Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

01 BH Partnership v. Bank of America CA2/1

Filed 10/26/26 01 BH Partnership v. Bank of America CA2/1
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 10/26/26 01 BH Partnership v. Bank of America CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

01 BH PARTNERSHIP, B346656

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21SMCV01405)
v.

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., et
al.,

Defendants and
Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mark H. Epstein, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Mark Goodfriend and Mark Goodfriend for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
McGuireWoods, Shailika S. Kotiya, and Alexandra S.
Farley for Defendants and Respondents.
__________________________________
In 2019, appellant 01 BH Partnership took title to a piece
of real property in Los Angeles (the Property) that was subject to
a deed of trust in favor of respondent Bank of America, N.A., as
servicer for respondent Deutsche Bank National Trust Company,
as Trustee for the Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-9,
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-9 (Deutsche).
The deed of trust secured a 2004 promissory note with an original
principal of $1,085,000.
Shortly thereafter, 01 BH filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
petition. In October 2020, 01 BH and Bank of America entered
into a stipulation, which stated that “SUBJECT TO
APPROVAL BY THE COURT, THE PARTIES HEREBY
STIPULATE AND AGREE AS FOLLOWS,” and then set forth
several terms, including deeming the “Principal” of the
promissory note to be $612,500. It is undisputed the bankruptcy
court never approved the stipulation. Instead, the court
dismissed the bankruptcy in January 2021 without confirming a
plan. Nevertheless, 01 BH timely tendered to Bank of America
four monthly payments that would have been due under the
stipulation; Bank of America returned the payments and
recorded a Notice of Trustee’s Sale.
In August 2021, 01 BH filed a complaint against
respondents. After the trial court declined to issue preliminary
injunctive relief, Bank of America purchased the Property at a
January 2022 trustee’s sale with a credit bid; it subsequently sold
the Property to defendant Mazariat LLC for $552,000 in or
around August 2022.
In April 2023, 01 BH filed its operative, first amended
complaint (FAC) against respondents, Mazariat, and Derek

2
Aghchay.1 The FAC essentially alleges that respondents
breached the October 2020 stipulation and, along with Mazariat
and Aghchay, violated the unfair competition law by colluding to
sell the Property to Mazariat instead of 01 BH. In June 2024,
respondents moved for summary judgment on the grounds that
the condition precedent in the stipulation—bankruptcy court
approval—never occurred, and that 01 BH lacked standing to
bring a claim under the unfair competition law. The court
granted the motion.
On appeal, 01 BH contends the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment for three reasons: (a) the court ignored parol
evidence that demonstrated the parties intended to be bound by
the stipulation even without court approval; (b) the
circumstances surrounding Bank of America’s sale of the
Property to Mazariat was “suspicious”; and (c) the court refused
to continue the summary judgment hearing to permit 01 BH to
conduct necessary discovery. We conclude 01 BH has
demonstrated no error and therefore affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. 01 BH Files a Complaint
In August 2021, 01 BH filed a complaint against Bank of
America and Deutsche. 01 BH alleged that it owned the
Property, which was subject to a first deed of trust securing a
$1,085,000 promissory note held by Deutsche. Bank of America
was Deutsche’s servicing agent on the loan. In October 2020, 01
BH, Deutsche, and Bank of America “entered into a stipulation
that was filed in United States Bankruptcy Court Central

1 Neither Mazariat nor Aghchay is a party to this appeal.

3
District of California, Case No. 1:19-bk-11924-DS, document no.
127 (‘Stipulation’), restructuring the loan for the Property, with
monthly payments in the amount of $4,074.98 beginning April,
2021.”
01 BH attached the stipulation as an exhibit to the
complaint. The stipulation, between 01 BH and Bank of America,
recited that in August 2004, “Christian Spannhoff, Ronald
Mattson and Eugenie Mattson” had executed a promissory note
in favor of America’s Wholesale Lender, and executed a Deed of
Trust granting the lender a “first priority security interest in the
Property.”2 In April 2011, the Deed of Trust was assigned to BAC
Home Loans Servicing, who in turn assigned it to Bank of
America in August 2012. After 01 BH filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy in July 2019, 01 BH and Bank of America disagreed
on the value of the Property for purposes of the reorganization
plan. 01 BH proposed a $300,000 valuation, and Bank of
America proposed a $925,000 valuation.
After the recitals, the Stipulation stated that “SUBJECT
TO APPROVAL BY THE COURT, THE PARTIES HEREBY

2 In a December 2021 minute order, the trial court noted

that in July 2019, two days before 01 BH filed for bankruptcy, the
Mattsons “deeded their interest in the property to Spannhoff.”
The same minute order revealed Spannhoff was the general
partner of 01 BH. In later pleadings, the court took judicial
notice of: (1) an October 2012 Grant Deed executed by Spannhoff
granting an undivided 25 percent interest in the Property to
Spannhoff, an undivided 15 percent interest in the Property to 01
NB Partnership, and an undivided 10 percent interest in the
Property to 01 BH Partnership, as tenants in common; and (2) a
July 2019 Grant Deed executed by Spannhoff and 01 NB
Partnership, granting their interest in the Property to 01 BH.

