Filed 9/29/26 A.J. v. Super. Ct. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
A.J., E088699
Petitioner, (Super.Ct.No. DPRI2300082)
v. OPINION
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE
COUNTY,
Respondent;
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES,
Real Party in Interest.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ. Malvina
Ovanezova, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art VI, § 21.) Petition denied.
Kathleen M. Peach for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
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Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, and Jamila T. Purnell and Prabhath Shettigar,
Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
A.J. (mother) petitions for an extraordinary writ after the juvenile court terminated
reunification services for most of her children and bypassed them for her remaining child.
Mother disputes the court’s finding that terminating reunification services was
appropriate and bypassing reunification services was in the children’s best interest. We
deny the petition.
BACKGROUND
This dependency concerns mother’s four children: K.H. (born 2021), E.H. (born
2022), H.H. (born 2023), and L.H. (born 2026).1
In March 2023, real party in interest Riverside County Department of Public
Social Services (the department) received a referral alleging emotional abuse and general
neglect of mother’s eldest—and at that time only—two children. On the same date the
department received another referral from law enforcement, who responded to a domestic
violence incident where “father head-butted the mother three times and the mother head-
butted the father once,” followed by father then hitting “mother four-to-five times in the
head with a closed fist.” Upon investigating, mother had “two black eyes, a laceration to
the neck, and a hematoma to the forehead.” She also “disclosed multiple incidents of
1 The department’s brief cites to four different records in four separate appeals—
case Nos. E081189, E082831, E087350, and this case, E088699. On our own motion, we
incorporated the record from case No. E087350, but we find no need to do so for the
others.
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domestic violence with the father, including incidents with the children present.” She
said father “previously used a knife to harm her.” Mother declined a restraining order,
declined to participate in services, and refused a safety plan requiring one parent to leave
the home. Father “was combative and aggressive during the investigation,” said he had
been diagnosed with “multiple personality disorder,” and denied being physically
aggressive with mother. However, he admitted to having physical altercations with
maternal grandfather.
The department filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
subdivision (b), and the court removed the children from parental custody.2 Mother and
father received reunification services, though the court had to suspend father’s visitation
because it was detrimental to the children’s well-being. At the six-month review hearing
the court continued reunification services for mother but terminated them for father.
Shortly after the six-month review hearing mother gave birth to H.H. The
department received another referral almost immediately after H.H.’s birth. Hospital
staff saw a small laceration under mother’s eye, which she claimed father caused.
Mother later recanted this accusation. Both parents refused to be interviewed or to grant
the department access to the home, so the department removed H.H. However, shortly
thereafter the court returned H.H. to the parents and ordered family maintenance services.
The department filed another petition under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j), as to
2 Unlabeled statutory citations refer to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
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H.H. The court found true one allegation each under section 300, subdivisions (b) and
(j), and continued family maintenance services.
In October 2024, the court placed the two older children with mother on the
condition father not reside or be left alone with the children and mother participate in
family maintenance services for them.
In June 2025, the court granted mother sole legal and physical custody of all three
children, with father receiving one visit per week. At this point, mother had participated
in individual counseling and completed a domestic violence program. Father was
discharged from individual counseling because he became increasingly hostile to the
provider, though he re-engaged sometime in 2024. He completed a 52-week batterer’s
program and participated in a psychological exam. However, that exam resulted in a
recommendation for medication, which he refused to take.
The very next month, July 2025, the department received another referral alleging
mother and H.H. were living with father again, and that father had threatened to kill
mother. The department conducted an unannounced home visit of maternal
grandmother’s home, where mother was supposed to be residing. Mother’s older two
children were living with maternal grandmother, but H.H. was with mother and father.
Maternal grandmother told the department she cares for the older two children full time,
and also picks up H.H. about once a week whenever mother and father had domestic
violence issues. Maternal grandmother claimed domestic violence occurred throughout
the previous case and worsened once the children were returned to mother’s care, in part
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because father wanted the children returned to his care. According to maternal
grandmother, mother knew she was not supposed to allow the children to reside with or
have unsupervised contact with father, but refused to comply and wanted to “take all
three children to live with her and the father permanently, once the dependency case is
officially closed[,] in order to appease the father.” Maternal grandmother also told the
department that mother leaves H.H. alone unsupervised with father while she works.
Both mother and father refused to speak to the department.
On July 22, 2025, the department obtained protective custody warrants for all
three children, removed them, and on July 25, 2025, filed another section 300 petition.
The petition alleged the parents failed to protect the children, “in that they minimize the
impact [of] domestic violence” and failed to comply with court orders intended to keep
the children from father. As of August 2025, the parents had refused to cooperate or
otherwise participate in the process, limiting the department’s ability to investigate. The
court held a jurisdiction hearing in November 2025, where it sustained the allegations,
ordered reunification services, continued the children detained from the parents, and
found the children to be a sibling group where at least one child was under three at the
time of removal.
