Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

Ace American Insurance Co. v. Superior Court CA4/2

Filed 11/6/26 Ace American Insurance Co. v. Superior Court CA4/2
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 11/6/26 Ace American Insurance Co. v. Superior Court CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, E088415
Petitioner,
(Super.Ct.No. CIVSB2200819)
v.
OPINION
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN
BERNARDINO COUNTY,
Respondent;

MICHELLE GOUIN,
Real Party in Interest.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate. Winston Keh, Judge.

Petition granted.

Clyde & Co US, Lindsay J. Bowman, Shain Wasser, and Yvonne M. Schulte for

Petitioner.

No response by Respondent.

Shernoff Bidart Echeverria, Ricardo Echeverria, Reid Ehrlich; Jeffrey E. Estes and

Associates, And Jeffrey E. Estes for Real Party in Interest.

1
Defendant Ace American Insurance Co. (Ace) filed a petition for writ of mandate

seeking review of an order denying its motion for summary judgment. We grant the

petition.

BACKGROUND

I. The car rental and collision

On February 2, 2016, Theresa Kendall rented a car in California from Avis Rent-

a-Car System LLC. The parent company of Avis Rent-a-Car System LLC is Avis Budget

Car Rental LLC. We refer to the entities collectively as Avis.

As part of the rental, Kendall selected optional insurance coverage from Avis

through its additional liability insurance program. Ace provided the additional liability

coverage. Kendall drove the rental car while under the influence of alcohol and was

involved in a collision with Michael Gouin, causing his death. In November 2016,

Kendall was convicted of vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated.

II. The wrongful death action

In April 2016, Michael’s parents filed a wrongful death action against Kendall and

Avis.1 In 2020, Michael’s mother (his father had passed away) secured a default

judgment against Kendall in the amount of approximately $1.9 million. Michael’s

1 We refer to the Gouins by their first names to avoid confusion. No disrespect is
intended.

2
mother subsequently assigned her rights in the judgment to Michael’s sister, Michelle

Gouin. Kendall assigned her rights against Ace and Avis to Michelle.2

III. The insurance coverage action

A. The operative pleading

In 2022, Michelle filed suit against Ace and Avis. The first amended complaint

contained five causes of action: (1) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing (as assignee and judgment creditor), (2) breach of contract (as assignee and

judgment creditor), and (3) recovery of a judgment under Insurance Code section 11580.

The causes of action against Ace are predicated on the allegation that “the ACE Policy

provided primary automobile liability insurance to Kendall.”

B. The parties’ cross-motions for summary adjudication

Ace moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication on

the grounds that the Ace policy contains an intoxication exclusion and such an exclusion

is valid in an excess insurance policy (i.e., a policy that provides coverage for damages

that exceed the legally required minimum coverage). Michelle filed a cross-motion for

summary adjudication as to Ace’s affirmative defense that the intoxication exclusion

contained in the Ace policy was enforceable. She argued that the exclusion was

2 In the captions and bodies of the first amended complaint and other filings by both
parties in the superior court and in this court, Michelle’s name is spelled “Michelle.” In
the agreement in which Kendall assigned her rights to Michelle, Michelle signed the
document as “Michele.” We refer to petitioner as Michelle to conform to the spelling
used by all sides throughout the proceedings, including in Michelle’s own operative
pleading.
3
unenforceable because the Ace policy operated as a primary policy and not an excess

policy.

C. The rental agreement

It is undisputed that Kendall cannot recall the exact version of the rental

agreement that Avis gave to her, and she did not retain the agreement. In the first

amended complaint, Michelle alleged that the rental agreement containing the terms and

conditions that governed Kendall’s rental was the version that Ace had attached to its

answer to the original complaint. Ace alleged in its answer that the terms of the Ace

policy issued to Kendall “are governed by the Rental Agreement Jacket” that it attached

to the answer. For purposes of its summary judgment motion, Ace assumed that Kendall

had been provided that version of the rental agreement.3 For simplicity, all further

references to the “rental agreement” are to the version attached to Ace’s answer to the

original complaint.

Paragraph 22 of the rental agreement is entitled “Liability Protection” and

provides: “With respect to rentals commencing in California, this agreement does not

afford you or any other driver of the car any insurance or protection against liability.”

