Schneider v. Superior Court

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Filed 12/6/13  Schneider v. Superior Court CA4/3

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

 

 

 

California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b).  This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

 

 

IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 

FOURTH
APPELLATE DISTRICT

 

DIVISION
THREE

 

 
>

WILLIAM SCHNEIDER,         Petitioner,                            v.   THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY,         Respondent;   THE PEOPLE,         Real Party in Interest.

G046895            (Super. Ct. No. M8776)            O P I N I O N

 

                        Original proceedings;
petition for a writ of mandate/prohibition to challenge an order of the
Superior Court of href="http://www.adrservices.org/neutrals/frederick-mandabach.php">Orange
County, David A. Hoffer, Judge. 
Petition denied.

                        Frank Ospino, Public
Defender, Jean Wilkinson, Chief Deputy Public Defender, Sharon Petrosino and
Mark S. Brown, Assistant Public Defenders, for Petitioner.

                        No appearance for
Respondent.

                        Tony Rackauckas,
District Attorney, and Elizabeth Molfetta, Deputy District Attorney, for Real
Party in Interest.

*                *                *

>Introduction

William Schneider is the subject
of a commitment petition filed pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act,
Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 et seq. (SVPA).href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">^[1]  The
respondent court found, pursuant to section 6602, probable cause existed
to believe Schneider met the criteria for commitment as a href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">sexually violent predator.  By this petition for writ of mandate or
prohibition, Schneider challenges the respondent court’s decision to receive in
evidence at the probable cause hearing two evaluation reports prepared by
psychologists appointed to evaluate him pursuant to section 6601.  For reasons we will explain, we deny the petition.


>Overview
of the SVPA Screening and

Evaluation Process

The
SVPA provides for involuntary civil commitment of an offender immediately upon
conclusion of his or her prison term if the offender is found to be a sexually
violent predator.  (Reilly v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 641, 646 (>Reilly); People v. Yartz (2005) 37 Cal.4th 529, 534.)  A sexually violent predator is defined as “a
person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against one or more
victims and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger
to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will
engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.” 
(§ 6600, subd. (a)(1).) 
A “diagnosed mental disorder” is defined to include “a congenital or
acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that
predisposes the person to the commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree
constituting the person a menace to the health and safety of others.”  (§ 6600, subd. (c).)

The
procedure for commitment under the SVPA begins with an initial screen in which
the Secretary of California’s Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR) determines whether a person in CDCR custody might be a sexually violent
predator.  (§ 6601, subd. (a)(1).)  If the secretary determines the person might
be a sexually violent predator, the secretary refers that person to the next
level evaluation.  (Ibid.) 

After
the secretary’s referral, the person is screened by the CDCR and the Board of
Parole Hearings in accordance with “a structured screening instrument”
developed and updated by the State Department of State Hospitals (SDSH) in
consultation with the CDCR. 
(§ 6601, subd. (b).) 
“If as a result of this screening it is determined that the person is likely
to be a sexually violent predator, the [CDCR] shall refer the person to the
[SDSH] for a full evaluation of whether the person meets the criteria in
Section 6600.”  (>Ibid.)

The
procedures for a full evaluation are set forth in section 6601, subdivision (c)
(section 6601(c)) and section 6601, subdivisions (d) through
(i).  Under section 6601(c) and
section 6601, subdivision (d), the person is evaluated by two
practicing psychiatrists or psychologists, or by one of each profession.  The evaluations must be conducted “in
accordance with a standardized assessment protocol, developed and updated by
the [SDSH], to determine whether the person is a sexually violent predator as
defined in this article.” 
(§ 6601(c).)  If both
evaluators find the person “has a diagnosed mental disorder so that he or she
is likely to engage in acts of sexual violence without appropriate treatment
and custody,” then the SDSH forwards a request to file a petition for
commitment to the county of the person’s last conviction.  (§ 6601, subd. (d).)  If the county’s designated counsel concurs
with the recommendation, then counsel files a petition for commitment in the
superior court.  (§ 6601, subd. (i).)

