1 2 3 4	Scott A. McMillan, SBN 212506 The McMillan Law Firm, APC 4670 Nebo Drive, Suite 200 La Mesa, CA 91941-5230 Tel (619) 464-1500 x 14 // Fax (206) 60 email: scott@mcmillanlaw.us	00-5095		
5	Alan Alexander Beck, SBN 276646 Attorney at Law 4780 Governor Drive			
6 7	San Diego, CA 92122 Telephone: (619) 971-0414 Email: ngord2000@yahoo.com			
8	Attorneys for Dimitirios Karras			
9				
10	UNITED STATI	ES DISTRICT COURT		
11	SOUTHERN DIST	TRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
12		•		
13	DIMITRIOS KARRAS, an individual,	Case No.: 3:14-cv-02564-BEN-KSC		
14	Plaintiff,	EX-PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER		
15	V.	AND APPLICATION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.		
16	WHILLIAM D. CODE CHEDIEE !			
17	WILLIAM D. GORE, SHERIFF, in his official capacity, COUNTY OF	Judge: Hon. Roger T. Benitez		
18	SAN DIEGO, a municipal corporation, UNKNOWN SAN	Courtroom: 5A Hearing Date:		
19	DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT FACEBOOK	Hearing Time:		
20	FAN PAGE ADMINISTRATORS I through V, in their individual and			
21	official capacities, inclusive, DOES VI THROUGH XX INCLUSIVE,			
22	Defendants.			
23				
24	TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR	R ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:		
25	Plaintiff Dimitrios Karras hereby	moves this Court under Federal Rules of		
26	Civil Procedure 65 to grant Plaintiff's ex-parte application for temporary			
27	restraining order, and for the court to set a briefing schedule on a preliminary			
28	injunction for the following relief:			

1 That Defendants desist and refrain from deleting or editing any 2 comments posted on the Facebook page maintained by the San Diego 3 County Sheriff's Department at URL: 4 https://www.facebook.com/sdsheriff. 5 **Further,** that defendants desist and refrain from preventing any persons from posting to the Facebook page for the San Diego County 6 7 Sheriff's Department at URL: https://www.facebook.com/sdsheriff. **Further,** that those persons that have been banned from 8 9 publishing comments at this URL: https://www.facebook.com/sdsheriff be allowed to publish their 10 11 comments on the comments section. 12 **Further**, that this relief shall be effective immediately. 13 **Further,** that no bond is required. 14 This application is based on this notice, the accompanying memorandum of points and authorities, the declaration of Dimitrios Karras, the declaration of 15 Lindy Diaz, all pleadings, papers, and records filed in this case, and any additional 16 17 evidence that may be submitted at the hearing on this application. 18 Respectfully submitted, 19 The McMillan Law Firm, APC 20 Dated: October 29, 2014 21 /s/ Scott A. McMillan 22 23 Scott A. McMillan Attorney for Dimitrios Karras 24 Plaintiff 25 26 27 28 EX-PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND APPLICATION FOR

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.

1	Scott A. McMillan, SBN 212506				
2	The McMillan Law Firm, APC 4670 Nebo Drive, Suite 200				
3	La Mesa, CA 91941-5230 Tel (619) 464-1500 x 14 // Fax (206) 600-5095				
4	email: scott@mcmillanlaw.us				
5	Alan Alexander Beck, SBN 276646 Attorney at Law 4780 Governor Drive				
6	San Diego, CA 92122				
7	Telephone: (619) 971-0414 Email: ngord2000@yahoo.com				
8	Attorneys for Dimitirios Karras				
9	LINITED STATES	DISTRICT COURT			
10		ICT OF CALIFORNIA			
11		1			
12	DIMITRIOS KARRAS, an individual,	Case No. 3:14-cv-02564-BEN-KSC			
13	Plaintiff,	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF EX			
14	V.	PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING			
15	WILLIAM D. GORE, SHERIFF, in	ORDER AND APPLICATION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION			
16	his official capacity, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, a municipal corporation, UNKNOWN SAN				
17	DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFF'S				
18	DEPARTMENT FACEBOOK FAN PAGE ADMINISTRATORS I through V, in their individual and official				
19	capacities, inclusive, DOES VI THROUGH XX INCLUSIVE,				
20	Defendants.				
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23		_			
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2526					
20 27					
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۷۵					

1		TABLE OF CONTENTS	Page
2	I.	Introduction	Ü
3	II.	Jurisdiction	
4	III.	Notice	
5	IV.	Facts	
6	V.		
7		Standards on Granting an order for Injunctive Relief	
8	VI.		
9		A. Fair Chance of Success	
0		1. Defendants are a "person" subject to 42 U.S.C. 1983	
1		2. Defendants' violated Plaintiff's rights in their operation of th Facebook page	e 6
2		a. Defendants' enforcement of it vague "civility" policy impaired Mr. Karras's First Amendment right to comment on the official Facebook page	7
4 5		b. Defendants' are unlikely to demonstrate that their need to regulate the content of speech about Government activities for "civility"	8
6			9
7 8		c. Defendants' Internet forum was a designated public forum because it indiscriminately invited all persons to participate in discussion	
9		d. Defendants' "civility policy" fails exacting scrutiny analysis because there is no vital interest in maintainin civility on an Internet forum and it eliminated Mr. Karras's political opportunity	
1 2 3		e. Content-based restrictions fail the strict scrutiny analysis because there is no compelling state interest in maintaining civility on an Internet forum	
			12
4 5		f. Lacking guidelines on "civility" Defendants will be unable to rebut the clear viewpoint discrimination demonstrate here.	ed 12
6 7		B. Suppression of Speech comprises Irreparable Injury that Money Damages alone cannot remedy	15
8			16
	3:14-cv-025	Memo. Re Issuance of Injunctive Relief	i

		Case	3:14-cv-0)2564-BI	EN-KSC	Document	6-1	Filed 10/29)/14	Page 3	3 of 23	
1		C.	The Bala Defer	ancing o	of Hardsh cannot be	ips test favo harmed by	rs P Kar	laintiff Karr ras's speecl	as b	ecause		. 16
2		D.	The disp	ute impl	icates a n	natters of pu	ıblic	interest				. 16
3		E.	The Cou	ırt shoul	d not req	uire a bond.						. 16
4	VII.	Co	nclusion.									. 17
5		TA	ABLE OF	CONT	ENTS FO	OR ATTAC	HM	ENTS				. 18
6 7				• • • • •					• • •	• • • • •		. 18
8												
10												
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25												
26												
27												
28												
	3:14-cv-02	564-BEI	V- <i>KSC</i>	Mer	no. Re Is	suance of Ir	njun	ctive Relief				ii