(Boldface & underlining omitted.) The next paragraph is entitled “Additional Liability

3 In its opposition to Michelle’s motion for summary adjudication, Ace submitted a
different version of Avis’s rental agreement, which Ace stated that Michelle produced in
response to a request for production of documents as the rental agreement that governed
Kendall’s rental. Michelle does not deny that she produced that version of the rental
agreement, but she contends that her production of that document is irrelevant because
Ace admitted in its answer that the other version of the rental agreement was the one
actually provided to Kendall. The terms of the rental agreement that Michelle produced
in discovery are more favorable to Ace’s claim that its policy is an excess policy.
4
Insurance (ALI) & Exclusions” and provides: “If you elect to purchase ALI, coverage

will be provided to you and any authorized driver under an excess automobile policy

issued to Avis. ALI provides protection for third party automobile claims for the

difference between the minimum financial responsibility limits provided under paragraph

22 above and a maximum combined single limit of liability of $1,000,000 or $2,000,000

of liability depending on the jurisdiction of rental for bodily injury, death, or property

damage for each accident. This coverage is provided under a policy of excess liability

insurance more fully described in the available brochure and is subject to all of the

conditions and limitations described in paragraph 22 above, except that notwithstanding

anything contained in this agreement, the terms of the policy will at all times control.

ALI does not apply to bodily injury or property damage arising out of any ‘prohibited use

of the car’ as described in paragraph 14 of this rental agreement, all of which are

exclusions to ALI.”

Paragraph 14 of the rental agreement sets forth numerous prohibited uses of the

car and states: “A violation of this paragraph, will automatically terminate your rental

and is an exclusion to and voids all liability protection and any optional products services

that you have accepted, including but not limited to additional liability insurance ....”

(Capitalization & boldfacing omitted.) The prohibited uses of the car include driving it

“while the driver is under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance” and using

the car “for conduct that could properly be charged as a felony or misdemeanor.”

5
D. The Ace policy

The Ace policy that Kendall purchased as additional liability insurance was

effective between January 1, 2016, and July 1, 2016. The policy incorporates the

coverage exclusions contained in the rental agreement.

The declarations page of the Ace policy states that the policy is an “Excess Rental

Liability Policy.” (Boldfacing omitted; all further quoted language from the Ace policy

omits any boldfacing included in the policy.) The named insured in Item 1 of the

declarations page is Avis, with the following individuals also identified as insureds:

“[T]hose persons renting an Automobile from the Named Insured who have agreed in

writing to accept Liability Insurance Supplement for an additional daily charge as shown

in the Rental Agreement.” Item 5 of the declarations page is entitled “Schedule of

Underlying Protection” and provides: “Limits of Protection as shown in the Rental

Agreement.” (Capitalization omitted.) Item 6 of the declarations page is entitled “Limits

of Liability” and includes a subsection for “Bodily Injury and Property Damage

Combined Single Limit” that provides: “The difference between the Limits of Protection

shown in Rental Agreement in the s[t]ate in which the accident occurs and a combined

single limit of $2,000,000 each occurrence for Bodily Injury (including death) and

Property Damage.” (Underlining omitted.)

The Ace policy provides definitions of the terms “‘Authorized Driver,’”

“‘Insured,’” and “‘Underlying Protection.’” “‘Authorized Driver’ means only those

persons authorized by the terms of a Rental Agreement to operate the Named Insured’s

6
Automobile.” “‘Insured’” includes anyone defined as an insured in the excess liability

coverage section of the insuring agreements. “‘Underlying Protection’” means “a

standard policy of automobile liability insurance or an approved program of self-

insurance of substantially similar scope, that meets or exceeds minimum motor vehicle

liability requirements for a rental vehicle to which this insurance applies.”

The “Insuring Agreements” section of the Ace policy includes a section entitled

“Excess Liability Coverage,” and it provides: Ace “will pay all sums in excess of those

payable under the terms of the Underlying Protection, up to the limit of liability identified

in the Declarations, that the insured is legally obligated to pay as damages” arising out of

an authorized driver’s use of the covered car. (Capitalization omitted.) An “Insured” is

defined in this section as including “[t]he Named Insured described in Item 3 of the

Declarations” and “[t]he Authorized Driver of the Automobile.”