If
one of the two professionals performing the evaluation does not conclude the person
meets the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent predator, and the other
concludes the person does meet those criteria, then the SDSH “shall arrange for
further examination of the person by two independent professionals selected in
accordance with subdivision (g).” 
(§ 6601, subd. (e).)  If
an evaluation by two independent professionals is conducted, a petition for
commitment may be filed only if both concur the person meets the criteria for
commitment as a sexually violent predator. 
(§ 6601, subd. (f).)

Upon
filing of the SVPA commitment petition, the superior court must review the
petition and determine “whether the petition states or contains sufficient
facts that, if true, would constitute probable cause to believe that the
individual named in the petition is likely to engage in sexually violent
predatory criminal behavior upon his or her release.”  (§ 6601.5.)  If the court determines the petition on its
face supports a finding of probable cause, then it must order the person named
in the petition to be kept in a secure facility until a probable cause hearing
under section 6602 is conducted. 
(§ 6601.5.)  The probable
cause hearing must be conducted within 10 calendar days of the issuance of the
order finding the petition would support a finding of probable cause.  (Ibid.)

The purpose of the probable cause
hearing is to determine whether “there is probable cause to believe that the
individual named in the petition is likely to engage in sexually violent
predatory criminal behavior upon his or her release.”  (§ 6602, subd. (a).)  If the court finds probable cause, it orders
a trial to determine whether the person is a sexually violent predator under
section 6600.  (§ 6602,
subd. (a).)  The person named in the
petition must remain in a secure facility between the time probable cause is
found and the time trial is completed.  (>Ibid.)

 

Allegations of the Petition and
the Return

In
September 1999, the Orange County District Attorney filed a petition for
commitment under the SVPA alleging Schneider was a sexually violent predator as
defined in section 6600.  Attached
to the SVPA commitment petition were two evaluation reports of Schneider; one report
was prepared by Dawn Starr, Ph.D., and the other was prepared by Kent W. Franks,
Ph.D.  In September 1999, a judge
reviewed the petition and found it stated sufficient facts which, if true,
would constitute probable cause to believe Schneider was likely to engage in
sexually violent predatory criminal behavior on his release.  As a consequence, Schneider was ordered to be
detained, pursuant to section 6601.5, in a secure facility until the
probable cause hearing.

Dr. Starr
conducted updated evaluations of Schneider in 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, and
2009.  Nancy Rueschenberg, Ph.D.,
conducted an evaluation of Schneider in 2005 and updated evaluations in 2006
and 2009.  

In
August 2009, Judge Luis A. Rodriguez found, pursuant to section 6602,
probable cause existed to believe Schneider met the criteria for commitment as
a sexually violent predator.  Judge Rodriguez
ordered that Schneider be detained in a secure facility until trial.

In
August 2008, the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) issued 2008 OAL
Determination No. 19, in which the OAL determined the 2007 version of the
SDSH’s Clinical Evaluator Handbook and Standardized Assessment Protocol
(Aug. 2007) (2007 SAP) used for SVPA evaluations amounted to an
“underground regulation” because portions of the assessment protocol, though
regulatory in nature, had not been adopted pursuant to Government Code
section 11340.5, part of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA; Gov. Code,
§ 11340 et seq.).  (2008 OAL
Determination No. 19 (Aug. 15, 2008) p. 3, available at

[as of Dec. 6, 2013]; see Reilly,
supra, 57 Cal.4th at
p. 649.)  In In re Ronje (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 509, 516‑517 (>Ronje), disapproved in >Reilly, supra, 57 Cal.4th 641, we agreed with the OAL and likewise
concluded the 2007 SAP was invalid as an underground regulation.  In 2009, the SDSH issued the 2009 version of
its Standardized Assessment Protocol for Sexually Violent Predator Evaluations
(Feb. 2009) (2009 SAP) as the new standardized assessment protocol for
SVPA evaluations.  In February 2009, the
OAL took emergency regulatory action to adopt part of the 2009 SAP.  In September 2009, the OAL made permanent the
emergency regulatory action. 