In March 2026, shortly after L.H., was born, the department filed an additional
section 300 petition. This petition was based on the existing case, namely the parents’
ongoing domestic violence and failure to engage with services. After L.H.’s birth,
nursing staff told the department that mother presented with bruises, that father was
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acting abnormally, that father would not leave the room to allow nursing staff to speak to
mother privately, and that both parents generally refused to speak to staff.3 The parents
also refused to speak to the department and father threatened the social worker and
hospital staff before being asked to leave by hospital security. The parents attempted to
have the child discharged, at which point the department took L.H. into protective
custody. The court ordered L.H. detained out of parental custody.
Later that month the department prepared a jurisdiction/disposition report, where it
disclosed that the parents still refused to speak to the department, refused to participate in
visitation, and refused to provide the information necessary for the department to refer
them to services. On March 26 the department spoke to the maternal grandparents who
said they “ ‘have begged [mother] to leave [father] and come home,’ ” and that they
“ ‘don’t know why she doesn’t leave him; it’s a lost cause.’ ” They said they “ ‘always
taught her that it is her children first and then her boyfriend, but she doesn’t listen.’ ”
They also said they “ ‘have seen her marks, and . . . seen him yell at her and hit her but
she tells [them] to stay out of it.’ ” They were concerned that “ ‘[t]he oldest child has
seen a lot of domestic violence as he was the one that was always present,’ ” and that he
“ ‘has a lot of aggressive behaviors.’ ”
In April 2026 the department prepared a report for the six-month status review
hearing in the eldest three children’s case. By that time mother had completed eight
3 Mother’s counsel later claimed the bruising was because of an IV, but nursing
staff said mother’s bruising was below the waist.
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therapy sessions, four parenting sessions, and had enrolled in domestic violence services.
However, mother admitted she was still in a relationship with father. Mother participated
in visitation but struggled to manage the children. Father still refused to speak to the
department and did not attend visits.
In June 2026, the department prepared an addendum report regarding L.H. At that
point the parents had still refused to make themselves available for interviews, refused to
participate in visitation, and refused to provide updates about their progress in services.
The department learned directly from mother’s service providers that she completed six
therapy sessions, her parenting education course, and three of 19 domestic violence
classes.
Meanwhile, all four children appeared to be doing well in their placement with
maternal grandparents. The department reported the maternal grandparents “consistently
demonstrated a strong commitment to the children’s safety, stability, and overall well-
being,” and that the children “have developed strong, healthy, and positive attachments to
their maternal grandparents . . . who serve as significant sources of support, care, and
permanency.”
The court held a contested six-month status review for the older three children in
June 2026. Mother requested the court continue services, arguing she had benefited from
those services despite still living with father. Father admitted to not participating in any
department-offered services, nor visiting the children, but offered proof he had completed
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a 52-week batterer program as part of probation—apparently the same one he previously
reported completing sometime in 2024.
The court found the department offered reasonable services, that the parents had
not benefited from those services, that returning the children would pose a substantial risk
of harm, and that there was no substantial probability of return. Accordingly, the court
terminated reunification services and set a permanency planning hearing under
section 366.26. In doing so, the court stated, “I do believe that domestic violence still
does exist between the parents in the home,” and that its “biggest concern is that the
parents fail to recognize that their conduct is domestic violence and the damage that it is
showing to the children. They don’t recognize it being an issue.” The court said it was
particularly fixated on an event that occurred when mother testified at the combination
jurisdiction/disposition and six-month status review hearing. Specifically, “when asked
whether or not she would report or contact law enforcement if there was another domestic
violence incident, the mother paused.” The court noted that the pause would not show up
in the transcript and so further clarified that “to this Court, it was a very long
uncomfortable pause before she said . . . she would contact law enforcement.” The court
acknowledged mother made progress, participated in some services, and visited the
children. But it could not see returning the children to mother at the next hearing if
services continued for Mother, “not because Mother and Father continue to be in a
relationship together. It’s because the parents continue to fail to recognize their actions
and how they are domestic violence.”
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The court then moved on to the jurisdiction/disposition hearing for L.H. It found
the allegations in the petition true, bypassed reunification services under section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(10), on the basis that mother had failed to reunify with the other three
children, and set a hearing under section 366.26.
DISCUSSION
Mother argues the juvenile court erred by terminating reunification services to her
eldest three children and bypassing them for L.H. We understand mother to argue that
the court’s decisions as to reunification services were based on an unflattering view of the
facts, where her progress was not evaluated separately from father’s progress, and were
not in the children’s best interest. As to the three older children, her view is that there is
no substantial evidence supporting the court’s findings that she failed to make progress
on reunification services and that there was no substantial probability of return.