One provision of the “Limits of Liability” section in the policy provides: “This is

excess insurance and only applies to those coverages for which Underlying Protection are

shown in the Declarations of this Policy.” Another provision in that section provides: “It

is expressly agreed that liability for any loss shall attach to [Ace] only after the

Underlying Protection has admitted liability or shall have been held liable to pay the full

of amount of its liability and [Ace] shall then be liable to pay only such additional

amounts up the applicable Limit of Liability described in Item 6 of the Declarations.”

7
E. Avis’s program of self-insurance

It is undisputed that Avis “was an authorized self-insurer under the California

Compulsory Financial Responsibility Law and was assigned self-insurance #77 pursuant

to Section 16053 of the California Vehicle Code for the applicable period.” The

Department of Motor Vehicles issued a certificate of self-insurance to Avis for the period

between July 1, 2015, and June 30, 2016.

In support of its motion, Ace identified as undisputed material facts: (1) The

additional liability insurance “coverage purchased by Kendall operated by Avis supplying

the underlying primary protection up to the California’s minimum required limits, with

the Ace Excess Policy supplying coverage above the primary protection”; and (2) in

2016, its self-insurance provided primary level insurance coverage “to all California

renters who purchased ALI.” Ace cited a declaration by Avis’s regional risk manager,

Jeanne Motosko, in support of those facts. Automobile claims in California under Avis’s

self-insurance were handled by a third-party claims administrator called Sedgwick, and

Motosko has oversight responsibility over Sedgwick. She attested that in 2016 Avis’s

self-insurance provided primary coverage of $15,000 per person and $30,000 per

collision (the legally required minimum) to all California renters who purchased

additional liability insurance.

Michelle disputed those material facts on the following grounds: “Kendall was

never provided any document stating that she was covered by any insurance protection

supplied by Avis. She received a Rental Agreement stating that it did not provide any

8
insurance, and the ACE Policy stated that it was excess to the insurance provided in the

Rental Agreement.” Michelle also asserted that “Avis never made any payments on

Kendall’s behalf—it paid $15,000 to settle its own liability under California Vehicle

Code section 17150.”4 In support of the last assertion, Michelle cited both the offer to

compromise under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 made by Avis to Michelle’s

parents in the underlying wrongful death action and the settlement agreement in that

action.

It is undisputed that in April 2016 Sedgwick sent two letters to Kendall confirming

“that underlying primary protection was available to Kendall from Avis in the amount of

$15,000 per person and $30,000 per accident.” Both letters state: “At the time of above

referenced accident [on February 16, 2016], you had rented a vehicle from Avis. Under

the terms of the rental contract we afford liability bodily injury protection in the amount

of $15,000/$30,000 and liability property damage protection in the amount of $5,000.”5
F. Communications with Kendall about coverage for the wrongful death
action

On April 20, 2018, Sedgwick sent Kendall a letter informing her that with respect

to the wrongful death action, Kendall had been denied coverage under the additional

4 Vehicle Code section 17150 provides: “Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable
and responsible for death or injury to person or property resulting from a negligent or
wrongful act or omission in the operation of the motor vehicle, in the business of the
owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission,
express or implied, of the owner.”

5 “Return to sender” is written on the envelope of the first letter. The second letter
was sent to Kendall at a different address.
9
liability insurance policy for numerous reasons, including that Kendall operated the car

while under the influence of alcohol. That letter also stated: “The only coverage even

potentially applicable under these circumstances is the minimum statutory liability

coverage underlying the excess policy. [¶] As to that underlying insurance, [Avis] has

agreed to pay $15,000.00 to the claimant(s) thereby exhausting its only policy limits by

payment of settlement.” It is also undisputed that in that letter “Avis also offered to

provide a defense to Kendall pursuant to the underlying primary coverage provided by

Avis if Kendall elected to have a defense.”

It is undisputed that “Kendall did not open key mail while incarcerated and did not

communicate with Avis or ACE, including as to major litigation developments.”

G. The Cerda litigation

In February 2018, Gina Cerda filed a lawsuit against Kendall for damages

allegedly caused by the February 2016 incident. In August 2018, Cerda accepted

$15,000 in exchange for a general release of all claims against Kendall and Avis resulting

from the February 2016 incident. Sedgwick issued a check to Cerda for $15,000 in

September 2018.