In
response to Ronje, in November 2010,
Judge James P. Marionhref="#_ftn2"
name="_ftnref2" title="">^[2] ordered new evaluations of Schneider, pursuant
to section 6601, using a valid standardized assessment protocol and
ordered a new probable cause hearing based on the new evaluations.  In compliance with the court’s order, the SDSH
reassigned Dr. Starr and Dr. Rueschenberg to evaluate Schneider.  In a report dated April 11, 2011, Dr. Starr
concluded Schneider met the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent
predator.  In a report dated April 28,
2011, Dr. Rueschenberg also concluded Schneider met those criteria.

A
probable cause hearing was conducted over several days in January and March 2012
before the respondent court.  Dr. Starr
and Dr. Rueschenberg testified at the probable cause hearing, and their
2011 evaluation reports were received in evidence.

At
the outset of the probable cause hearing, Schneider presented a motion in
limine to exclude “any” evaluation reports prepared by Dr. Starr and
Dr. Rueschenberg.  Schneider argued
their 2011 evaluations of him were invalid because they were conducted in
accordance with the 2009 SAP, which, he argued, is not a valid standardized
assessment protocol under the SVPA and had not been promulgated as a
regulation.  In support of his motion,
Schneider submitted declarations from two psychologists (Richard Wollert,
Ph.D., and Robert L. Halon, Ph.D.), both of whom expressed the opinion that the
2009 SAP is not a “standardized assessment protocol,” as that term is
understood in the “scientific and psychological community.”  In opposition, the district attorney
submitted a copy of a declaration, dated April 23, 2010, from Amy Phenix,
Ph.D., the psychologist who developed the SVPA standardized assessment
protocols.  Dr. Phenix expressed the
opinion the 2009 SAP “comports with the generally accepted definition of a
‘standardized assessment protocol’” and “comprises a ‘standardized assessment
protocol’ according to general acceptance in the field of psychology.” 

The
respondent court issued a written ruling that denied Schneider’s motion in
limine.  The court concluded the 2009 SAP
“meets and exceeds the statutory criteria of section 6601,
subdivision (c)” and therefore is an actual standardized assessment
protocol.  The court denied Schneider’s
request to cross‑examine Dr. Phenix because “the court bases its
ruling on its own independent review of the 2009 SAP.”  The court also concluded (1) section IV.D.
of the 2009 SAP, which requires the evaluators to use certain assessment tools,
had been submitted to the OAL as an emergency regulation and approved as a
permanent regulation in September 2009 and (2) the rest of the 2009 SAP
consists of statements from the SVPA and case law and therefore did not require
approval as a regulation by the OAL.  

On March 16, 2012, the
respondent court granted the district attorney’s motion to receive in evidence
Dr. Starr’s April 2011 evaluation report and Dr. Rueschenberg’s April
2011 evaluation report.  The court then found,
pursuant to section 6602, probable cause existed to believe Schneider met
the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent predator.

> 

>History
of Writ Petition Proceedings

In May 2012, Schneider filed this
petition for writ of mandate or prohibition to challenge the respondent court’s
order receiving in evidence the 2011 evaluation reports of Dr. Starr and
Dr. Rueschenberg.  We summarily
denied Schneider’s writ petition. 

Schneider petitioned the
California Supreme Court for review of our order summarily denying his writ petition.  He presented four issues for Supreme Court
review, one of which was whether Dr. Starr’s April 2011 evaluation report
and Dr. Rueschenberg’s April 2011 evaluation report were updated or new
evaluations.  The Supreme Court granted
the petition for review and transferred the matter back to us with directions
to vacate our order denying mandate and to issue an order directing the
respondent court to show cause why the relief requested in the petition for
writ of mandate or prohibition should not be granted.  We complied with the Supreme Court’s
directions.  The district attorney filed
a return to Schneider’s petition for writ of mandate or prohibition, to which
Schneider filed a reply. 

After oral argument, we vacated
submission to allow the parties to file supplemental letter briefs addressing
the impact of Reilly, >supra, 57 Cal.4th 641, on this
case.  After receiving supplemental
letter briefs from the district attorney and Schneider, we resubmitted the
matter.

> 

>Discussion

>I.