1	TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2	United States Constitutional Authority Page
3	First Amendment to the United States Constitution, Free Speech Clause 8
4	Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
56789	Federal Decisional Authority Amandola v. Town of Babylon, 251 F.3d 339 (2d. 2001)
10	Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 11 Buckley v. Valeo, 42 U.S. 1 (1976). 10
11 12	Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund., Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985) ., Inc., 473
13	Doctors Assoc., Inc. v. Stuart, 85 F.3d 975, 985 (2d Cir. 1996) 16
14	Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976)
15	FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978)
16	Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992)
17	<i>Gillette v. Delmore</i> , 979 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1992) 6
18	Int'l Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) 9
19	Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150 v. Vill. of Orland Park, 139 F. Supp. 2d 950 (N.D. Ill. 2001)
20	Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1978)
21	Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)
22	Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)
23	New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
24 25	Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 598 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2010)
25	Norse v. Santa Cruz, 586 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2009)
27	Penbaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) 6
28	Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) 9
_0	Reed v. Town of Gilbert, AZ, 587 F.3d 966, 974 (9th Cir. 2009)
	3:14-cv-02564-BEN-KSC Memo. Re Issuance of Injunctive Relief vi

Case 3:14-cv-02564-BEN-KSC Document 6-1 Filed 10/29/14 Page 5 of 23

1	Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1992) 13
2	S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark, 152 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 1998)
3	Scher v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972)
4	<i>Texas v. Johnson</i> , 491 U.S. 397 (1989)
5	Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945)
6	Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 989 F.2d 1254 (9th Cir. 1993) 5
7	United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Sw. Ohio Reg'l Transit Auth,163 F.3d 341, (6th Cir. 1998)11
8	West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988)
9 10	Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927)
11	Federal Statutory Authority
12	28 U.S.C. § 1367
13	42 U.S.C. § 1983
14	28 U.S.C. § 1367
15	42 U.S.C. § 1983
16	
17	Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
18	Fed. R. Civ. P. 65
19	Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)
20	California Constitutional Authority
21	California Constitution Article I. 8 2(a) "Free Speech Clause"
22	California Constitution, Article I, § 2(a), "Free Speech Clause."
23	Other Authority David S. Ardio Covernment Speech and Online Forums.
24	David S. Ardia, Government Speech and Online Forums: First Amendment Limitations on Moderating Public
25	First Amendment Limitations on Moderating Public Discourse on Government Websites, 2010 BYU L. Rev. 1981 (2010),
26	
27	
28	
	Memo. Re Issuance of Injunctive Relief vii

I. Introduction

Sheriff Bill Gore maintains an official Facebook page. Dimitrios Karras posted on the page. Finding the comments disagreeable, Sheriff Gore's Facebook page administrators deleted Mr. Karras's comments and then banned him from posting thereafter.

Plaintiff Dimitrios Karras (Karras) brings the instant applications for *ex parte* temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to stop the Defendant William B. Gore, Sheriff of San Diego County (Sheriff Gore), from suppressing viewpoints and criticism of his office in the forum that his government agency has otherwise opened up to the public through Facebook. Sheriff Gore's staff not only deletes the comments that the Sheriff's Department disagrees with posted on the official Sheriff's Facebook page, but bans the posters. Sheriff Gore provides no means for a once banned poster, to recover their ability to once again participate in the forum otherwise open to the public.

Plaintiff Dimitrios Karras seeks an Order from this Court providing the following relief:

That Defendants desist and refrain from deleting or editing any comments posted on the Facebook page maintained by the San Diego County Sheriff's Department at URL: https://www.facebook.com/sdsheriff.

Further, that defendants desist and refrain from preventing any persons from posting to the Facebook page for the San Diego County Sheriff's Department at URL:

https://www.facebook.com/sdsheriff.

Further, that those persons that have been banned from publishing comments at this URL:

https://www.facebook.com/sdsheriff be allowed to publish their comments on the comments section.

1 **Further**, that this relief shall be effective immediately. 2 **Further,** that no bond is required. 3 Jurisdiction 4 II. 5 Plaintiff Karras invokes this Court's Federal Question jurisdiction under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. As this case is brought according to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 applies. The 7 8 Court has supplemental jurisdiction as to the Third Cause of Action according to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 9 10 Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides the remedial 11 vehicle to stop the Sheriff Department's censorship. 12 III. **Notice** 13 Plaintiff's attorney Scott McMillan provided notice of this matter to the parties, and their counsel, as known. In the event that the parties or their attorneys 14 15 cannot be present to be heard in opposition, this Court should enter a temporary 16 restraining order without notice, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). IV. **Facts** 17 18 Defendants are a municipal corporation and its agents operating in a 19 number of locations within the County of San Diego. [Karras Dec. ¶ 3]. 20 Defendants, including elected political official, Sheriff Gore, operate a Facebook 21 fan page for the San Diego County Sheriff's Department. [Karras Dec. ¶ 4]. The 22 Facebook fan page, a government-operated Internet forum, invites Internet users 23 to leave comments and opinions on any stories or photos that Defendants post on its Internet forum. [Karras Dec. ¶ 5]. 24 25 26 27

Defendants describe a number of rules for these users in its "General Information":

We are not opposed to dissenting opinions on topics we post, but we ask that our social conversations remain civil, respectful and on-topic. Many of our postings concern matters of employee and volunteer successes. We believe it is the height of incivility to use those opportunities to vent about unrelated topics or offer unrelated insults. We are respectful of the right we all have to free speech. We invite any users with opinions on any topic to post anything they want on their social media accounts. We simply ask for a degree of civility when making comments on our pages. Any user would likely expect the same of those posting made by others to their pages. Comments on topics outside these postings may be directed to the Sheriff's Department via http://www.sdsheriff.net/ ("civility" policy").

[Karras Dec. ¶ 32].

Defendants enforce this "civility" policy by removing comments that fail to be "civil, respectful, and on-topic." [Karras Dec. ¶ 33]. Defendants leave no other guideline to the public for determining what it means to be "civil, respectful, and on-topic."

On September 2, 2014 Mr. Karras posted a comment on the Sheriff's Department Facebook fan page. [Karras Dec. ¶ 7]. Within the hour, Plaintiff was startled to find that his comment was removed, and that he was banned from making further comments. [Karras Dec. ¶ 8].

On September 3, 2014, Mr. Karras called the Sheriff's office to determine why he was prevented from commenting and why he had been banned from making further comments. [Karras Dec. ¶ 9]. After requesting transfer to a staff member who administers the Sheriff's Department Facebook fan page, Plaintiff was transferred to Defendant Unknown San Diego County Sheriff's Department Facebook Fan Page Administrator I. [Karras Dec. ¶ 10]. Administrator I, a female, explained to Mr. Karras that she would not allow him to post on the Sheriff's Department Facebook fan page. [Karras Dec. ¶ 10].

