Filed 10/8/26 A & Y Property Investments 26 v. Chavez CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
A & Y Property Investments 26 B343969
LLC et al.,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiffs and Respondents, Super. Ct. No. 22STCV27779)
v.
JOSE CHAVEZ et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Wendy Chang, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Kenneth Gaugh and Kenneth R. Gaugh for
Defendants and Appellants.
Law Offices of Nico N. Tabibi and Nico N. Tabibi for
Plaintiffs and Respondents.
_________________________________
INTRODUCTION
We affirm the trial court’s decision to deduct the amount of
a lost grant from the monies that the buyer owed the seller when
the trial court enforced a contract in specific performance. We
also hold the sellers forfeited any evidentiary challenge to the
trial court’s basis for admitting the grant into evidence for failing
to provide record citations or citations to relevant case law.
Finally, we address this matter by a memorandum opinion in
accordance with the California Standards of Judicial
Administration, section 8.1. (See People v. Garcia (2002)
97 Cal.App.4th 847, 850–855 [memorandum opinions].)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 21, 2023, Plaintiffs A & Y Property
Investments 26 LLC and Matthew Farzam (collectively A & Y)
filed a verified first amended complaint against defendants Jose
Chavez, Andres Diaz, and Miriam Diaz (collectively Sellers).
A & Y alleged causes of action for (1) breach of contract—specific
performance; (2) breach of contract—damages; (3) breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) promise
without intent to perform; and (5) preliminary injunction,
temporary restraining order, and permanent injunction to
prevent the transfer of real property. The crux of A & Y’s claims
are that it had an enforceable agreement to purchase the
property at 6326 South Central Avenue in Los Angeles (property)
from Sellers.
On May 20, 2024, A & Y moved for summary adjudication
based on their first cause of action for breach of contract—specific
performance and their fifth cause of action seeking injunctive
relief. A & Y contended that the parties agreed on a purchase
price of $1.15 million for the property as reflected in the purchase
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agreement. Among other requests in their motion, A & Y sought
“to compel the sale of the same real Property, at the same
purchase price, less only consequential damages to which
Plaintiffs are lawfully entitled as a part of an award of specific
performance.” A & Y contended that they lost a commitment for
a $230,000 grant, and they are “entitled to [a] reduction of [the]
purchase price in said amount as part of [an] award of specific
performance.” On August 14, 2024, Defendants opposed A & Y’s
motion for summary adjudication, with A & Y filing a reply on
August 21, 2024.
On September 10, 2024, the trial court ruled in A & Y’s
favor, granting summary adjudication on A & Y’s breach of
contract—specific performance claim and its claim for injunctive
relief. Among other findings in support of specific performance,
the trial court found the agreement’s purchase price at $1.15
million was adequate consideration for the property. Further in
granting summary adjudication for injunctive relief, the trial
court described A & Y’s financing, “Plaintiffs had obtained an
SBA business loan for the sum of $885,000.00 at a fixed interest
rate of 5.12% for a term of 25 years and a grant of $230,000.00,
evidenced by a commitment letter from the California Statewide
Certified Development Corp[.] for the first, and a letter
confirming a grant from the Local Initiative Support Corporation
for the second.”
On October 7, 2024, A & Y filed a proposed order for Sellers
to complete the sale of the property to A & Y while also
dismissing A &Y’s remaining claims without prejudice, among
other requests. A & Y also filed a proposed judgment seeking “a
purchase price from Plaintiffs in the sum of $846,722.50.” Sellers
objected to the proposed order and judgment. On November 15,
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2024, the trial court denied A & Y’s request for an order and
explained that if A & Y sought judgment, it must first dispose of
its remaining causes of action. Then, A & Y sought dismissal
without prejudice of its second, third, fourth, and fifth causes of
action, and the trial court granted the request. Thereafter, the
trial court issued a judgment ordering (1) Sellers to execute a
grant deed for the property and (2) for A & Y to pay $846,722.50
to the Sellers for the property.
DISCUSSION
Sellers present a narrow appeal. They do not appeal the
trial court’s grant of summary adjudication for specific
performance or the trial court’s grant of injunctive relief in favor
of A & Y. Moreover, Sellers do not contest the order compelling
them to sell the property to A & Y. Instead, Sellers only
challenge the trial court’s reduction of A & Y’s payment by
$230,000 to account for the grant that was no longer available to
A & Y. Given the broad authority the trial court wields in equity,
we conclude Sellers establish no trial court error.
1. Specific performance
Both parties agree that the sale price of the property was
$1.15 million. Sellers contend that the trial court erred as a
matter of law in deducting $230,000, the amount of A & Y’s lost
grant, from the amount owed from the purchase of the property.
Specific performance is an equitable remedy for breach of
contract. (Mesa Shopping Center-East, LLC v. O Hill (2014)
232 Cal.App.4th 890, 901.) In this context, our Supreme Court
has explained, “ “it is thoroughly settled that a court of equity
taking jurisdiction for the purpose of specifically enforcing a
contract takes full jurisdiction of all the rights of the parties,
whether legal or equitable, and may award such legal damages as
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the [plaintiff] may have suffered by reason of the delay in
performance.” ” (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002)
28 Cal.4th 888, 906–907.) “The guiding principle with respect to
the calculation of the damages incident to the decree of specific
performance, as we have seen, is to relate the performance back
to the date set in the contract.” (Ellis v. Mihelis (1963) 60 Cal.2d
206, 220–221.)
Here, on appeal, Sellers do not cite to the record and do not
apply the facts in this case to any applicable authority on this
point. Instead, Sellers only explain some concepts applicable to
specific performance from two cases without applying them to the
facts in this appeal. Because we presume the trial court’s
judgment is correct, Sellers’ paltry analysis has not disrupted
this presumption. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609.)
This is especially true here given the trial court’s broad authority
when a plaintiff has prevailed in securing a specific performance
remedy. (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co., supra, 28 Cal.4th at
pp. 906–907.)
2. Sellers forfeit evidentiary challenge
Defendants also argue that A & Y did not provide
admissible evidence to support a commitment from the Local
Initiatives Support Corporation to A & Y for the $230,000 grant.
However, their argument contains no citations to the appellate
record and no case citations. As above, we presume that the trial
court’s judgment is correct. (Jameson v. Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th
at p. 609.) “[T]o overcome that presumption appellants must
affirmatively establish prejudicial error by providing an adequate
record, citing to the record, and presenting a persuasive
argument with citations to supportive legal authorities.” (LNSU
#1, LLC v. Alta Del Mar Coastal Collection Community Assn.
5
(2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1070.) Because Sellers’ argument
fails this standard, bereft of record citations and case law, Sellers
have forfeited their appellate challenge to A & Y’s evidence in
support of the monetary grant. (Ibid.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents to recover costs on
appeal.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
WILEY, J.
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