order denying arbitration is reversed, and the matter is remanded
for further proceedings. As to these plaintiffs, the trial court is directed on remand to
hold a hearing to determine: (1) whether specific claims alleged in the complaint are or
are not subject arbitration under the plain terms of the agreements pertaining to these
specific plaintiffs; (2) whether, in the exercise of its discretion, any claim not subject to
arbitration should be severed and trial court proceedings stayed pending resolution of
arbitrable claims specific to these plaintiffs; and (3) whether, in the exercise of its
discretion, the third-party exception to arbitration as set forth in Code of Civil Procedure
section 1281.2 should apply to these plaintiffs.
35
Plaintiffs Constance Prisco, Genevieve Diaz, Debbie Odoardi, Regina R.
Thompson, Teresa Cassidy Darmody, Timothy Darmody, George Eckmann or Carol
Lineberger are awarded their costs on appeal. All other parties are to bear their own costs
on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS
J.
We concur:
CODRINGTON
Acting P. J.
LEE
J.
36