Filed 9/14/26 A.H. v. Brown CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
A.H.,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A174747
v.
CHRISTOPHER TODD BROWN, (Alameda County Super. Ct.
No. 25FL108958)
Defendant and Appellant.
Christopher Brown, appearing in propria persona, appeals from an
order denying his motion under California’s anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit
against public participation) statute, Code of Civil Procedure1 section 425.16,
to strike a request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) filed by
his ex-wife (A.H.). We find no error and affirm.
BACKGROUND
On January 31, 2025, A.H. filed a request for domestic violence
restraining order. A.H. alleged that Brown had been harassing her for years
during the course of pending litigation regarding the custody of their
daughter, but that “in the last several months, Mr. Brown’s behavior has
grown more brazen and become intolerable, and has included violations of
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
court orders designed to keep the peace.” The petition detailed several
incidents of alleged abuse, three of which we set forth below.
A.H. alleged that on September 14, 2024, Brown confronted her at their
daughter’s soccer game. A.H.’s declaration states, “[daughter] and I were late
to her soccer game due to a mix-up. I thought the arrival time was 8:00 am.
However, the match started at 8:00 am. On the way in, Mr. Brown
intercepted us. [Daughter] ran off to meet her team. Mr. Brown started
filming me, saying things like ‘what kind of mental health problems would
make you be forty minutes late to your kid’s soccer game.’ This was a
violation of the [court order] that prohibited us from talking to each other at
games. I tried to ignore him and angle away from him, but he kept pace, and
kept filming and talking to me, again in violation of the court order. I
reminded him that he was not supposed to talk to me, and he said he was not
talking to me. I asked him not to film me, and he said it was a public place. I
picked up my pace, and he picked up his pace to keep up with me. [¶] When
I was within earshot of another adult who looked like a parent for the other
team, I asked him for help. He asked Mr. Brown why he was bothering me,
which angered Mr. Brown, who started to verbally abuse him. The other dad
guided Mr. Brown away from me and they continued to argue. A few other
parents noticed I was upset and stuck with me. The dad that had guided
Mr. Brown away later came over and told me that he had spoken with the
police who were ready to come if things escalated further. I told him I did not
want my daughter to witness a scene, and he assured me that he would help
me if needed.”
Next, A.H. alleged that on December 17, 2024, Brown attended their
daughter’s ballet recital but he did not leave at the end of the performance as
he was required under a court order to do. A.H.’s declaration states: “He
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stayed and appeared to film me. He said to me, among other things, ‘I’ll see
you in appeals court next month,’ in violation of the court order prohibiting
him from speaking to me. I walked away from him and told a ballet studio
employee that he was filming me again (this had previously been an issue at
the ballet studio). Since they needed to clear the studio for the next class, I
was forced to walk back to the hallway where he was standing in order to exit
the building. He stood in front of me filming us both in selfie mode—I could
see us on his screen. The ballet studio employee must have seen this as well
and told him no one should be filming in that area. He continued to hang
around while [daughter] got changed and continued to speak with her, again
in violation of the court order. I heard her tell him that her mom always
causes a struggle. He stayed talking to [the daughter] on and off, and
muttering things about appeals court, until we made it all the way to the
main sidewalk when he finally left.”
Finally, A.H. alleged that on January 23, 2025, Brown followed and
filmed her as she tried to walk towards the Civic Center BART station after
an oral argument before this court. A.H.’s declaration states, “When I
emerged from the building, I saw Mr. Brown on the steps to the building. I
immediately turned in the opposite direction and headed down the sidewalk
towards the Civic Center BART station. He followed me and caught up to me
at the crosswalk. He put his phone near my face as if he was filming me. I
backed away and asked him to leave me alone and to get away from me. He
refused and kept following me. I then changed directions abruptly and
walked back toward the courthouse entrance. He did the same. Again, I
asked him to get away from me. [¶] He seemed to be making a video for our
daughter or speaking with her, as I could hear him addressing her with the
phone pointed at me. He was narrating how the court hearing went. As I
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walked along the side of the courthouse toward the main entrance, I told two
security guards stationed outside that Mr. Brown was following me.