On April 17, 2018, Michelle’s mother accepted $15,000 in exchange for a general

release of claims against Avis arising out of the collision. Michelle contends that Avis

made the payment not on Kendall’s behalf but on the basis of Avis’s status as the owner

of the car under Vehicle Code section 17150.

10
H. The trial court’s ruling

The trial court denied both parties’ motions. It denied Ace’s motion on the

grounds that “triable issues of fact exist as to whether or not (1) which rental agreement

Kendal[l] signed; (2) whether or not Avis provided any underlying insurance coverage;

(3) whether or not the Ace policy was primary or secondary; (4) whether or not the ...

[Ace policy’s] drunk driver exclusion was enforceable or prohibited by law; (5) whether

or not Avis Certificate of Self-Insurance also provided coverage for Kendall or just

provide[d] for coverage for Avis; and (6) whether or not Avis’ settlement in the

underlying action was paid on its own behave [sic] pursuant to liability imposed by

California Vehicle Code section 17150.” The trial court denied Michelle’s motion for

summary adjudication for the same reasons and also because of disputes about “whether

or not the Ace policy must ‘drop down’ and render Ace the primary insurer” and

“whether or not Ace’s interpretation of its policy would render coverage illusory.”

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The trial court may grant summary judgment if there is no triable issue of material

fact and the issues raised by the pleadings may be decided as a matter of law. (Code Civ.

Proc., § 437c, subds. (c), (f)(2); Biancalana v. T.D. Service Co. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 807,

813.) A moving defendant must show that one or more elements of the challenged cause

of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th

826, 849 (Aguilar).)

11
Once the moving defendant has carried its initial burden, the burden shifts to the

plaintiff to show a triable issue of material fact with respect to the cause of action or

defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849.)

The court must consider all of the evidence and the reasonable inferences from it in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party. (Aguilar, at p. 843.) “There is a triable

issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to

find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the

applicable standard of proof.” (Id. at p. 850.)

We independently review summary judgment orders and apply the same legal

standard as the trial court. (Miller v. Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446,

460.) We independently examine the record to determine whether there are triable issues

of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

(Ibid.)

DISCUSSION

Ace contends that the trial court erred by denying its motion for summary

judgment on the ground that there are disputed issues of material fact as to whether the

Ace policy constituted a primary or an excess insurance policy. We agree.

Interpretation of an insurance policy is generally “a question of law that is decided

under settled rules of contract interpretation.” (State of California v. Continental Ins. Co.

(2012) 55 Cal.4th 186, 194 (Continental).) The parties’ mutual intention “at the time the

contract is formed governs interpretation. (Civ. Code, § 1636.) Such intent is to be

12
inferred, if possible, solely from the written provisions of the contract. (Id., § 1639.) The

‘clear and explicit’ meaning of these provisions, interpreted in their ‘ordinary and popular

sense,’ unless ‘used by the parties in a technical sense or a special meaning is given to

them by usage’ (id., § 1644), controls judicial interpretation. (Id., § 1638.) Thus, if the

meaning a layperson would ascribe to contract language is not ambiguous, we apply that

meaning.” (AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 807, 821-822.) If the policy

“‘language is clear and explicit, it governs.’” (Continental, at p. 195.)

“‘A policy provision will be considered ambiguous when it is capable of two or

more constructions, both of which are reasonable.’” (Continental, supra, 55 Cal.4th at

p. 195.) Language in an insurance policy “‘must be construed in the context of that

instrument as a whole, and in the circumstances of that case, and cannot be found to be

ambiguous in the abstract.’” (Ibid.) ‘“If an asserted ambiguity is not eliminated by the

language and context of the policy, courts then invoke the principle that ambiguities are

generally construed against the party who caused the uncertainty to exist (i.e., the insurer)

in order to protect the insured’s reasonable expectation of coverage.’” (Ibid.)

“Insurance is sometimes procured in a series of layers, with an insured acquiring a

primary insurance policy that provides an initial layer of coverage for loss or liability and

an excess insurance policy or policies that provide additional coverage in the event the

underlying coverage is exhausted.” (Fox Paine & Co., LLC v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co.