Mr. Karras, baffled, continued to investigate the extent of Defendants' practice of removing comments and banning users who infringe on its posted

1	"civility" policy. [Karras Dec. ¶ 12].		
2	Undeterred, on September 3, 2014, Mr. Karras posted under his alias		
3	Facebook account with the name "Jim Block," to the Sheriff's page. He posted		
4	the following criticism of Defendant Sheriff William D. Gore under a post		
5	entitled "#Brake4Buses." [Karras Dec. ¶ 13]. Mr. Karras's comment was as		
6	follows:		
7	"Sheriff Gore: Do you plead the 5th about your involvement in the		
8	MURDER of an unarmed woman who was holding her baby?		
9	REMEMBER RUBY RIDGE."		
10	[Karras Dec. ¶ 13].		
11	Then, without any explanation, Defendants removed Plaintiff's comment.		
12	[Karras Dec. ¶ 15]. To investigate Defendants' censorship, Plaintiff scoured		
13	through the Sheriff's Department Facebook fan page and observed removal of a		
14	number of comments that appear negative to the Sheriff's Department, and the		
15	curious lack of removal for those that praise the Sheriff's Department. [Karras		
16	Dec. ¶ 20].		
17	Sheriff William B. Gore's currently seeks re-election without any declared		
18	opposition candidate. Plaintiff Karras is aware of the status. [Karras Dec. ¶¶ 32-		
19	33].		
20	V. Standards on Granting an order for Injunctive Relief		
21	The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure empower the District Court to grant		
22	both preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders. F.R.C.P. Rule 65.		
23	The traditional equitable criteria for determining whether an injunction should		
24	issue are		
25	(1) Have the movants established a strong likelihood of success on		
26	the merits;		
27	(2) does the balance of irreparable harm favor the movants;		
28	///		

(3) does the public interest favor granting the injunction?

American Motorcyclists Ass'n v. Watt, 714 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1983).

The alternative test holds that "preliminary injunctive relief is available to a

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points on a sliding scale in which the required degree of irreparable harm increases as the probability of success decreases.' [Citation omitted] If the

party who demonstrates either (1) a combination of probable success and the possibility of irreparable harm, or (2) that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardship tips in its favor." Arcamuzi v. Continental Air Lines, Inc.,

819 F.2d 935, 937 (9th Cir. Cal. 1987). "These two formulations represent two

plaintiff shows no chance of success on the merits, however, the injunction

should not issue." Id. "As an "irreducible minimum," the moving party must demonstrate a *fair chance* of success on the merits, or questions serious enough to

require litigation." *Id.* (emphasis added).

Further, a movant must show that he suffered a significant threat of irreparable injury. Arcamuzi, 819 F.2d at 937. The plaintiff "need not demonstrate that he risks irreparable injury, but he must at least show that he will suffer a degree of hardship that outweighs the hardship facing the opposing party if the injunction is not issued." Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 989 F.2d 1524, 1528 (9th Cir. 1993).

For a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief, irreparable injury is presumed if he alleges First Amendment violations, "for even minimal periods of time." Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976); Topanga Press, Inc., 989 F.2d at 1528-29.

VI. Argument

Fair Chance of Success. Α.

As shown below, Plaintiff should prevail on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for three reasons: (1) Plaintiff can show that he is likely to prevail under a Monell analysis for municipal corporations and its agents; (2) Defendants' policy likely violates both the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and the "Free Speech Clause" of the California State Constitution; and (3) Defendants' policy fails to afford Plaintiff sufficient due process.

1. Defendants are a "person" subject to 42 U.S.C. 1983.

To recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that (1) a defendant violated the plaintiff's constitutional right; and (2) that defendant was a person acting under the color of state law. *West v. Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Municipal corporations and their agents are persons acting under state law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. *Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv.*, 436 U.S. 658, 683-90 (1978). A plaintiff can prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the plaintiff shows that a municipal agent committed a constitutional violation under a formal government policy or longstanding custom or practice. *See Gillette v. Delmore*, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 1992). The regulation does not have to be written law, but should "fairly be said to represent official policy." *Monell*, 436 U.S. at 694. In addition, liability may be based on a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances. *Penbaur v. City of Cincinnati*, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986).

2. Defendants' violated Plaintiff's rights in their operation of the Facebook page.

Defendant Sheriff Gore's official policy (located in the "General Information" section of the Sheriff's Department Facebook fan page) for censoring the public's comments is the following: "[Defendants] ask that our social conversations remain civil, respectful and on-topic . . . [w]e invite any users with opinions on any topic to post anything they want on their social media accounts . . . [w]e simply ask for a degree of civility when making comments on our pages." [Karras Dec. ¶ 32]. Defendants' evaluation of acceptable speech of whether the speech is "civil" or "uncivil" is entirely within the exercise of Defendants' discretion.

Sheriff Gore gives no objective criteria as "civil" speech is.

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Yet, under this policy, Defendants twice removed Mr. Karras's comment
and banned him from continuing to publish his comments on the Sheriff's
Department Facebook fan page. At least one of the removed comments contained
criticism of the Sheriff Gore, a political official who is seeking reelection to
office. [Karras Dec. ¶¶ 22, 24, 26, 27.]

In his post, Plaintiff criticized the Sheriff Gore's handling, while employed by the FBI of the circumstances surrounding the 1992 shooting death of Vicki Weaver. [Karras Dec. ¶ 13]. Defendants' "civility" policy and its subsequent actions are not in sufficient compliance with First Amendment limitations on government censorship of speech.

a. Defendants' enforcement of it vague "civility" policy impaired Mr. Karras's First Amendment right to comment on the official Facebook page.

A plaintiff can show causation by showing "some kind of direct personal participation in the deprivation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury." *Johnson v. Duffy*, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978).

Defendants had direct personal participation in the deprivation because Defendants, as the administrators of the Sheriff's Department Facebook fan page, removed Plaintiff's comments and banned Plaintiff from making additional comments on the Internet forum. Additionally, Defendants indirectly confirmed their censorship of Plaintiff's speech over the phone when Plaintiff called the Defendants requesting answers and a resolution –and being told that by Defendant Unknown San Diego County Sheriff's Department Facebook Fan Page Administrator, that he was not allowed to post on the Sheriff's Department Facebook fan page. [Karras Dec. ¶ 9, 10.]

Therefore, Defendants directly caused injury to Plaintiff by denying him

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exercise of his First Amendment rights.

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b. Defendants' are unlikely to demonstrate that their need to regulate the content of speech about Government activities for "civility".

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that

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"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech" U.S. Const. Amend. I.

Likewise, Article 1, Section 2 (a) of the Constitution of the State of California provides that "[e]very person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press." Cal. Const. art. 1, § 2(a).