Mr. Brown continued to follow me. I climbed the courthouse steps, entered
the courthouse, and told security inside the courthouse what was happening.
They called for assistance, and a uniformed officer emerged quickly from
within the building. . . . [¶] As the officer spoke with Mr. Brown on the
courthouse steps, two plainclothes officers (I believe they were officers) told
me they would escort me to the BART station. They planned to take the long
way around Civic Center Plaza, so we would walk away from Mr. Brown.
However, Mr. Brown started following us, even with the uniformed officer
keeping pace. The plainclothes officers then switched plans and decided to
walk me to the courthouse garage to give me a ride to BART in a vehicle. As
we entered the garage, I could hear Mr. Brown arguing with the uniformed
officer about it being a public place. [¶] One of the plainclothes officers
identified himself to me as Oscar. He walked me to the BART turnstile after
they gave me a ride to the station. He instructed me to text him once I was
on the train, or to come back upstairs if Mr. Brown was on the platform. I
went down to the platform and waited for my train, which we had timed to
arrive within five minutes. While waiting, I received a text from Oscar that
he was in touch with the uniformed officer, who was still talking to
Mr. Brown at the courthouse. We thought I would be able to board the train
before Mr. Brown’s arrival. My train arrived and I boarded to return to
Berkeley, thinking all was clear. Somehow though, Mr. Brown had caught
up, and he boarded the same train I did, sitting down near me, with his
phone out as if he were filming me. I got up to move, asking him to stay
away from me, but he followed me to the other end of the car. I texted Oscar
to let him know what was happening and he recommended I contact the
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BART police department. [¶] At the next station, I switched BART cars, but
again Mr. Brown followed me. I moved to the far end of the new car, and he
sat a few seats away, apparently filming, while muttering and staring at me.
I texted and called the BART police. He may have heard part of the call,
because he got off at the West Oakland station, the first East Bay stop after
the transbay tube.”
A.H. concluded her description of January incident as follows:
“Following the incident, Mr. Brown sent me a message stating that I
harassed him by asking for help from the officers. . . . He also suggested that
his behavior during the incident was acceptable since he did not specifically
threaten to hurt me. I never told the police that he threatened to hurt me.
The fact that Mr. Brown believes he can invade my personal space, disturb
my peace, disregard my boundaries, and cause me emotional distress, as long
as he does not threaten to hurt me, underscores the need for [a] restraining
order. [¶] Although I did not fear that Mr. Brown was going to strike me, the
entire incident was emotionally unsettling, caused me distress and anxiety,
and left me physically shaking.” With respect to the incident at the soccer
game, she wrote: “Like the Court of Appeals incident, I did not fear that
Mr. Brown was going to physically strike me. But his complete disregard of
my personal space, my boundaries, the court orders, and the vitriol he was
directing at me, in public where my daughter might witness it, left me
emotionally unsettled and physically shaking, and again, underscores the
need for a restraining order. These recent examples are the continuation and
escalation of a pattern of harassment that has been ongoing for years.”
A.H.’s declaration concludes, “I believe the above incidents are
sufficient to grant me the protection of a temporary restraining order. At the
hearing for a restraining order, I will additionally testify to Mr. Brown’s
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continuous hostile and combative communications, both in writing, and
verbally, but specifically, communications in violation of our court order
dated April 17, 2023, which requires that all non-emergency communication
go through our parenting app, and that all communication be brief,
respectful, and directly related to the minor or the timeshare.”
A temporary restraining order was issued the same day.
In a supplemental declaration filed in February 2025, A.H. attached as
exhibits messages sent by Brown to her since January 31, which she claimed
were representative of Brown’s hostile and combative communications.