Regarding L.H., mother contends the court abused its discretion by failing to consider
whether bypassing services was in the child’s best interest.
A. The Decision to Terminate Reunification Services was Supported by Substantial
Evidence
“As a general rule, when a child is removed from parental custody under the
dependency statutes, the juvenile court is required to provide reunification services
pursuant to section 361.5 to ‘the child and the child’s mother and statutorily presumed
father.’ [Citation.] The purpose of these reunification services is ‘to facilitate the return
of a dependent child to parental custody.’ ” (In re Jaden E. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th
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1277, 1281.) Section 361.5, subdivision (a)(1)(B), guaranteed the first six months of
reunification services, as it requires that if a child is under three years old at the time of
removal “court-ordered services shall be provided for a period of 6 months from the
dispositional hearing.” As well, section 361.5, subdivision (a)(1)(C), provides the same
services to “a sibling group whose members were removed from parental custody at the
same time, and in which one member of the sibling group was under three years of age on
the date of initial removal.” The eldest three children are a designated sibling group, and
H.H. was under three when they were removed.
At the six-month review hearing, “the court shall order the return of the child to
the physical custody of their parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to their parent or legal
guardian would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical
or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.21, subdivision (e)(1).) “If the child is not
returned to parental custody at the six-month review hearing and is under three years of
age, the court may set a section 366.26 hearing if it finds by clear and convincing
evidence the parent failed to participate regularly and make substantial progress in a
court-ordered treatment plan. (§ 366.21, subd. (e).) If, however, the court finds there is a
substantial probability the child may be returned to his or her parent within six months or
that reasonable services have not been provided, the court is required to continue the case
to the 12-month permanency hearing.” (Kevin R. v. Superior Court (2010) 191
Cal.App.4th 676, 688 (Kevin R.).)
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We review the record supporting the juvenile court’s finding that there is no
substantial probability of return for substantial evidence. (Kevin R., supra, 191
Cal.App.4th at pp. 688-689.) “Under that standard we inquire whether the evidence,
contradicted or uncontradicted, supports the court’s determination. We resolve all
conflicts in support of the determination . . . and may not substitute our deductions for
those of the juvenile court.” (Georgeanne G. v. Superior Court (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th
856, 865.) “We do not pass on the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in
the evidence or evaluate the weight of the evidence[,] . . . and affirm the order even if
other evidence supports a contrary conclusion.” (In re Megan S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th
247, 251.)
Ample evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that mother failed to make
progress in her case plan and that this was unlikely to change within the next six months.
Both the previous dependency and the current one were based on the exact same
concerns: father’s violent behavior, the domestic violence he perpetrates, and mother’s
refusal to acknowledge that this behavior threatens her children. Within a month of the
previous dependency ending, and despite court orders to the contrary, mother returned to
living with father. Then, throughout the present dependency, mother continued to live
with father and refused to acknowledge any problems. As the court said at the six-month
review hearing, “look[ing] at the 2023 detention report . . . what’s so troubling and
concerning is it’s almost identical,” because in both 2023 and 2026 father exhibited
violent, controlling behavior while mother made no attempt to protect herself or her
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children from it. The court concluded that father and mother’s problematic behaviors are
“not necessarily historical. It’s ongoing, and nothing has changed.” Thus, the evidence
establishes that mother has not made progress in identifying the risks father’s behavior
poses, is likely to re-expose them to abuse by father, and she is unlikely to recognize
those risks and take appropriate action to protect her children in the next six months.
Mother asserts, “[t]he Department’s analysis of the relationship between mother
and father seems to be limited to a narrow view unsubstantiated by fact.” She complains
that if the maternal grandmother and mother make competing claims about father’s
behavior, “the Department takes the maternal grandmother at her word.” But we do not
review the department’s factual findings, we review the court’s. The court is entitled as
fact finder to credit one piece of evidence or one person’s testimony over another, and we
may not second guess that decision. That the juvenile court credited evidence offered by
the department and others over mother’s own statements is not a basis for reversing its
factual findings.
Mother also suggests the trial court “failed to evaluate mother’s progress in her
services as separate from the father’s.” But the trial court expressly evaluated mother
separately. It stated that “as it relates to the mother, the mother has made progress, has
completed some of her services.” The court recognized her visitation with the children.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that even with additional time to complete the services,
mother would not be able to show that it was safe to return the children to her, due to her
inability to deal with the domestic violence in the home. Although mother draws a
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different conclusion from the record, the trial court expressly evaluated her progress in
services separately from father’s progress, so did not err in the manner mother suggests.