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STIPULATE AND AGREE AS FOLLOWS.” Among other
terms, the parties agreed Bank of America could file a claim for
$612,500 (i.e., the average of the two proposed valuations), which
would be secured by a deed of trust as a first priority security
interest against the Property. “ ‘Principal’ as defined in the Note
shall be deemed to be $612,500.00, with a fixed interest rate of
7% and principal and interest payments to be made in the
amount of $4,074.98 from the Effective Date of Debtor’s
confirmed plan of reorganization or April 1, 2021, whichever
comes first (the ‘Commencement Date’). The ‘Maturity Date’ as
defined in the Note shall be deemed to be 30 years from the
Commencement Date.” After setting forth the other terms of the
agreement, the parties asked the court to “enter an order
approving this Stipulation.”
01 BH alleged it “made the payments required thereunder,
for April, May, June and July 2021, but Defendants refused to
accept payments.” Instead, “Defendants recorded a notice of sale
August 2, 2021.” Based on these allegations, 01 BH brought five
causes of action: (1) Injunctive Relief; (2) Breach of Contract;
(3) Unfair Business Practices; (4) Declaratory Relief; and
(5) Wrongful Foreclosure.
Respondents answered the complaint in April 2022. In
December 2021, the court denied 01 BH’s request for a
preliminary injunction to enjoin foreclosure proceedings, finding
01 BH had virtually no likelihood of success because the
bankruptcy court never approved the parties’ stipulation.
However, in October 2022, the court mostly denied respondents’
motion for judgment on the pleadings—granting it only as to
injunctive relief because it is a remedy and not a cause of
action—finding that, despite its earlier ruling on 01 BH’s request

5
for preliminary injunction, the court was required to accept the
factual allegations in the complaint in considering a motion for
judgment on the pleadings.

B. 01 BH Amends the Complaint
In April 2023, 01 BH filed a first amended complaint,
adding defendants Mazariat, LLC and Derek Aghchay. 01 BH
again alleged that in October 2020, 01 BH, Bank of America, and
Deutsche entered into a written stipulation, “restructuring the
loan for the Property, with monthly payments in the amount of
$4,074.98.” Although 01 BH made these payments for April,
May, June, and July 2021, “Defendants” refused to accept them.
Instead, in January 2022, “Bank Defendants wrongfully held a
trustee’s sale.” Additionally, although the parties had agreed
“the debt was reduced from over $1.7 million to $612,500, . . . at
the time the trustee’s sale was conducted by Defendants, the
amount of the alleged debt was purportedly in excess of $1.9
million.” At the sale, “Bank of America for the benefit of
Deutsche Bank credit bid the sum of $877,500 and took title to
the Property.” “Mazariat subsequently purchased the Property
from Bank Defendants for $552,000, which was only $3,000 more
than Plaintiff had offered to purchase the Property for. The
Property was conveyed to Mazariat by Quitclaim Deed recorded
on August 9, 2022,” “Mazariat and Aghchay colluded with Bank
to ‘rig’ bidding for the Property and to wrongfully interfere with
Plaintiff’s attempts to purchase the Property from Bank.”
Based on these allegations, 01 BH brought four causes of
action: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Unfair Business Practices;
(3) Declaratory Relief; and (4) Wrongful Foreclosure. All
defendants answered the FAC in May 2023.

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C. The Court Grants Summary Judgment

1. Respondents Move for Summary
Judgment
In June 2024, respondents filed a motion for summary
judgment, set to be heard on September 17, 2024. They argued
the stipulation that was the basis of 01 BH’s breach of contract
claim contained a condition precedent—approval by the
bankruptcy court—that was never fulfilled, and 01 BH had no
evidence to show the parties intended the stipulation to be
binding without the condition precedent occurring.
Respondents also argued 01 BH lacked standing to pursue
its unfair competition claim because it was not 01 BH who offered
to purchase the Property, but an entity named 17 Oakdale LLC,
which was not a party to the action. Further, the claim lacked
merit because there was “no evidence of any conspiracy to
unlawfully sell the property to Mazariat.” Indeed, 17 Oakdale’s
“Final & Best Offer” for the Property was $549,000, and 01 BH
alleged in its FAC that Mazariat purchased the Property for
$552,000 (i.e., $3,000 more). Respondents additionally pointed
out that both Bank of America and 17 Oakdale agreed that Bank
of America: (1) had “ ‘absolute discretion’ in rejecting offers”
because “price was only one factor of many to consider when
accepting or rejecting offers”; and (2) was permitted “to continue
to discuss negotiations and terms with other offerors.”