In April 2025, Brown filed the motion to strike under section 425.16,
arguing that A.H.’s DVRO request arose from his “constitutionally protected
activity, including written communications made in connection with a judicial
proceeding and expressive conduct in a public forum.” In a declaration
submitted with his reply brief, he explained that he is a founding member of
a nonprofit that advocates for “[r]eforms in family law, especially in the use of
court-appointed mediators and evaluators” and “[b]roader changes within the
family law system.” He also states that he is a professional film maker and
since 2023, in conjunction with the nonprofit, he has been contributing to a
documentary film project to expose abuses by a specific family law mediator
and “systemic issues within the family law courts.” He argues that the videos
he produces and publishes, whether of A.H. or not, “are protected speech
under the U.S. and California Constitutions, as they related to matters of
public concern and are directly connected to [the nonprofit’s] advocacy.”
A.H.’s opposition to the motion to strike makes clear that she while she
“included communications between the parties over [the] parenting app to
show that [Brown] does not follow court orders, and that a restraining order
enforceable by law enforcement is necessary to get him to keep the peace . . .
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[t]he main thrust of [Brown’s] liability is not based on his rude [] messages,
however, but on allegations that he has not been respecting [her] requests to
be left alone, and that he has been following her, harassing her, and
disturbing her peace despite [her] making clear [that] [Brown’s] conduct was
unwelcome.” She argued that, even assuming Brown’s act of filming her was
protected activity, “it is not the act of filming that gives rise to the DVRO
request. It is [Brown] not leaving [her] alone despite her pleas and
continuing to physically follow her and harass her that gives rise to the
DVRO request.” She argued further that even if her DVRO request “did
sufficiently implicate [Brown’s] protected first amendment activities,” the
motion should still be denied because the allegations of Brown’s “behavior
outside the Court of Appeals, at [daughter’s] soccer game, or at [daughter’s]
ballet studio,” together, or individually, are sufficient to establish a
probability of prevailing.
Following a hearing, the court denied the motion to strike.
DISCUSSION
I.
Under section 425.16, a request for a DVRO that arises from an act in
furtherance of a person’s constitutional right of free speech in connection with
a public issue is subject to a special motion to strike, unless the party seeking
the DVRO establishes a probability of prevailing on the request. (Bassi v.
Bassi (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1080, 1093 (Bassi); § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) The
court evaluates a special motion to strike in two steps.
In the first step, “[t]he court must evaluate whether the moving
defendant has shown the speech or act underlying the plaintiff’s claim falls
within one or more of the four categories of protected acts set out in
section 425.16, subdivision (e).” (Bassi, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 1094.)
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“If the defendant prevails at the first step, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
demonstrate the merit of the claim. [Citations.] In the second step, the
plaintiff must show ‘ “that the complaint is both legally sufficient and
supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable
judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” ’ [Citation.]
‘If the plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that his or her claim has at least
minimal merit, then the trial court should deem the cause of action a SLAPP
and should strike it.’ [Citation.] ‘Only a cause of action that satisfies both
prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute—i.e., that arises from protected speech or
petitioning and lacks even minimal merit—is a SLAPP, subject to being
stricken under the statute.’ ” (Ibid.)
“ ‘We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion.
[Citation.] We exercise independent judgment in determining whether, based
on our own review of the record, the challenged claims arise from protected
activity.’ [Citation.] We consider the pleadings and declarations, accepting
as true the evidence that favors the plaintiff . . . and evaluating the
defendant’s . . . evidence ‘ “ ‘ “only to determine if it has defeated that
submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of law.” ’ ” ’ ” (Bassi, supra,
101 Cal.App.5th at p. 1095.)
Here, A.H. assumes for purposes of the present appeal that her DVRO
request arises, in part, from Brown’s protected activity as defined in
section 425.16, subdivision (e). She argues that, even so, the trial court
properly denied the motion because her declaration established a probability
of prevailing on her DVRO request. We agree.