California's free speech clause and "its right to freedom of speech are not only broad and as great as the First Amendment's, they are even 'broader' and 'greater.'" Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, 24 Cal.4th 468, 491 (2000).

No decisional authority under this nation's First Amendment jurisprudence remotely suggests that the government should oppress speech simply because society finds the speech "offensive or disagreeable." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). In fact, the founding fathers argued that engaging in political speech was a public duty. "Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law – the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed." Whitney v. California., 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

This Court should "consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement,

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Here, Defendants' Sheriff's Department Facebook fan page is a designated

caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).

c. Defendants' Internet forum was a designated public forum because it indiscriminately invited all persons to participate in discussion.

One extent to the government's ability to limit a person's speech under the First Amendment depends on the character of the property where the speech took place. Under the Public Forum Doctrine, there are three categories of forums that set the limits to the government's ability to limit speech: (a) "traditional" public forums, (b) "designated" or "limited" public forums, and (c) "non-public" forums. See Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-49 (1983). The government has minimal ability to limit a person's speech in a "traditional" public forum (e.g., streets or parks) and the maximum ability to limit a person's speech in a "non-public" forum (e.g., a public school's internal mail system). See e.g., id. at 45, 47.

A "designated" or "limited" public forum is "public property which the State has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity." See id. at 45. To determine whether a "designated" or "limited" public forum exists, a court analyzes the government's intent to create such a forum by examining its "policy and practice" as to the forum, and "the nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive activity." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund., Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). Under a "designated" or "limited" public forum, a government's regulation of speech is reviewed under the same exacting scrutiny as a traditional public forum. *Int'l Society for Krishna Consciousness*, *Inc. v. Lee*, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992). Thus, if the court finds that an Internet forum is a designated public forum, then the government has minimal ability to limit a person's speech—it is as if the plaintiff spoke in a park or on a street corner.

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public forum. It explicitly invites "any [Internet] user with opinions on any topic to post anything they want " [Karras Dec. ¶ 32].

The Sheriff's Facebook page allows an interactive discussion between any user (including Defendants), on any Internet-connected device that has Web access, in the form of comments, emoticons, or even Facebook "likes." [Karras Dec. ¶ 6]. There is no ostensible limit to the types of comments other than Defendants' vague requirements that the "social conversations remain civil, respectful, and on-topic."

d. Defendants' "civility policy" fails exacting scrutiny analysis because there is no vital interest in maintaining civility on an Internet forum and it eliminated Mr. Karras's political opportunity.

Political express is a core First Amendment right. Buckley v. Valeo, 42 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1976). Because of this, the courts must evaluate the defendants' case to exacting scrutiny. *Id.* In "core" political expression cases, "the restriction can be sustained "only if it furthers a 'vital' government interest . . . that is achieved by means that does not unfairly or unnecessarily burden either [party's] continued availability of political opportunity." See id. at 94.

Here, Mr. Karras engaged in political speech. He questioned Sheriff Gore's involvement in a 1992 shooting of a woman [Decl. Karras ¶ 13], a topic of discussion on political leadership and decision-making that is worthy of critique and discussion in light of the upcoming November election. It should weigh on voters' minds as they make their voting decisions.

Defendants can cite to no "vital" government interest because there is no "vital" government interest in, at best, maintaining a "civil" Internet forum for discussion. Furthermore, Defendants's means to achieve any "vital" government interest is impermissible under the exacting scrutiny test. This is because Defendants' chosen means to pursue any legitimate interest in censoring Mr.

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Karras's speech necessarily unfairly and unnecessarily burden's Mr. Karras's political expression – in fact, in one single click of the mouse, they *eliminated* Mr. Karras's right to political expression. Therefore, Defendants' infringement of Mr. Karras's right to political expression cannot be ignored by this Court.

e. Content-based restrictions fail the strict scrutiny analysis because there is no compelling state interest in maintaining civility on an Internet forum.

Content-based restrictions are government regulations where either the underlying policy is to "suppress particular ideas or, if the regulation, by its very terms, singles out particular content for differential treatment." *Reed v. Town of Gilbert, AZ*, 587 F.3d 966, 974 (9th Cir. 2009).

If the government opens up a forum for discussion over "a wide array of political and public-issue speech," a content-based restriction on speech in a designated public forum must be subjected to strict scrutiny analysis. *See e.g.*, *United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Sw. Ohio Reg'l Transit Auth.*, 163 F.3d 341, 352-53 (6th Cir. 1998). Under content-based strict scrutiny review, government action limiting a person's speech "must be necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." *Boos v. Barry*, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).

Here, the government Defendants explicitly engage in content-based restriction on speech. Defendants suppress speech that they consider to be "uncivil." Furthermore, Defendants not only remove "uncivil" comments, but Defendants ban any speaker from making further speech based on possible future comments from the speaker—it actively restrains the speaker from making any future public comment of any kind. Defendants unambiguously engage in the worst kind of content-based restrictions of speech in a designated forum. Therefore, this Court should evaluate Defendants' regulations under strict scrutiny analysis.

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And under the scope of strict scrutiny, Defendants are unlikely to be able to satisfy their burden. Defendants are unlikely to show that there is a compelling state interest in its iron-first moderation of an Internet forum that invites all users to share their opinions. There are no safety concerns. There are no disruption issues that impede on the conducting of government business. *E.g.*, *Norse v.*Santa Cruz, 586 F.3d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 2009), reh's en banc granted, Norse v.

City of Santa Cruz, 598 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that a city council properly ejected the plaintiff for being disruptive during a city council meeting).

There is no case law that Defendants can rely on to support their arguments. As to the "narrowly tailored" requirement, the policies that govern the First

Amendment restrictions on the Sheriff's Department Facebook fan page are not narrowly drawn because enforcement of its "civility" requirements are entirely within the Defendants' whim.

Therefore, Defendants are unlikely to be able to show that their current Sheriff's Facebook fan page policy meets strict scrutiny analysis.

f. Lacking guidelines on "civility" Defendants will be unable to rebut the clear viewpoint discrimination demonstrated here.

As part of the government's burden to show that its application of content-based restrictions for its website was permissible under strict scrutiny analysis, the government must also show that its censorship does not discriminate based upon the speaker's viewpoint. *See Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement*, 505 U.S. 123, 130-31 (1992). The government must show that its regulation was reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral. *Cornelius*, 473 U.S. at 806.