2. 01 BH Asks the Court to Continue the
Summary Judgment Hearing
On July 31, 2024, 01 BH noticed a deposition for August 12,
2024, for Bank of America’s Custodian of Records. One week
later, Bank of America’s counsel responded they were unavailable

7
on the unilaterally noticed date and asked for deposition dates “in
late August or early September.”
On August 23, 2024, 01 BH noticed three depositions for
September 3, 2024: a deposition for Mazariat’s Person Most
Knowledgeable at 9:30 a.m., a deposition for Aghchay at 11:00
a.m., and a deposition for Bank of America’s Person Most
Knowledgeable at 1:30 p.m. It also noticed a deposition for
September 5, 2024, for Mazariat’s Custodian of Records.
Four days later, Bank of America’s counsel e-mailed 01
BH’s counsel to state Bank of America “would need at least three
weeks to provide the availability of a PMK witness,” and stated
one could be “available during the week of September 23, 2024 or
during the week of September 30, 2024.” Mazariat and Aghchay
had not responded by August 29, 2024.
Based on these events, on August 29, 2024, 01 BH filed an
ex parte application to continue the September 17, 2024
summary judgment hearing “on the grounds that facts essential
to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, be
presented.” The court denied the request, noting the complaint
was filed in August 2021, and thus the court was “utterly at a
loss as to why it is that the kind of basic discovery plaintiff here
seeks was not sought years ago.” The court added that the
discovery “is not pointed discovery; it is blunderbuss discovery,
such as a request for all the documents that support the answer
denying liability.”

3. 01 BH Opposes Summary Judgment
In September 2024, 01 BH opposed the motion for
summary judgment. As to the breach of contract cause of action,
in support of its claim that the parties’ stipulation was intended
to be binding even without court approval, 01 BH pointed to

8
“compelling economic reasons and incentives,” specifically that
“the Property was deeply underwater – having a value of as little
as $300,000 while the secured debt owed to Bank Defendants was
over $1.75 million – with no payments having been made on the
Loan in approximately 10 years.” 01 BH also contended that
“parol evidence, which Plaintiff seeks in discovery, by, inter alia,
taking the deposition of Bank Defendants’ PMK, may both
‘reveal . . . ambiguity’ susceptible to 01 BH’s construction and
support 01 BH’s contention that Bank Defendants at least
understood Plaintiff’s objectively reasonable expectation as to the
binding nature of the Stipulation, if indeed they did not actually
subscribe to it themselves.”
As for the unfair business practices cause of action, 01 BH
argued the “suspicious circumstances of the sale [of the Property]
to Mazariat at least potentially falls within” the “broad
definition” of unfair competition. While the opposition provided
no details of what these “suspicious circumstances” were, 01 BH
concurrently filed a declaration from Ahron Zilberstein in support
of its opposition. Zilberstein declared he was the manager of “540
Van, one of the general partners” of 01 BH, as well as the
“Manager of 17 Oakdale, LLC,” which he claimed was an
“affiliate” of 01 BH. Zilberstein averred that “in seeking to
purchase the Property from Bank Defendants in 2022, [17
Oakdale] was acting on 01 BH’s behalf and as an agent for 01
BH.” Zilberstein admitted that 17 Oakdale’s highest offer for the
Property (made in July 2022) was $549,000, and claimed
respondents accepted an offer from “Defendants Mazariat, LLC
and Aghchay” for $552,000. Zilberstein also declared that in or
around November 2021, both during a voluntary mediation “and
outside it, around that time, 01 BH offered to purchase the Loan