The
Evaluators Conducted New Evaluations

as Then Required by Ronje.>

Schneider argues Dr. Starr’s
April 2011 evaluation report and Dr. Rueschenberg’s April 2011 evaluation
report were updated rather than new evaluations and, therefore, should not have
been received in evidence at the probable cause hearing.  We disagree. 
Under Reilly, >supra, 57 Cal.4th 641, Schneider cannot
prevail even if this argument has merit. 


In Reilly, the Supreme Court concluded a court is not required to
dismiss SVPA commitment proceedings if the OAL determines the initial
evaluations supporting the SVPA commitment petition were conducted under a
standardized assessment protocol that did not comply with the OAL’s procedural
requirements.  (Reilly, supra, 57 Cal.4th
at p. 646.)  “Instead, an alleged
sexually violent predator (SVP) must show that any fault that did occur under
the assessment protocol created a material
error.”  (Ibid.)  “Absent material
error, ‘once a petition has been properly filed and the court has obtained
jurisdiction, the question of whether a person is a sexually violent predator
should be left to the trier of fact . . . .’”  (Id.
at p. 656.)  Reilly disapproved Ronje,
supra, 179 Cal.App.4th 509, to the
extent it required new evaluations using a valid standardized assessment
protocol without a showing of material error. 
(Reilly, supra, at pp. 655, 656.)

In Rabuck v. Superior Court (Dec. 6, 2013, G046936) __
Cal.App.4th __, __ [page 10] (Rabuck),
we concluded that absent a showing of material error in using the 2007 SAP,
whether evaluation reports prepared using the 2009 SAP constituted new or
updated ones would make no difference to their admissibility at the probable
cause hearing.  Thus, “[a]bsent a showing
of material error, the [initial] evaluations of [Schneider] would be valid and
would support filing the SVPA commitment petition, and the 2011 evaluations
properly could serve as either new or updated evaluations under
section 6603, subdivision (c)(1).” 
(Id. at p. __ [p. 10].)  Schneider has not shown that use of an
invalid assessment protocol materially affected his initial evaluations.  (See Reilly,
supra, 57 Cal.4th at
p. 656.)  Since evaluators concluded
Schneider was a sexually violent predator under both the 2009 SAP and the 2007
SAP, “it is clear that the 2007 protocol error did not materially affect the
outcome of his probable cause hearing.” 
(Ibid.)

Schneider’s contention the
evaluations were “updates” rather than “new” has no merit even if it remains
viable after Reilly.  Ronje
required new evaluations under section 6601(c); that is, evaluations
conducted as though no prior diagnosis had been reached and no SVPA commitment
petition had yet been filed.  In
contrast, updated evaluations are permitted under section 6603,
subdivision (c)(1), “[i]f the attorney petitioning for commitment under
this article determines that updated evaluations are necessary in order to
properly present the case for commitment.” 


The evidence supported a finding
that Dr. Starr’s April 2011 evaluation report and Dr. Rueschenberg’s
April 2011 evaluation report were new evaluations of Schneider.  At the probable cause hearing, Dr. Starr
testified her 2011 evaluation was a new evaluation.  She explained that while an updated
evaluation considers only what has transpired since the prior evaluation, in
preparing her April 2011 evaluation report, she considered all of her prior
evaluation reports and all of Schneider’s available prison and medical
records.  At the probable cause hearing,
Dr. Rueschenberg testified her 2011 evaluation was a “new evaluation”
under section 6600.

Our review of Dr. Starr’s 67‑page
April 2011 evaluation report and Dr. Rueschenberg’s 43‑page April
2011 evaluation report confirms to us they are new evaluations under section
6601(c), not updated evaluations under section 6603, subdivision
(c).  Dr. Starr’s April 2011
evaluation report states it is an “initial sexually violent predator
evaluation” (capitalization, boldface, & underscoring omitted) and a “Ronje
evaluation.”  Dr. Rueschenberg’s
April 2011 evaluation report states, “[t]he purpose of this current evaluation
is to complete a new evaluation per the Ronje decision” and “[t]his evaluation replaces
all previous reports by the undersigned and includes information from the
current interview and all previous interviews with Mr. Schneider” (boldface
omitted).  Both Dr. Starr and Dr. Rueschenberg
conducted clinical interviews of Schneider in 2011 as part of the new
evaluations.  Both reports show that Dr. Starr
and Dr. Rueschenberg considered Schneider’s entire psychiatric, family,
criminal, and qualifying offense history, and reassessed all of the commitment
criteria and risk factors.  Neither Dr. Starr
nor Dr. Rueschenberg merely updated previous diagnoses; rather, their
reports demonstrate they both started anew in reaching the conclusion Schneider
met the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent predator.