When a government enacts "civility" or "decorum" policies for website use, for those policies to be reasonable, the government must show that its civility or decorum policies contain "narrow, objective, and definite standards" to ensure that the government does not engage in viewpoint discrimination. David S. Ardia,

1 Government Speech and Online Forums: First Amendment Limitations on Moderating Public Discourse on Government Websites, 2010 BYU L. Rev. 1981, 3 2004 (2010)¹; Forsyth Cnty., 505 U.S. at 131. 4 The underlying principle behind viewpoint discrimination is that if a 5 government chooses to promote speech at all, it must promote all forms of speech equally. Viewpoint discrimination is "thus an egregious form of content 6 7 discrimination. The government must abstain from regulating speech when the 8 specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction." Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 10 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1992). 11 This is a difficult standard for a government defendant to meet. Courts have "consistently" invalidated government policies that "merely leave it to the 12 government's discretion to determine what is acceptable." Ardia, supra, at 2004-5 13 (citing Amandola v. Town of Babylon, 251 F.3d 339, 341 (2d. 2001) (reversing 14 15 the district court denial of plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction in a case 16 involving wrongful facility permit policies); Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 17 Local 150 v. Vill. of Orland Park, 139 F. Supp. 2d 950, 954 (N.D. Ill. 2001) 18 (granting a preliminary injunction to plaintiffs involving a case of wrongful 19 picketing permit policies)). As a bottom line rule: the government cannot 20 suppress speech simply because society may find the speech offensive. FCC v. 21 Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978). 22 The facts in this case suggest no reason to deviate from established First 23 Amendment jurisprudence. Defendants failed to set out a "narrow, objective, and 24 definite standard" to its ability to restrict speech on its designated public forum. 25 And through its "civility" requirement, it twice stopped Plaintiff from making his 26 speech (at least one of which was his lawful criticism of a government official) 27 ¹ This article is available at: Available at: 28

nttp://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2010/iss6/1

and then banned him from making any further speech – simply based on the content of the initially "offending" speech. When the government can decide what is an acceptable viewpoint, and what is not – the government engages in viewpoint discrimination, as did the Defendants in this case.

Therefore, Defendants' administration of its Sheriff's Department Facebook fan page and its "civility" policy violates the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Free Speech guaranteed of the California State Constitution.

3. Defendants lack any predetermined method for providing Procedural Due Process to persons who have been banned.

The Due Process clause states "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." This requires procedural safeguards to accompany substantive choices. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). Plaintiff's comments were censored and their further participation forbidden without any explanation. Mr. Karras had no recourse to recover those comments or challenge being banned from the site. [Karras Dec. ¶ 11].

When analyzing procedural due process, the court should apply the three factor test articulated by the Supreme Court in *Mathews v. Eldridge*. There, the Supreme Court stated that in order to determine the adequacy of due process, the following should be considered: First, "[t]he private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and, finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." *Mathews*, 424 U.S. at 335.

Here, the interest affected is Plaintiff's fundamental right to free speech.

The risk of erroneous deprivation is very high as it appears that Defendants make arbitrary decisions, without explanation, and allow no means to have that decision reviewed. Plaintiff suffered erroneous deprivation by having his comments removed, and being banned from further commenting on the Sheriff's Department Facebook fan page.

The administrative burden imposed on Defendants would be, at worst, minimal. If Defendants want to limit free speech, all they would have to do is simply turn the commenting ability off..

If Defendants were to create a policy that unquestioningly protects constitutional free speech, the only foreseeable additional burden that should be imposed is affording aggrieved citizens some form of review pertaining to their removed post(s). Citizens should be notified and afforded some meaningful opportunity to be heard before being prohibited from participating in the public discussion. While it is highly doubtful that the number of citizens aggrieved by such action would overwhelm the administrators, even if it did require additional or even substantial effort on the part of Defendants, such is the cost due process requires.

For these reasons, Plaintiff is likely to prevail on the Due Process cause of action.

B. Suppression of Speech comprises Irreparable Injury that Money Damages alone cannot remedy.

The right to speech and expression guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of California is fundamental. And "the loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestioningly constitutes irreparable injury." *S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark*, 152 F.3d 1136, 1148 (9th Cir. 1998).

Mr. Karras wants to comment on Sheriff Gore's tax-payer supported page prior to the November 4 election. Thus, each day that he is unable to do so causes

irreparable injury. [Karras Dec. ¶ 37].

C. The Balancing of Hardships test favors Plaintiff Karras because Defendants' cannot be harmed by Karras's speech.

The grave hardship of denial of fundamental liberties is imposed solely on Plaintiff. There is no likelihood that Defendants will be damaged as a result of restoring Plaintiff's removed comments and allowing Plaintiff to participate in its online forum. Moreover, there is a substantial public interest at stake because the instant litigation concerns the government's subject-matter restriction on speech made in a designated public forum.

D. The dispute implicates a matters of public interest.

The instant case revolves around political speech that is undeniably a matter of public interest because Mr. Karras's speech was core political speech. His questioning of Sheriff Gore's handling of a 1992 shooting of a woman [Decl. Karras ¶ 13], is relevant in light of the upcoming November election. Questioning public authority is a vital First Amendment interest.

The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind through regulating the press, speech, and religion. In this field every person must be his own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any government to separate the true from the false for us.

Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945). Mr. Karras's speech and speeches of others like him serve a critical interest in ensuring that the government cannot, by its own censorship of the press, speech, and regulation, be the guardianship of the public mind. Here, it is clear that Mr. Karras's right to political expression is the right that should be protected. Not the government's to limit it.

E. The Court should not require a bond.

Because there is a strong likelihood of success on merits as shown above. Therefore, Plaintiff respectfully requests a nominal bond be imposed, if at all. *See Doctors Assoc., Inc. v. Stuart*, 85 F.3d 975, 985 (2d Cir. 1996); *Scher v. Volpe*, 466 F.2d 1027, 1035 (7th Cir. 1972).

1	VII. Concl	lusion		
2	Based	upon the foregoing, F	Plaintiff resp	pectfully urges this Court to issue a
3	Temporary F	Restraining Order and	a Prelimina	ary Injunction preventing Defendants
4	from underta	king any further denia	al of the rig	ht to free speech and expression
5	based on the	content of the speech	thereof, ar	nd/or violations of due process
6	thereof			
7				Respectfully Submitted,
8	Dated:	October 29, 2014		THE McMillan Law Firm, A.P.C.
9				/s/ Scott A. McMillan
10			BY:	
11				Scott A. McMillan
12				Attorney for Plaintiff Dimitrios Karras
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Memo. Re Issuance of Injunctive Relief

1	TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR ATTACHMENTS	
2	Declaration of Dimitrios Karras w/ Exhibits	
3	Declaration of Lindy Diaz w/ Exhibits	
4		
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		
10		
11		
12		
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	Memo. Re Issuance of Injunctive Relief	