9
for the sum of $612,500, the amount previously agreed upon for
the Loan” but “Bank Defendants declined.” Instead, “Bank
proceeded with a trustee’s sale on January 13, 2022, with the
Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale recorded on March 25, 2022 . . .
reflecting that the total debt at that time was $1.94 million and
that Bank Defendants purchased the Property by a credit bid of
$877,500.”
As for its causes of action for declaratory relief and
wrongful foreclosure, 01 BH contended these were “largely
derivative of the First and Second Causes of Action and should
survive for the reasons set forth above and/or the hearing should
be continued to allow for appropriate discovery.”
Lastly, 01 BH repeated its request for the court to continue
the summary judgment hearing pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h) because “ ‘facts essential
to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, be
presented’ without further discovery,” citing to its inability to
depose the defendants before its opposition was due. In support
of this request, 01 BH submitted a declaration from its counsel
stating 01 BH needed to take the depositions of “the PMK(s) of
Bank Defendants, the PMK of Mazariat, LLC and . . . Derek
Aghchay” because “it is certainly possible that testimony by Bank
Defendants’ PMK concerning Bank Defendants’ reasons for
entering into the Stipulation and the circumstances that led up to
it could be probative as to how the Stipulation should be
interpreted” and whether “Bank Defendants themselves believed
that Plaintiff reasonably understood and believed that Plaintiff
had a reasonable expectation that the Stipulation would be
binding independent of any court action.” Counsel also averred
that 01 BH found “the circumstances surrounding the sale of the

10
Property to Mazariat, involving a razor-thin difference between
the prices offered by 01 BH’s affil[i]ate and Mazariat (or,
apparently by Aghchay, who then assigned his interest to
Mazariat), highly suspicious” and it was “entitled to cross-
examine Defendants and obtain their documents (e.g.,
communicating with each other) in a reasonable attempt to elicit
evidence which may be probative on the issues raised by the
MSJ.” Counsel described the discovery sought as “basic,
foundational discovery” that was “necessary for Plaintiff to
oppose Bank Defendants’ MSJ.” Counsel did not explain why 01
BH could not have taken this discovery sooner.
One week after it filed its opposition, 01 BH also filed its
response to respondents’ separate statement of undisputed facts.3
01 BH disputed respondents’ claim that “the parties entered into
a stipulation (the ‘Stipulation’), which provided for payment of
the claim on the senior lien, explicitly dependent upon approval
of . . . the Bankruptcy Court.” Citing paragraphs 5 through 14 of
Zilberstein’s declaration, 01 BH asserted: “Because the value of
the Property was so low and because of the nonperforming nature
of the Loan, the parties mutually intended that the Stipulation
would resolve a problematic Loan pursuant to a binding
settlement agreement.”4

3 01 BH explained the untimeliness by claiming

“Defendants did not provide an editable Word version [of the
separate statement] in response to Plaintiff’s multiple requests,
commencing on August 30, 2024, until September 5, 2024.”
4 Nothing in Zilberstein’s declaration provides direct

evidentiary support for a claim that Bank of America intended
the stipulation to be binding without court approval.

11
01 BH did not dispute it did not offer to purchase the
Property, but claimed that “17 Oakdale, LLC, which offered to
purchase the subject Property, was an affiliate and agent of 01
BH and acting on its behalf, and before the trustee’s sale in
January 2022,” and that “01 BH itself offered to buy the Loan for
$612,500 -- more than the Property was sold for.” Similarly, 01
BH “disputed” the claim that it had “no evidence . . . that either
Plaintiff or Mazariat submitted a bid at the auction to sell the
Property” by claiming that 17 Oakdale, “which offered to
purchase the subject Property,” was an affiliate and agent of 01
BH.

4.Respondents Reply
In their reply, respondents contended there were no real
disputes of fact. Regarding the breach of contract cause of action,
respondents pointed out that “[a]t no point does Zilberstein attest
that the parties mutually agreed not to be bound by this
condition” of court approval and “Plaintiff makes no argument
about how a 2022 appraisal of the property creates a dispute of
fact relating to the communications with Defendants’ bankruptcy
counsel.” Regarding the unfair competition cause of action,
respondents argued that 01 BH had never before claimed 17
Oakdale was acting as its agent and had served verified discovery
responses stating otherwise. Nor did Zilberstein’s declaration
adequately establish that 17 Oakdale was acting as 01 BH’s
agent. Moreover, 17 Oakdale’s final offer was less than the offer
accepted for the Property.5 Respondents also reiterated that 17

5 As for the offer 01 BH made to buy the loan in mediation,

respondents contended evidence of such an offer violated
Evidence Code section 1119, which “makes clear that ‘[n]o
(Fn. is continued on the next page.)

12
Oakdale agreed that Bank of America had “sole and absolute
discretion to accept, counter, or reject any offers,” and that the
purchase price was only one factor to be considered.
Finally, respondents opposed 01 BH’s request for a
continuance to conduct discovery, arguing that the declaration
from 01 BH’s counsel in support of that request described the
discovery to be taken as “basic, foundational discovery” and
“do[es] not assert parol evidence indicating the parties agreed not
to be bound by the condition precedent even exists.”