> 

>II.

>The Evaluators Followed the 2009 SAP.

Schneider argues that Dr. Starr
and Dr. Rueschenberg, though purporting to use the 2009 SAP, in fact used
the 2007 SAP in preparing their 2011 evaluations of him.  According to Schneider, the 2011 evaluation
reports prepared by Dr. Starr and Dr. Rueschenberg demonstrate they
used the 2007 SAP because those reports include the same headings, apply the
same criteria, make the same findings, and use the same diagnostic tools and
risk factors, as those required by the 2007 SAP.

Under Reilly, if Dr. Starr and Dr. Rueschenberg used the 2007
SAP in preparing their 2011 evaluation reports of Schneider, any error would be
harmless unless he made a showing that use of the 2007 SAP resulted in material
error.  (Reilly, supra, 57 Cal.4th
at p. 656 & fn. 5.) 
Neither in his writ petition nor his supplemental letter brief
addressing Reilly, did Schneider make
such a showing.  Schneider does not
contend any of the reports prepared by Dr. Starr and Dr. Rueschenberg,
or any of their diagnoses and conclusions, are inaccurate or otherwise invalid.

Schneider argues Dr. Starr
and Dr. Rueschenberg followed the 2007 SAP in their 2011 evaluations “[s]ince
each of the doctor’s reports contain[s] provisions required by the 2007 SAP,
and these same provisions are not required by or even mentioned in the 2009
SAP.”  Dr. Starr’s and Dr. Rueschenberg’s
2011 evaluation reports did follow the format, outline, and structure provided
in the 2007 SAP and did include notice, provisions, and findings required by
that protocol.  But the 2009 SAP does not
prohibit them from doing so and does not prescribe a particular format,
outline, or structure for an evaluation report. 
(Rabuck, supra, __ Cal.App.4th at p. __ [p. 12].)  As Schneider argues, Dr. Starr’s and Dr. Rueschenberg’s
2011 evaluation reports used the headings “Identifying Data,” “Findings,” and
“Conclusion” or “Conclusions” (boldface & some capitalization omitted),
which were provided by the 2007 SAP.  In >Rabuck, supra, __ Cal.App.4th at page __ [page 12], we concluded,
“those are logical and natural headings for sections within an SVPA evaluation
report.”

As further proof that
Dr. Starr and Dr. Rueschenberg did not follow the 2009 SAP, Schneider
asserts they drafted their conclusions in a specific format required by the
2007 SAP.href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title="">^[3]  Section IV.C. of the 2009 SAP, >supra, at page 3, identifies the
question the evaluator must answer as “[d]oes the person being evaluated have a
diagnosed mental disorder so that he or she is likely to engage in acts of
sexual violence without appropriate treatment and custody?”  The findings in Dr. Starr’s 2011
evaluation report and Dr. Rueschenberg’s 2011 evaluation report track this
question and answer it.  “Dr. [Starr]
and Dr. [Rueschenberg] drafted their respective conclusions in a format
that is so obvious and logical that it cannot be said to be specific to the
2007 SAP.”  (Rabuck, supra, __
Cal.App.4th at p. __ [p. 13].)

Schneider contends Dr. Starr
and Dr. Rueschenberg followed the 2007 SAP because they used procedures,
diagnostic tests, and actuarial risk assessment tools specifically required by
that protocol.  In Rabuck, supra, __
Cal.App.4th at page __ [pages 13‑14], we rejected a similar
argument.  We explained that “[u]nlike
the 2007 SAP, which provided detailed instructions on how to conduct a sexually
violent predator assessment and prepare an evaluation report, the 2009 SAP
relies on each evaluator’s exercise of ‘independent professional judgment in
the course of performing SVP [(sexually violent predator)] evaluations.’  [Citation.]” 
(Id. at p. __ [p. 13].)  We concluded that the evaluators’ decision to
follow procedures and practices and to apply tests, instruments, and actuarial
risk tools that were required by the 2007 SAP did not mean they failed to use
the 2009 SAP.  (Id. at p. __ [p. 14].)