1	Scott A. McMillan, SBN 212506	
2	4670 Nebo Dr., Suite 200	
3	Scott A. McMillan, SBN 212506 The McMillan Law Firm, APC 4670 Nebo Dr., Suite 200 La Mesa, CA 91941-5230 Tel. 619-464-1500 x 14 // Fax (206) 600- email: scott@mcmillanlaw.us	-5095
4	Alan Alexander Beck, SBN 276646	
5	Attorney at Law 4780 Governor Drive	
6	San Diego, CA 92122 Telephone: (619) 971-0414	
7	Email: ngord2000	
8	Attorneys for Dimitrios Karras	
9		
10	UNITED STATES	DISTRICT COURT
11	SOUTHERN DISTRI	CT OF CALIFORNIA
12		
13	DIMITRIOS KARRAS, an individual,	Case No. 3:14-cv-02564-BEN-KSC
14		
15	Plaintiff,	DECLARATION OF DIMITRI KARRAS IN SUPPORT OF EX
16	V.	PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
17	WILLIAM D. GORE, SHERIFF, in his official capacity, COUNTY OF SAN	ORDER AND APPLICATION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
18	DIEGO, a municipal corporation, UNKNOWN SAN DIEGO COUNTY	
19	SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT FACEBOOK FAN PAGE	Date: Time:
20	ADMINISTRATORS I THROUGH V, in their individual and official capacities,	Dept.:
21	inclusive, DOES VI THROUGH XX INCLUSIVE,	
22	Defendants.	
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26	111	
27	///	
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DECLARATION OF DIMITRI KARRAS

I, DIMITRIOS KARRAS, declare as follows:

- 1. I am the plaintiff in the above captioned case, and if called before this court or any other court I could and would testify competently to the following from my own personal knowledge except as to those matters I state on information and belief, and as to those matters I believe them to be true.
- 2. This declaration is made in support of the present Ex-Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Application for Preliminary Injunction.
- 3. I am aware that the San Diego County Sheriff's Department is a municipal corporation, and that the agency and its agents operate within the County of San Diego.
- 4. Defendants, including elected political official, Defendant Sheriff William D. Gore (Sheriff Gore), operate a Facebook fan page for the San Diego County Sheriff's Department at the following URL: https://www.facebook.com/sdsheriff
- 5. The San Diego County Sheriff's Department Facebook fan page invites Internet users to leave comments and opinions on any stories or photos that Defendants post on the website.
- 6. The San Diego County Sheriff's Department Facebook page allows an interactive discussion between any user (including Defendants), on any Internet-connected device that has Web access, in the form of comments, emotions, or even Facebook "likes."
- 7. On or about September 2, 2014, I posted a comment on the San Diego County Sheriff's Department ("Sheriff's Department") Facebook fan page.
- 8. Within the hour, my posted comment was removed; and, at the same time, my personal Facebook account was banned from further commenting on the Sheriff's Department Facebook fan page.

depiction of the censorship is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.

- 16. On or about September 4, 2014, I sent a letter to Defendants demanding that they bring themselves into compliance with the First Amendment and announcing that I would take legal action, if they did not. A true and correct copy of the letter, dated September 4, 2014, is attached hereto as **Exhibit 3**.
- 17. On or about September 4, 2014, my friend, Lindy Diaz, posted a comment on the Sheriff's Department Facebook fan page. She posted the following:

Are you the same person that is responsible for the death of Vicki Weaver. If so, how are you not in jail? If the world was just you would be tried for your crimes.\

A fair and accurate depiction of the posting is attached hereto as Exhibit 4.

- 18. On or about the evening of September 4, 2014, I saw that Lindy Diaz's comment was removed. A fair and accurate depiction of the censorship is attached hereto as **Exhibit 5**.
- 19. On or about the evening of September 4, 2014, Lindy Diaz informed me that she too was banned from posting comments on the Sheriff's Department Facebook fan page.
- 20. After further investigations into Defendants' censorship, I observed the removal of a number of comments that appear negative to the Sheriff's Department, and the curious lack of removal for comments that praise the Sheriff's Department.
- 21. On or about September 9, 2014, I saw a comment posted on the Sheriff's Department Facebook fan page by user Brendon Benghazi Von, referencing Sheriff Gore, which stated:

What about Bill Gore? Isn't he responsible for the death of 2 people at ruby ridge?

A fair and accurate depiction of the posting by user Brendon Benghazi Von is attached hereto as **Exhibit 6**.

22. Later, on or about September 9, 2014, I saw that user Brendon

23. On or about September 9, 2014, I saw another comment posted on the Sheriff's Department Facebook fan page by user TJ Smith, referencing a deadly 1992 confrontation between government agents and the wife of a religious leader, Vicki Weaver, which stated (with a picture of Vicki Weaver):

Can I bring my mom, she is drop dead gorgeous.

A fair and accurate depiction of the posting by TJ Smith is attached hereto as **Exhibit 7**.

- 24. On or about September 10, 2014, I saw that user TJ Smith's comment was removed. A fair and accurate depiction of the censorship is attached hereto as **Exhibit 8**.
- 25. As another example, on or about September 3, 2014, I saw that one post from the Sheriff's Department Facebook fan page should have displayed eight comments. A fair and accurate depiction of the option to view eight comments is attached hereto as **Exhibit 9**.
- 26. However, I saw that the same post only displayed four comments when I chose to "show" all comments. A fair and accurate depiction of the inconsistency is attached hereto as **Exhibit 10**.
- 27. And as another example, on or about September 4, 2014, I saw that one post from the Sheriff's Department Facebook fan page should have displayed nineteen comments, but I was only able to view ten of them. A fair and accurate depiction of the inconsistency is attached hereto as **Exhibit** 11.
- 28. And as another example, on or about September 4, 2014, I saw that one post from the Sheriff's Department Facebook fan page should have displayed six comments, but I was only able to view four of them. A fair and accurate depiction of the inconsistency is attached hereto as **Exhibit 12**.