Accordingly, we decline to disturb the court’s order terminating reunification
services and setting a hearing under section 366.26 as to the three eldest children.
B. The Decision to Bypass Reunification Services was Supported by Substantial
Evidence
“Ordinarily, when a child is removed from parental custody, the juvenile court
must order services to facilitate the reunification of the family. [Citation.]
‘ “Nevertheless, as evidenced by section 361.5, subdivision (b), the Legislature
recognizes that it may be fruitless to provide reunification services under certain
circumstances. [Citation.] Once it is determined one of the situations outlined in
subdivision (b) applies, the general rule favoring reunification is replaced by a legislative
assumption that offering services would be an unwise use of governmental resources.” ’ ”
(R.T. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 908, 914 (R.T.).)
“Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) . . . authorize[s] the denial of services to a
parent who has failed to reunify with another child . . . if the court finds that the parent
‘has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal
of the sibling or half sibling . . . .’ ” (R.T., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 914.) “If the
evidence suggests that despite a parent’s substantial history of misconduct with prior
children, there is a reasonable basis to conclude that the relationship with the current
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child could be saved, the courts should always attempt to do so.” (Renee J. v. Superior
Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1464.)
We review an order denying reunification services under section 361.5,
subdivision (b), for substantial evidence. (Jennifer S. v. Superior Court (2017) 15
Cal.App.5th 1113, 1121.)
We find substantial evidence supports the court’s decision to bypass reunification
services as to L.H. There is no question that mother failed to reunify with L.H.’s
siblings. There is ample evidence mother failed to take strides to correct the problem
which led to her reunification services being terminated. The juvenile court reasonably
concluded mother failed to make any progress in recognizing father’s danger to her
children despite multiple dependency proceedings based on that concern, or any other
relevant form of progress. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to allow the court
to bypass reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10).
We also conclude the court did not abuse its discretion by determining that
bypassing reunification services was in L.H.’s best interest.
Section 361.5, subdivision (c)(2), states “[t]he court shall not order reunification
for a parent or guardian described in paragraph . . . (10) . . . of subdivision (b) unless the
court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of
the child.” As noted above, “[w]hen the court determines a bypass provision applies, the
general rule favoring reunification is replaced with a legislative presumption that
reunification services would be an unwise use of governmental resources.” (In re S.B.
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(2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 612, 622.) Therefore, “[t]he burden is on the parent to show that
reunification would serve the best interests of the child.” (Id. at p. 623.)
Because the burden of proof is on mother to convince the juvenile court to find
that reunification services would be in the child’s best interest, mother does not challenge
an affirmative finding or order from the court. Instead, she challenges the court’s
declination to make a finding. Under these circumstances, “the question for a reviewing
court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a
matter of law,” that is, whether the evidence supporting mother’s position “was (1)
‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no
room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’
[Citation.]” (In re. I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528, disapproved on another
ground in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7; see In re Raul V.
(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 290, 300-301.)
Mother effectively admits that the evidence against her was neither uncontradicted
nor unimpeached. As discussed above, one of mother’s primary contentions is that the
court credited the evidence against her position more than the evidence for it. This is an
admission that there was evidence contradicting her claim that further reunification
services would be in the children’s best interest. Moreover, mother points to no record
evidence in favor of her position when arguing bypass is inappropriate. Rather than
argue she met her burden of proof to show further reunification services were in the
child’s best interest, mother’s petition complains about her “considerable anger and
15
resentment toward the Department based on over three years of dependency cases,” and
argues the department is somehow at fault for her failures, as she “barely had time to
recover and re-establish her relationship with her children before . . . [they] were
snatched from her hands,” and she was forced to “once again face[] the intrusive process
imposed by the Department while trying to mitigate the father’s resistance to any
cooperation.” Mother’s petition ends with her arguing “her relationship with the father
has improved,” as they have “better communication” and that she has benefited from her
services and believes she is more “able to provide stability for her children.”
Notably none of these arguments concern any reference to record evidence—let
alone uncontradicted record evidence—that further reunification services would be best
for L.H. Mother’s petition instead focuses entirely on what a burden these proceedings
have been for her, and her belief that this burden is unfair. Mother’s only attempt to
argue that reunification services would be in L.H.’s best interest—rather than in mother’s
best interest—is a perfunctory reference, unsupported by the record, that she is now able
to provide a more stable home. Mother’s grievances with the department, fair or not, do
not show that reunification services would be in L.H.’s best interest.
Thus, mother fails to demonstrate the juvenile court erred when declining to find
further reunification services would be in L.H.’s best interest, and we decline to disturb
the order bypassing reunification services for L.H. and setting a section 366.26 hearing.
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DISPOSITION
We deny the petition for extraordinary writ.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAPHAEL
J.
We concur:
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
MENETREZ
J.
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