5. The Court Grants the Motion
In September 2024, the court granted the motion for
summary judgment. The court declined to continue the hearing
for 01 BH to take discovery, finding that its “presentation lacks
any explanation of how the PMK depositions may contain
controverting evidence” and did not “even attempt to identify any
specific evidence that might be adduced in discovery that would
allow plaintiff to defeat the motion.” The court concluded that “a
fair reading of plaintiff’s position is that it is possible that
something will be discovered.” The court also found the discovery
01 BH sought to conduct was “not targeted discovery aimed at
the summary judgment motion” but “foundational discovery that
should have been done years ago but for some reason was not
done until now.” Noting the case had “been pending for three

evidence of anything said or any admission’ during a mediation is
admissible or subject to discovery, and that all such
communications must remain confidential.” “To the extent that
Plaintiff claims such offers existed outside the scope of mediation,
Plaintiff nevertheless identifies no communication or document
in the Opposition that supports this contention.”

13
years,” the court stated that “[a] party opposing such a motion
[for summary judgment] cannot sit on its hands for years and
then, once the motion is filed, fire off a broadside discovery
request and delay the motion until that discovery has been
produced and disputes concerning it have been resolved on the
theory that maybe there will be something in that discovery
somewhere that might help.”
As for the breach of contract cause of action, the court
found the claim failed because “the stipulation was only to
become effective upon approval by the Bankruptcy Court,” which
did not happen. The court acknowledged 01 BH was arguing the
stipulation contained “a latent ambiguity” that was demonstrated
by the “appraisal reports” and the facts that “the property had
little actual value but secured a debt of over $1.75 million
without any payments having been made over the last ten years.”
But the court opined that this argument required it “to make a
series of strained inferences: that the appraisal reports are
reflective of defendants’ state of mind when they agreed to the
stipulation, they communicated this to plaintiff, and as a result,
the parties agreed the stipulation would be binding even without
approval.” The court concluded 01 BH’s evidence “does not
actually concern the interpretation of the stipulation” and its
argument that the appraisal report reflected respondents’ state of
mind was “sheer speculation and not admissible evidence.” Even
were it “stronger than that,” the court found it unpersuasive and
“decline[d] to draw the inference plaintiff advances.” The court
stated it did “not believe there is an ambiguity” and, even if there
were, respondents’ interpretation was “the only tenable one.”
As for the unfair competition cause of action, the court
found 01 BH lacked standing to bring the claim because it never

14
offered to buy the Property. The court saw no evidence to support
01 BH’s claim that 17 Oakdale was acting as its agent and noted
that, in any case, respondents sold the Property to a higher
bidder. As to 01 BH’s contention that it offered to buy the
Property for $612,500 in November 2021, the court pointed out
that “[n]one of this is alleged in the FAC, including the claim that
its ‘agent’ Oakdale made an offer on its behalf.” The court also
noted it could not consider evidence of any offers made in
mediation.
As for the declaratory relief cause of action, the court
concluded it was derivative of the breach of contract cause of
action and therefore failed as well. Finally, as for the wrongful
foreclosure cause of action, the court found “that plaintiff cannot
establish that the foreclosure was illegal, fraudulent, or willfully
oppressive,” because the “wrongfulness” of the foreclosure was
“predicated on the idea that the stipulation was valid,” a
conclusion the court rejected. Also, the court found 01 BH had
failed to tender the outstanding debt, which was a prerequisite to
setting aside a trustee’s sale.
In November 2024, the court entered a judgment of
dismissal. 01 BH timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
“We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.” (Nieto
v. Blue Shield of California Life & Health Ins. Co. (2010) 181
Cal.App.4th 60, 71.) “The general rule is that summary
judgment is appropriate where ‘all the papers submitted show
that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. . . .’ ”
(Ibid.) “A defendant moving for summary judgment meets this
burden by presenting evidence demonstrating that one or more

15
elements of the cause of action cannot be established or that
there is a complete defense to the action.” (Ibid.) “Once the
defendant makes this showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff
to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to that
cause of action or defense.” (Ibid.) “To determine whether the
parties have met their respective burdens, we consider ‘ “all of
the evidence set forth in the [supporting and opposition] papers,
except that to which objections have been made and sustained by
the court, and all [uncontradicted] inferences reasonably
deducible from the evidence.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
01 BH argues the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment for three reasons: (a) triable issues of material fact
support 01 BH’s contention that the parties intended to be bound
by the stipulation even without court approval; (b) the
“suspicious circumstances” of the sale of the Property to Mazariat
“at least potentially fall[] within” the broad definition of unfair
competition; and (c) the court should have continued or denied
the motion to permit 01 BH to conduct discovery. We address
each contention in turn.