- 29. On or about September 8, 2014, I saw that comments such as "Good job guys!! Keep it up! We appreciate ya!" were posted on the San Diego County Sheriff's Department's Facebook fan page. A fair and accurate depiction of the positive comment is attached hereto as **Exhibit 13**.
- 30. On or about September 10, 2014, I saw that the same positive comments that praise the Defendants were not censored. A fair and accurate depiction of the self-serving lack of censorship is attached hereto as **Exhibit** 14.
- 31. On or about October 28, 2014, I reviewed the "About" Section of the San Diego County Sheriff's Department Facebook fan page, which details its posting policies. A fair and accurate depiction of the policies are attached hereto as **Exhibit 15**.
- 32. I read from the "About" section of the San Diego County Sheriff's Department Facebook fan page that there are a number of rules for posting a comment to the San Diego Sheriff's Department Facebook fan page. Those rules are the following:

We are not opposed to dissenting opinions on topics we post, but we ask that our social conversations remain civil, respectful and on-topic. Many of our postings concern matters of employee and volunteer successes. We believe it is the height of incivility to use those opportunities to vent about unrelated topics or offer unrelated insults. We are respectful of the right we all have to free speech. We invite any users with opinions on any topic to post anything they want on their social media accounts. We simply ask for a degree of civility when making comments on our pages. Any user would likely expect the same of those posting made by others to their pages. Comments on topics outside these postings may be directed to the Sheriff's Department via http://www.sdsheriff.net/

- 33. Defendants remove comments that fail to be "civil, respectful, and on-topic" according to the standards that they alone define and enforce.
 - 34. I am aware that Sheriff Gore is a candidate for the November

- 1			
1	2014 election for Sheriff. A fair and accurate depiction of the Sheriff Gore's		
2	Candidate Intention Statement is attached hereto as Exhibit 16.		
3	35. I am aware that Sheriff Gore is unopposed for the November		
4	2014 election.		
5	36. I believe that Defendants targeted my comments for removal		
6	and banned me from the public forum in light of the upcoming November		
7	2014 election.		
8	37. I want to comment and post on Sheriff Gore's tax-payer		
9	supported page prior to the November 4 election. Thus, each day that I am		
10	unable to do so causes irreparable injury. Defendants do not have an		
11	appeal process that I am able to participate in to have my ability to post		
12	comments restored.		
13	38. I seek a stop to further violations of the First Amendment and		
14	other just compensation for the time I spent bringing this injustice to light.		
15	I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and		
16	correct. Executed on October 29, 2014.		
17			
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19	Dimitrios Karras		
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1	Trable of Contents for	
2	Table of Contents for Exhibits Decl. of Dimitrios Karras	
	Exhibit #	Description District Dimitries Verses's somment on
3	Ex. 1	Plaintiff Dimitrios Karras's comment on
4		#Break4Buses post.
5	Ex. 2	Defendants' censorship of Plaintiff Dimitrios
6		Karras's comment on #Break4Buses post.
7	Ex. 3	Plaintiff Dimitrios Karras's letter to
8		Defendants concerning Defendants' First
9		Amendment violations.
10	Ex. 4	Lindy Diaz's comment on Facebook fan page.
11	Ex. 5	Defendants' censorship of Lindy Diaz's
		comment on Facebook fan page.
12	Ex. 6	User Brendon Benghazi Von's comment on
13		Facebook fan page.
14	Ex. 7	User TJ Smith's comment on Facebook fan
15		page.
16	Ex. 8	Defendants' censorship of User TJ Smith's
17		comment on Facebook fan page.
18	Ex. 9	A Facebook fan page post that should have
19		contained eight comments.
20	Ex. 10	Inconsistent number of comments.
21	Ex. 11	A Facebook fan page post that should have
22		contained nineteen comments.
23	Ex. 12	A Facebook fan page post that should have
24		contained six comments.
	Ex. 13	Speech that Defendants promote.
25	Ex. 14	Speech that Defendants do not censor.
26	Ex. 15	"About" Section of the San Diego County
27		Sheriff's Department Facebook fan page.
28	Ex. 16	Sheriff Gore's Candidate Intention Statement

EXHIBIT 1





EXHIBIT 2



Lycurgan, Inc. Ares Armor

208 N Freeman St

Oceanside, CA 92054

TO: Sheriff Bill Gore

FROM: Dimitrios Karras, CEO Ares Armor

SUBJ: 1st Amendment Violation and MURDER OF VICKI WEAVER

DATE: September 4, 2014

Sheriff Gore,

Firstly, I would like to congratulate you on holding the public office that you do. This is quite the accomplishment considering your past. The simple fact of the matter is that YOU are responsible for the death of an unarmed woman while she was holding her infant child. The orders that YOU gave, which were then followed by your subordinates, directly caused Vicki Weaver to be shot in the head. She was unarmed and posed no threat to you or your officers.

This is not why I write to you today though. I write to you in regards of your censorship of a public forum. This activity is despicable in every way. You are an elected official and you are using the publicly owned Facebook page http://Facebook.com/sdsheriff as a tool to silence any who would have negative comment about your ability and fidelity to hold this office.

The veracity of the comments that you remove from this page are never questioned, the only thing that is accomplished is censorship. Your illegal actions serve to remove any dissenter's rights to speak on this particular public forum. Others who support you are allowed to speak in this same public forum without restriction.

I have screenshots of the censorship that occurred; the comments were not profane or otherwise inappropriate.

As much as I dislike a murderer such as yourself holding the office that you do, I do not wish to burden the public with legal action to force you into complying with the law.

Let this be notice to you, if you do not within 14 days:

- Un-block all of the citizen's accounts from the public Facebook page of the San Diego Sheriff's Department and allow these citizens the same 1st amendment rights that you allow to your supporters.
- Cease and Desist ALL unreasonable censorship of political speech on the public forum Http://facebook.com/sdsheriff

I will then be left no option but to take legal action against your violations of the people's 1st amendment rights by means of civil suit. I pray that it does not come to this and that you will do the right thing and comply with the law on this particular issue.

I hope you live with your cowardice and your shame for a thousand years. May your children and your children's children learn of your disgrace and cast their eyes to the ground in embarrassment at the mere mention of your name.

With great disgust,

Dimiteos Karras, CEO Ares Armor



































San Diego County Sheriff's Departn

Government Organization

Timeline About

Photos

Events

Location

Hours

Phone

Website

Basic Info

Joined Facebook09/11/2009

Contact Info

More +

9621 Ridgehaven

Mon - Fri: 8:00 a

(858) 565-5200

http://www.sdshe

About

Sheriff Bill Gore - Official San Diego County Sheriff's Department - This is a nonemergency communications tool. In an emergency dial 9-1-1.

Description

The San Diego County Sheriff's Department is the chief law enforcement agency in San Diego County. The department is comprised of approximately 4,000 employees, both sworn officers and professional support staff. The department provides general law enforcement, detention and court services for the people of San Diego County in a service area of approximately 4,200 square miles, In

addition, the department provides specialized regional services to the entire

county, including the incorporated cities and the unincorporated areas of the

SHERIFF'S ROLF

county.

The Sheriff, elected by the residents of San Diego County, is the chief executive of the department. He manages seven major detention facilities as well as eight major patrol stations, four patrol substations, a crime laboratory and an array of support operations necessary to provide full law enforcement coverage for the County of San Diego.