(July 27, 2026, S287404) __ Cal.5th __ [2026 Cal. LEXIS 3943, *2].) With the primary

level of coverage, “‘liability attaches immediately upon the happening of the occurrence

13
that gives rise to liability.’” (Montrose Chemical Corp. of California v. Superior Court

(2020) 9 Cal.5th 215, 222.) “Liability under an excess policy attaches only after all

primary coverage has been exhausted.” (North River Ins. Co. v. American Home

Assurance Co. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 108, 112.)

Vehicle Code section 16056 requires minimum automobile liability coverage of at

least $15,000 for bodily injury or death to one person and $30,000 for bodily injury or

death to two or more persons. (Id., § 16056, subd. (a); former Veh. Code, § 16056, subd.

(a).) Insurance Code section 11580.1 contains an exhaustive list of the exclusions that

are permitted in a primary automobile insurance policy. (Ins. Code, § 11580.1, subd. (c);

Hertz Corp. v. Home Ins. Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1071, 1078 (Hertz).) The list of

exclusions does not include driving while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled

substance. (Ins. Code, § 11580.1, subd. (c).) An excess insurance policy is not subject to

those same “limitations on permissible exclusions if the excess policy contains a

requirement for ‘underlying insurance’ or a retained limit of self-insurance equal to or

greater than the limits specified in Vehicle Code section 16056.” (Hertz, at p. 1078.)

The trial court erred by denying Ace’s motion for summary judgment on the

ground that there were disputed issues of material fact. All but one of the purported

factual disputes identified by the trial court are issues of policy interpretation and hence

are pure questions of law, e.g., whether the Ace policy operates as a primary or excess

policy or whether the exclusion for driving while intoxicated is enforceable.

14
Of the putatively factual issues identified by the trial court as grounds for denying

Ace’s motion, only one is actually factual, namely, the issue of “which rental agreement

Kendal[l] signed.” But that issue was not disputed, because Ace assumed for the

purposes of its motion that the operative rental agreement is the version attached to Ace’s

answer. The trial court therefore erred by denying Ace’s motion on the ground that there

were disputed issues of material fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (c), (f)(2).) The

disputed issues presented by Ace’s motion were legal.

The error was prejudicial, because Ace was right about the dispositive legal issues.

It is undisputed that the Ace policy contains an exclusion that prohibits driving under the

influence of alcohol and that the exclusion is enforceable if and only if the Ace policy is

an excess policy. It is also undisputed that the $1.9 million judgment is based on

damages that Kendall caused by driving the rental car while under the influence of

alcohol. Thus, if the Ace policy is an excess policy, then the intoxication exclusion

would preclude coverage for the $1.9 million judgment. (Hertz, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at

p. 1078; Harbor Ins. Co. v. KSCH, Inc. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 965, 968.)

To determine whether the Ace policy is a primary or excess policy, we analyze the

policy’s plain language. The policy is entitled, “Excess Rental Liability Policy.” The

terms of the policy show that the title is accurate. The insuring agreement provides, in a

section with the heading “excess liability coverage,” that Ace “will pay all sums in excess

of those payable under the terms of the Underlying Protection up to the limit of liability

identified in the Declarations.” (Italics added & capitalization omitted.) The limits of

15
liability section in the policy likewise provides: “This is excess insurance and only

applies to those coverages for which Underlying Protection are shown in the Declarations

of this Policy.” (Italics added.) That section also provides that the parties expressly

agree that “any loss shall attach to [Ace] only after the Underlying Protection has

admitted liability or shall have been held to pay the full amount of its liability.” (Italics

added.) The policy defines “‘Underlying Protection’” as including “a standard policy of

automobile liability insurance or an approved program of self-insurance of substantially

similar scope, that meets or exceeds minimum motor vehicle liability requirements for a

rental vehicle to which this insurance applies.” (Italics added.)

Under the plain language of those provisions, the Ace policy provides an excess

layer of coverage that attaches only after the underlying protection has been exhausted.

Thus, according to the policy’s plain language, the Ace policy covers only damages that

exceed the coverage of the primary insurance, i.e., the “Underlying Protection.” The

policy defines “Underlying Protection” as including qualifying programs of self-

insurance. In sum, the plain language of the Ace policy thus establishes that it provides

coverage in excess of primary coverage, which may be provided by self-insurance. And

it is undisputed that Avis had an approved program of self-insurance.