A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting
Summary Adjudication for Breach of Contract
“ ‘Under statutory rules of contract interpretation, the
mutual intention of the parties at the time the contract is formed
governs interpretation. (Civ. Code, § 1636.) Such intent is to be
inferred, if possible, solely from the written provisions of the
contract. (Id., § 1639.) The “clear and explicit” meaning of these
provisions, interpreted in their “ordinary and popular sense,”
unless “used by the parties in a technical sense or a special
meaning is given to them by usage” (id., § 1644), controls judicial

16
interpretation. (Id., § 1638.)’ ” (Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange,
Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 18.)
“[A] condition precedent is either an act of a party that
must be performed or an uncertain event that must happen
before the contractual right accrues or the contractual duty
arises.” (Platt Pacific, Inc. v. Andelson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 307, 313;
see also 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2026)
Contracts, § 799, p. 855 [precedent “is a fact, the happening or
nonhappening of which creates . . . a duty on the part of the
promisor. . . . [I]f the promisor makes a conditional promise, he
or she is bound to perform only if the condition precedent
occurs . . . . The condition may be the happening of an event, or
an act of a party”].)
Here, the parties’ stipulation expressly states in bold,
capital letters: “SUBJECT TO APPROVAL BY THE COURT,
THE PARTIES HEREBY STIPULATE AND AGREE AS
FOLLOWS.” Additionally, the agreement concluded with a
request by the parties that the bankruptcy court “enter an order
approving this Stipulation.” The court’s approval of the
stipulation was thus a condition precedent of the parties’
obligation to perform as agreed in the stipulation. It is
undisputed such approval did not occur, and no evidence suggests
respondents were at fault for the lack of approval. Therefore,
respondents were not obligated to perform as set forth in the
stipulation. (See Van Norden v. Metson (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d
595, 598 [“It is elementary that where a payment is agreed to be
made on the occurrence of a future event and, through no fault of
the promisor, the event does not occur there can be no recovery
on the promise”].)

17
01 BH agrees bankruptcy court approval “did not occur.”
Nor does it contend that, if court approval were a condition
precedent, respondents would not be obligated to perform as set
forth in the stipulation. Instead, 01 BH argues the court erred in
granting summary judgment because it failed to consider that the
“dire circumstances surrounding the execution of the stipulation
support a theory that it was intended by both parties to be and
was binding regardless of court approval.” Specifically, 01 BH
points to the appraisals of the Property, the fact that the loan
was “nonperforming” (as no payments had been made for
approximately 10 years), the “extremely poor condition of the
Property,” and that the “purpose of the stipulation was to avoid
delay, expense, litigation and uncertainty.”
“A contract may be explained by reference to the
circumstances under which it was made, and the matter to which
it relates.” (Civ. Code, § 1647; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 1860
[“For the proper construction of an instrument, the circumstances
under which it was made, including the situation of the subject of
the instrument, and of the parties to it, may also be shown, so
that the Judge be placed in the position of those whose language
he is to interpret”].) But these code sections do not mean that “a
contract reduced to writing and executed by the parties shall
have anything added to it or taken away from it by such evidence
of ‘surrounding circumstances.’ This rule of evidence is invoked
and employed only in cases where upon the face of the contract
itself there is doubt and the evidence is used to dispel that doubt,
not by showing that the parties meant something other than
what they said but by showing what they meant by what they
said.” (United Iron Works v. Outer Harbor Dock & Wharf Co.
(1914) 168 Cal. 81, 84.) In other words, “[t]he test of

18
admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a
written instrument is . . . whether the offered evidence is relevant
to prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is
reasonably susceptible.” (Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. G. W. Thomas
Drayage etc. Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 33, 37.)
Even if the evidence 01 BH cites supported an inference
that the parties intended to be bound by the stipulation without
court approval, 01 BH points to no actual ambiguity in the
agreement that this evidence would help us interpret. Nor does
01 BH explain what latent ambiguity is revealed by this
evidence. “Subject to approval by the court” is not reasonably
susceptible to the meaning “even without approval by the court.”
“Courts will not strain to create an ambiguity where none exists.”
(Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc., supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 18–
19.) The failure of the stipulation’s condition precedent obviated
respondents’ obligation to abide by its terms, and thus, as a
matter of law, 01 BH cannot recover for breach of contract
against respondents for not following its terms.6

6 None of 01 BH’s cited cases holds differently.(See Garcia
v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1984) 36 Cal.3d 426, 433, 435 [extrinsic
evidence admissible to determine meaning of “supervisory or
instructional services” because “ ‘test of admissibility of extrinsic
evidence to explain the meaning of a written instrument is not
whether it appears to the court to be plain and unambiguous on
its face, but whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove a
meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably
susceptible’ ”]; Neverkovec v. Fredericks (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th
337, 351–352 [when release agreement “purports to release
anyone chargeable with liability for Larry Neverkovec’s injuries”
but “also provides that Howard (on Larry’s behalf) must ‘repay’
any additional amounts that anyone chargeable with liability for
(Fn. is continued on the next page.)