Likewise, “the fact
Dr. [Starr] and Dr. [Rueschenberg] decided to follow procedures and
practices and to apply tests, instruments, and actuarial risk tools that were
required by the 2007 SAP does not mean they failed to use the 2009 SAP.”  (Rabuck,
supra, __Cal.App.4th at p. __
[p. 14].)  In compliance with the
2009 SAP, Dr. Starr and Dr. Rueschenberg explained in their
respective 2011 evaluation reports how the tests, instruments, and risk factors
they used had gained professional recognition or acceptance in the field of
diagnosing, evaluating, or treating sexual offenders, how they were applied,
and why they were appropriate to Schneider.

Schneider argues Dr. Starr
and Dr. Rueschenberg used the 2007 SAP because, at the beginning of their
2011 evaluation reports, each stated she provided Schneider with a notice of evaluation
as a sexually violent predator, presumably in the form attached as appendix B
to the 2007 SAP.  We rejected the
identical argument in Rabuck, >supra, __Cal.App.4th at page __ [page 14].  Schneider also argues that Dr. Starr and
Dr. Rueschenberg followed the 2007 SAP by including in their respective
2011 evaluation reports a statement, required by the 2007 SAP, on the question
whether Schneider’s future sexually violent acts and offenses would, or likely would,
be predatory in nature.  “But the fact
Dr. [Starr] and Dr. [Rueschenberg] answered a question presented by the
2007 SAP does not lead to the conclusion they did not follow the 2009 SAP and
meet its requirements.”  (>Rabuck, supra, __Cal.App.4th at p. __ [p. 15].)

 

III.

>The 2009 SAP Is a Legitimate Standardized
Assessment Protocol and Complies with Section 6601(c).

Schneider
argues the 2009 SAP is invalid because it is not a standardized assessment
protocol as that term is understood in the scientific and psychological communities.  In support of this argument, he relies on the
declarations of Dr. Wollert and Dr. Halon, both of whom presented a
definition of a standardized assessment protocol, reviewed the 2009 SAP, and
concluded it did not come within that definition.  The district attorney, in response, relies on
Dr. Phenix’s declaration.  Dr. Phenix,
who was instrumental in developing the assessment protocols under the SVPA,
declared the 2009 SAP is a standardized assessment protocol according to
generally accepted principles of psychology.

The
respondent court did not base its decision on the declarations.  Instead, the court upheld the 2009 SAP based
on its “own independent review of the 2009 SAP” and concluded, “the 2009 SAP is
a genuine one because it meets and exceeds the statutory criteria of section 6601,
subdivision (c).”  In >Rabuck, supra, __ Cal.App.4th at page __ [pages 15‑18], we
concluded the 2009 SAP is a legitimate standardized assessment protocol as
required by section 6601(c).

 

IV.

>The 2009 SAP Was Properly Promulgated

as a Regulation.

Schneider
argues that if the 2009 SAP is a legitimate standardized assessment protocol,
it is invalid nonetheless because it is an underground regulation that was not
promulgated in accordance with the APA. 
But if the 2009 SAP was not promulgated in accordance with the APA, then
Schneider would have the burden of showing material error (Reilly, supra, 57 Cal.4th
at pp. 646, 656‑657); that is, “the invalid assessment protocol
materially affected his . . . evaluations” (id. at p. 656).  He has
not done so.  In addition, in >Rabuck, supra, __Cal.App.4th at page __ [pages 18‑19], we
concluded the 2009 SAP was validly promulgated as a regulation.

Government
Code section 11350 identifies the limited grounds on which the validity of
a regulation may be challenged.  Schneider
does not challenge the OAL’s approval of section IV.D. of the 2009 SAP on
any of the grounds identified in Government Code section 11350.

>Disposition

The petition for writ of mandate
or prohibition is denied.

 

 

                                                                                   

                                                                                    FYBEL,
J.

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.

 

 

 

ARONSON, J.