GENERAL SERVICE AREAS

The San Diego County Sheriff's Department is organized into six general service areas which includes the following:

- ■Office of the Sheriff
- ■Law Enforcement Services
- ■Detention Facility Services
- ■Court Services
- Human Resource Services ■Management Services

Law Enforcement Services

Decl. of Karras Ex. 15 p.1

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■Management Services

Law Enforcement Services

The San Diego County Sheriff's Department provides contract law enforcement services for the cities of Del Mar, Encinitas, Imperial Beach, Lemon Grove, Poway, San Marcos, Santee, Solana Beach and Vista. In these cities the Sheriff's Department serves as their police department, providing a full range of law enforcement services including patrol, traffic and investigative services.

In the unincorporated (non-city) areas, the Sheriff's Department provides generalized patrol and investigative services. The California Highway Patrol has the primary jurisdiction for traffic services in unincorporated areas.

Detention Services

The San Diego County Sheriff's Department operates seven detention facilities. Male arrestees are booked at the San Diego Central Jail and Vista Detention Facility, while female arrestees are booked at the Las Colinas and Vista Detention Facilities. The remaining jails house inmates in the care of the Sheriff.

In order to provide critical services to a daily inmate population over 5,000, the Detention Services Bureau is supported by a state-of-the-art food services production center, comprehensive medical services, laundry, commissary, and inmate processing services. The Inmate Services Division provides a number of educational and rehabilitative programs aimed at improving the reentry success of those returning to our communities.

Court Services

In January 2000, the former San Diego County Marshal's Office merged with the Sheriff's Department. Since that time, the Sheriff has provided court security and related services for the San Diego Superior Court at several locations throughout the county.

General Information

Decl. of Karras Ex. 15 p. 2

We are not opposed to dissenting opinions on topics we post, but we ask that

Law Enforcement Services

services for the cities of Del Mar, Encinitas, Imperial Beach, Lemon Grove, Poway, San Marcos, Santee, Solana Beach and Vista. In these cities the Sheriff's Department serves as their police department, providing a full range of law

Page 42

enforcement services including patrol, traffic and investigative services. In the unincorporated (non-city) areas, the Sheriff's Department provides generalized patrol and investigative services. The California Highway Patrol has the primary jurisdiction for traffic services in unincorporated areas.

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Detention Services

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social conversations remain civil, respectful and on-topic. Many of our postings concern matters of employee and volunteer successes. We believe it is the height

of incivility to use those opportunities to vent about unrelated topics or offer unrelated insults. We are respectful of the right we all have to free spee... See More

Careers

Decl. of Karras Ex. 15 p. 3

Find Friends Badges People Pages Places Games Locations About

Privacy

Cookies

Terms

Help

e Ad

Create Page

Developers

Case 3:14-cv-02564-BEN-KSC Document 6-2 Filed 10/29/14 Page 44 of 44 2013 APR 30 A 10: 49 cz CANDIDATE INTENTION STATEMENT **Candidate Intention Statement** Date Stamp **CALIFORNIA** D S. D. CO. ROV **FORM** For Official Use Only Check One: Amendment (Explain) 1. Candidate Information: MBER (optional) E-MAIL (optional) NAME OF CANDIDATE (Last, First, Middle Initial) FRE WILLIAM STATE ZIP CODE DISTRICT NUMBER, if applicable. OFFICE SOUGHT (POSITION TITLE) NON-PARTISAN PARTY: State (Complete Part 2.) ☐ Multi-County: 2. State Candidate Expenditure Limit Statement: (CalPERS and CalSTRS candidates, judges, judicial candidates, and candidates for local offices do not complete Part 2.) Primary/general election Special/runoff election (Check one box) ☐ I accept the voluntary expenditure ceiling for the election stated above. l do not accept the voluntary expenditure ceiling for the election stated above. Amendment: O I did not exceed the expenditure ceiling in the primary or special election held on: ____/___ and I accept the voluntary expenditure ceiling for the general or special run-off election. (Mark if applicable) _____, I contributed personal funds in excess of the expenditure ceiling for the election stated above. 3. Verification: I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Decl. of Karras Ex. 16

FPPC Form 501 (April/2011) FPPC Toll-Free Helpline: 866/ASK-FPPC (866/275-3772)

-	Case 3:14-cv-02564-BEN-KSC Documer	t 6-3 Filed 10/29/14 Page 1 of 7	
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Scott A. McMillan, SBN 212506 The McMillan Law Firm, APC 4670 Nebo Dr., Suite 200 La Mesa, CA 91941-5230 Tel. 619-464-1500 x 14 // Fax (206) 600 email: scott@mcmillanlaw.us Alan Alexander Beck, SBN 276646 Attorney at Law 4780 Governor Drive San Diego, CA 92122 Telephone: (619) 971-0414 Email: ngord2000 Attorneys for Dimitrios Karras	-5095	
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11	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
12	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
13			
14	DIMITRIOS KARRAS, an individual,	Case No. 3:14-cv-02564-BEN-KSC	
15			
16	Plaintiff,	DECLARATION OF LINDY DIAZ IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE	
17	V.	APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND	
18	WILLIAM D. GORE, SHERIFF, in his official capacity, COUNTY OF SAN	APPLICATION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION	
19	official capacity, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, a municipal corporation, UNKNOWN SAN DIEGO COUNTY		
20	SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT FACEBOOK FAN PAGE		
21	ADMINISTRATORS I THROUGH V, in their individual and official capacities, inclusive DOES VI THROUGH VY		
22	inclusive, DOES VI THROUGH XX INCLUSIVE,		
23	Defendants.		
24			
25			
26	///		

1 DECLARATION OF LINDY DIAZ 2 I, Lindy Diaz, do solemnly swear or affirm under the penalty of perjury that the following is true and is based upon my own personal knowledge. 3 I am over the age of 18 years old and fully competent to testify to the 4 5 following matters based upon my own personal knowledge. On or about September 4th, 2014, I posted a comment on the San Diego 6 2. 7 County Sheriff's Department Facebook fan page with the following: 8 Are you the same person that is responsible for the death of Vicki 9 Weaver. If so, how are you not in jail? If the world was just you 10 would be tried for your crimes.\ 11 12 A fair and accurate depiction of the posting is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. 13 On or about the evening of September 4th, 2014, my comment was 14 removed. A fair and accurate depiction of the censorship is attached hereto as 15 Exhibit 2. 16 On or about the evening of September 4th, 2014, I found out that I was 17 banned from posting comments on the Sheriff's Department Facebook fan page. 18 19 FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 20 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. 21 Executed on October 79, 2014. 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Declaration of Lindy Diaz 2

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Table of Contents	able of Contents for Exhibits Decl. of Lindy Diaz	
Exhibit #	Description	
Ex. 1	Lindy Diaz's post on the Facebook fan page.	
Ex. 2	Defendants' censorship of the same.	

DECLARATION OF LINDY DIAZ