Michelle argues that despite the unambiguous language of those provisions of the

policy, the Ace policy is not an excess policy because (1) the policy “purports to be

excess to the insurance provided in the” rental agreement, and (2) the rental agreement

“does not provide any insurance.” According to Michelle, the Ace policy therefore “must

16
... be treated as a primary policy,” because otherwise “the coverage Kendall purchased

and paid for would be a nullity.” We are not persuaded.

It is true that the rental agreement states that it does not provide insurance. But

that does not end the analysis. Contrary to Michelle’s argument, the Ace policy does not

identify the rental agreement as the primary policy to which the Ace policy provides

excess coverage. Rather, the Ace policy states that it provides coverage that is excess to

the “Underlying Protection,” which may be an approved program of self-insurance. And

it is undisputed that Avis had an approved program of self-insurance.

Michelle’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. To support her contention

that the Ace policy purports to be excess only to primary coverage provided by the rental

agreement, she points out that the limits of liability section in the Ace policy states that it

is an excess policy that “only applies to those coverages for which Underlying Protection

are shown in the Declarations of this Policy.” Michelle then points to items 5 and 6 in

the declarations page that respectively provide that the schedule of underlying protection

is the “[l]imits of protection as shown in the Rental Agreement” and that the limit of

liability for each accident is “[t]he difference between the Limits of Protection shown in

the Rental Agreement in the s[t]ate in which the accident occurs and a combined single

limit of $2,000,000.” (Underlining omitted.) But because “there are no ‘Limits of

Protection’ shown in the” rental agreement, Michelle concludes that “the only insurance

provided to Kendall through the [r]ental [a]greement was the” Ace policy itself.

17
The argument lacks merit. Item 6 of the declarations states that the limit of

liability under the Ace policy is the difference between the limit of protection in the

rental agreement and $2,000,000. If there is no protection provided in the rental

agreement, then it follows that the Ace policy limit is $2,000,000. That establishes only

what the Ace policy limit is. It does not establish that the Ace policy is “excess to

nothing” and therefore must be treated as primary. Rather, other provisions of the Ace

policy establish that the Ace policy is excess to the “Underlying Protection,” which may

be provided by an approved program of self-insurance, which Avis undisputedly had.

The reference in item 5 of the declarations to the “[l]imits of protection as shown

in the Rental Agreement” is difficult to interpret, given that the rental agreement states

that it does not provide any insurance. But whatever it might mean, the language in item

5 does not change the fact that the Ace policy provides for liability coverage in excess of

the “Underlying Protection,” which is defined as including an approved program of self-

insurance.

In sum, the Ace policy provides that its excess liability coverage attaches after the

“Underlying Protection” has admitted liability or has been held liable to pay the limits of

its policy, and “Underlying Protection” is defined as including qualifying self-insurance.

Viewing the language of the Ace policy “‘“in the context of that instrument as a

whole,”’” we conclude that the policy provides liability coverage for damages in excess

of those covered by primary coverage that may be provided by an approved program of

self-insurance. (Continental, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 195.)

18
Avis’s approved program of self-insurance provided primary coverage, so the Ace

policy was indeed an excess policy; it was not “excess to nothing.” And because it was

an excess policy, the intoxicated driver exclusion is enforceable. (Hertz, supra, 14

Cal.App.4th at p. 1078.) Kendall and Michelle as her assignee consequently were not

covered under Ace’s excess policy for any claims arising from the February 2016

collision. Because all of Michelle’s claims are based on the allegation that Kendall was

covered by the Ace policy, the trial court erred by denying Ace’s motion for summary

judgment.

DISPOSITION

The amended petition for writ of mandate is granted. Let a peremptory writ of

mandate issue directing the trial court to vacate the order denying Ace’s motion for

summary judgment, to issue an order granting Ace’s motion for summary judgment, and

to enter judgment in favor of Ace. Ace shall recover its costs of this original proceeding.

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.493(a)(1)(A).) The stay of proceedings in the trial court is

lifted.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MENETREZ
J.

We concur:

MILLER
Acting P. J.

CODRINGTON
J.
19

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