The Domestic Violence Prevention Act, Family Code section 6200
et seq. (DVPA) is intended “to prevent acts of domestic violence, abuse, and
sexual abuse and to provide for a separation of the persons involved in the
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domestic violence for a period sufficient to enable these persons to seek a
resolution of the causes of the violence.” (Id., § 6220.) Courts may issue a
restraining order to achieve this purpose upon “reasonable proof of a past act
or acts of abuse.” (Id., § 6300, subd. (a).) As used in the DVPA, “[a]buse is
not limited to the actual infliction of physical injury or assault.” (Id., § 6203,
subd. (b).) Instead, “abuse” means, among other things, “[t]o engage in any
behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to [Family Code]
[s]ection 6320.” (Id., § 6203, subd. (a).) Under Family Code section 6320,
subdivision (a), a court may enjoin a party from, among other things,
“disturbing the peace of the other party.” Disturbing the peace of the other
party “refers to conduct that, based on the totality of the circumstances,
destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party.” (Id., § 6320,
subd. (c).)
Accepting the contents of A.H.’s declaration as true, the evidence
establishes a reasonable probability that she will prevail on her request for a
DVRO. Brown’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive.
Citing Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260,
Brown argues that “ ‘disturbing the peace’—with no violence, no threats, and
no fear of physical harm—falls below the minimal-merit threshold as a
matter of law.” The cited case, however, involves a special motion to strike a
complaint alleging malicious prosecution. It has no relevance to whether the
conduct described in A.H.’s declaration is sufficient to establish abuse within
the meaning of the DVPA.
Brown fails to cite any case holding that conduct such as that alleged
here is insufficient to establish abuse under the DVPA. Contrary to his
suggestion, the statute makes clear that proof of physical violence or fear of
physical harm is not required. Nor does the statute require proof that Brown
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made any specific threats to A.H. before a DRVO may be issued.2 As A.H.
argues, Brown’s lawful right to film in a public place does not create a right
to harass, follow, intimidate, or disturb the peace of a former spouse. (See,
e.g., Doe v. McLaughlin (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 640, 656 [the First
Amendment does not guarantee the right to harassment of another, even
where the harassment is accomplished through otherwise protected activity].)
II.
We resolve Brown’s additional arguments asserted in his opening brief
summarily. Brown argues that the court erred by denying his motion to
continue the DVRO hearing and by taking A.H.’s testimony after he indicated
he intended to file an appeal. While the court’s order attached to Brown’s
notice of appeal reflects both the denial of the motion to strike and the trial
court’s determination that there was no good cause to continue the DVRO
hearing, his notice purports to appeal only from the order denying his motion
to strike. Accordingly, this argument is beyond the scope of the present
appeal. In any event, any error in the denial of his request to continue was
harmless. As Brown acknowledges, “[a]fter taking [A.H.’s] evidence over [his]
objection, the trial court reversed its earlier ‘no good cause’ ruling, suspended
the trial, and deferred any finding.”
2 For this reason, Brown’s argument that the text messages sent using
the application required by the family court cannot be used to form the basis
of any threat sufficient to support issuance of a DVRO because they are
protected speech under the First Amendment and are privileged under Civil
Code section 47 subdivision (b) is irrelevant. A.H. has not relied on Brown’s
messages to establish any threat and the DVPA does not require A.H. to
prove a specific threat in order to demonstrate that Brown has engaged in
abusive conduct.
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Brown also argues that the court lacked jurisdiction to reissue the
temporary restraining order when the court suspended the proceedings on
June 13 and again on January 29, 2026 and that the firearm prohibition in
the temporary restraining order violates the second amendment. These
orders are not before the court in the present appeal.
Finally, Brown makes several arguments regarding actions taken or
that he anticipates will be taken in the DVRO proceedings. He asserts that
the reassignment of the presiding judge compels a mistrial because the new
judge could not rely on the testimony already taken; that the existing
temporary restraining order is being used improperly to bar discovery in the
DVRO proceedings; and that he was not permitted to call witnesses before
the court suspended the proceedings. As far as we are aware, however, no
final DVRO has been issued. In any event, consideration of these arguments
at this time exceeds the scope of the present appeal and is premature.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Brown’s motion to strike is affirmed.
GOLDMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
BROWN, P. J.
STREETER, J.
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