19
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting
Summary Adjudication for Unfair Competition
The unfair competition law (UCL) “prohibits, and provides
civil remedies for, unfair competition, which it defines as ‘any
unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.’ ”
(Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 320.)
Business and Professions Code section 17204 provides that a
private party bringing an action for relief under the UCL must be
“a person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or
property as a result of the unfair competition.” (See also Kwikset,
at pp. 321–322 [“under the UCL, standing extends to ‘a person
who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as
a result of the unfair competition’ ”].) In other words, for a
private party to have standing to bring a claim under the UCL, it
must “establish a loss or deprivation of money or property
sufficient to qualify as injury in fact, i.e., economic injury,” and
“show that that economic injury was the result of, i.e., caused by,
the unfair business practice or false advertising that is the
gravamen of the claim.” (Id., at p. 322.)
01 BH argues that Business and Professions Code section
17200 defines unfair competition broadly, and “the suspicious
circumstances of the sale [of the Property] to Mazariat at least
potentially fall[] within” that definition. Although 01 BH does
not articulate what these “suspicious circumstances” are,

Larry’s injury might be compelled to pay in the future,”
agreement is ambiguous about who is released from liability—
because “[i]f the release was to be operative against anyone liable
for Larry’s injuries, Larry could not be expected to recover further
amounts from which to make repayments”—and therefore
extrinsic evidence permitted to aid in interpreting it].)

20
elsewhere in its appellate briefing, it states that respondents sold
the Property “for a de minimis $3,000 more than 01 BH’s affiliate
offered, but $60,500 less than 01 BH had recently offered.”
Specifically, after 17 Oakdale made a “Final & Best Offer” of
$549,000 in July 2022, respondents sold the Property to Mazariat
for $552,000, even though Bank of America rejected 01 BH’s
November 2021 offer of $612,500 to buy the loan.
01 BH’s cause of action fails as a matter of law. First, “[i]t
is well established that the pleadings determine the scope of
relevant issues on a summary judgment motion.” (Nieto v. Blue
Shield of California Life & Health Ins. Co., supra, 181
Cal.App.4th at p. 74.) “The complaint limits the issues to be
addressed at the motion for summary judgment. The rationale is
clear: It is the allegations in the complaint to which the
summary judgment motion must respond.” (Laabs v. City of
Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1258.) “If a plaintiff
wishes to expand the issues presented, it is incumbent on the
plaintiff to seek leave to amend the complaint either prior to the
hearing on the motion for summary judgment, or at the hearing
itself.” (Ibid.) “A moving party seeking summary judgment . . . is
not required to go beyond the allegations of the pleading, with
respect to new theories that could have been pled, but for which
no motion to amend or supplement the pleading was brought,
prior to the hearing on the dispositive motion.” (Howard v. Omni
Hotels Management Corp. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 403, 421.) As
the trial court found, nowhere in the FAC does 01 BH argue that
respondents violated the UCL because they failed to accept 01
BH’s November 2021 offer of $612,500 to buy the loan. Thus, we
are not required to consider this theory. (See Johnson v.

21
Raytheon Co. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 617, 636 [“A plaintiff may
not oppose summary judgment by raising a theory not pleaded”].)
Second, we agree with the trial court that 01 BH lacks
standing to pursue a claim for violating the UCL. Zilberstein
asserted that in November 2021, both in and “outside” mediation,
01 BH offered to buy the loan for $612,500, but respondents
refused. In January 2022, Bank of America purchased the
Property at a foreclosure sale for a “credit bid” of $877,500,
substantially more than 01 BH offered for the loan. Six months
later, 17 Oakdale—not 01 BH—offered $549,000 for the Property,
but respondents sold the Property to Mazariat for a higher price.
01 BH cites no evidence that its $612,500 offer was still valid or
was re-extended after respondents’ previous rejection. Nor does
it cite any evidence to contradict respondents’ assertion that 01
BH neither bid on the Property at the Trustee’s Sale, nor
subsequently made any offers to purchase the Property.
Therefore, because there is no evidence that 01 BH was a
potential buyer of the Property when Bank of America was
selling it, 01 BH lacks standing because there is no evidence it
suffered an economic injury, or that any alleged wrongdoing by
respondents in selling the Property to Mazariat caused 01 BH
economic injury.
Third, even if 01 BH were able to demonstrate that 17
Oakdale was offering to buy the Property as 01 BH’s agent—a
proposition supported only by the testimony of Zilberstein, and
not any documentary evidence establishing an agency—as the
trial court pointed out, it is undisputed that 17 Oakdale did not
offer the most money for the Property. Again, 01 BH points to no
evidence that it renewed its previous offer of $612,500, which
respondents had rejected eight months prior. Because the

22
undisputed evidence shows that respondents sold the Property to
the highest bidder, 01 BH’s “suspicio[n]” that respondents and
the other defendants colluded is insufficient to create a triable
issue of material fact. The trial court did not err in finding 01
BH could not recover as a matter of law under its unfair
competition cause of action.

C. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Declining to
Continue the Hearing for the Summary
Judgment Motion
“If it appears from the affidavits submitted in opposition to
a motion for summary judgment . . . that facts essential to justify
opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, be presented,
the court shall deny the motion, order a continuance to permit
affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had, or make any
other order as may be just.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (h).)
The parties agree that we review the court’s order denying a
continuance for abuse of discretion.
“A declaration in support of a request for continuance
under section 437c, subdivision (h) must show: ‘(1) the facts to be
obtained are essential to opposing the motion; (2) there is reason
to believe such facts may exist; and (3) the reasons why
additional time is needed to obtain these facts.’ ” (Cooksey v.
Alexakis (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 246, 254.)
In support of its request for a continuance, 01 BH’s counsel
submitted a declaration stating that he needed to depose
respondents because “it is certainly possible that testimony by
Bank Defendants’ PMK concerning Bank Defendants’ reasons for
entering into the Stipulation and the circumstances that led up to
it could be probative as to how the Stipulation should be
interpreted,” and he needed to depose Mazariat, and Aghchay

23
because 01 BH “is entitled to cross-examine Defendants and
obtain their documents (e.g., communicating with each other) in a
reasonable attempt to elicit evidence which may be probative on
the issues raised by the MSJ.”
Whether or not counsel’s declaration adequately
demonstrated the facts 01 BH sought to obtain were “essential to
opposing the motion,” it failed to show any reason to believe these
facts may exist or explain the reasons why additional time was
needed to obtain them. With regards to respondents, presumably
any written communications they had with 01 BH about the
stipulation would be in 01 BH’s possession, and any oral
communication could be testified to by whichever member of 01
BH respondents spoke with. 01 BH provided neither
documentary evidence nor a declaration from any of its members
or managers to suggest the existence of any facts in respondents’
sole possession that would be relevant to support a theory that
the stipulation was enforceable even without court approval. As
the trial court noted, the discovery 01 BH was requesting “is not
targeted discovery aimed at the summary judgment motion.” 01
BH’s “presentation lacks any explanation of how the PMK
depositions may contain controverting evidence” and did not
“even attempt to identify any specific evidence that might be
adduced in discovery that would allow plaintiff to defeat the
motion.” We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that “a fair
reading of plaintiff’s position is that it is possible that something
will be discovered.” That is insufficient.
With regards to Mazariat and Aghchay, as discussed above,
it is undisputed that respondents sold the Property to the highest
bidder. The fact that eight months prior to the sale, respondents
may have rejected a bid to buy the loan for $612,500 is

24
insufficient evidence to reasonably believe the discovery 01 BH
wished to conduct would reveal any facts to support a theory of
collusion between respondents, Mazariat, and Aghchay,
especially when, after the rejection, Bank of America purchased
the Property for a credit bid of $877,500, substantially more than
the $612,500 it turned down.
Moreover, 01 BH makes no attempt to explain why it
needed additional time to obtain these facts. As its counsel
readily admits, the discovery sought was “basic, foundational
discovery.” Given that 01 BH filed the original complaint in
August 2021, and the FAC in April 2023, 01 BH provided no
explanation as to why it had not even deposed the principal
defendants by September 2024. We agree with the trial court
that the requested discovery was “foundational discovery” that
should have been done long ago. On this record, we cannot
conclude the trial court abused its discretion by failing to permit
additional discovery before ruling on the summary judgment
motion.7

7 As for 01 BH’s remaining causes of action for declaratory

relief and wrongful foreclosure, 01 BH argues only that these
causes of action “are largely derivative of the First and Second
Causes of Action and should survive for the reasons set forth
above and/or the hearing should be continued to allow for
appropriate discovery.” As we conclude 01 BH cannot prevail on
the first two causes of action as a matter of law, and that the
court did not err in declining to continue the hearing to allow 01
BH to conduct discovery, so too do we conclude 01 BH cannot
prevail on these “largely derivative” causes of action.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their
costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

M. KIM, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

BENDIX, J.

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