P. v. Nieto
Filed 1/14/13 P.
v. Nieto CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits
courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
SANTOS GARCIA
NIETO,
Defendant and Appellant.
F063708
(Kings Super. Ct. No. 10CM8636)
THE COURT
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Superior Court of
County. Donna Tarter,
Judge.
Gordon
S. Brownell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez,
Leanne LeMon, and Lewis A. Martinez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
On
August 26,
2011, appellant Santos Garcia Nieto pleaded
no contest to the following charges:
Count 1 –
intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (a)); Veh. Code, § 23578)
Count 2 –driving
under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs with a blood-alcohol content of
0.15 percent or higher and causing great bodily injury or death (Veh. Code,
§§ 23153, subd. (a), 23558, 23578; Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a));
Count 3 –
driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs with a blood-alcohol
content equal to or great than 0.08 percent and causing great bodily injury or
death (Veh. Code, §§ 23153, subd. (b), 23558, 23578; Pen. Code,
§ 12022.7, subd. (a)); and
Count 4 –
driving on the wrong side of the roadway (Veh. Code, § 21650), an
infraction.
On September 26, 2011, the trial court denied appellant probation and sentenced him to a
total term of 16 years 8 months in state prison. The court imposed the upper term of 10 years
on count 1, a consecutive eight-month term (one-third of the middle term) on
count 2 and two consecutive three-year terms for the great bodily injury
enhancements (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)).
count 3 (Pen. Code, § 654) and dismissed count 4. The court did not impose an additional
one-year prison term for appellant’s violation of Vehicle Code section
23558. The court awarded appellant 594
days of custody credits.
On October 24, 2011, appellant filed a notice of
appeal.
On
the afternoon of April 24, 2010, Kings County
Deputy Sheriff Samuel Weimer responded to the scene of a fatal vehicular
accident near Highway 269 and Interstate Freeway 5. A white Chevrolet Avalanche and a Ford Cobra
Coupe were involved in the accident.
Deputy Weimer and other officers determined that appellant was driving
the Avalanche southbound on Highway 269 and Jack Bolding was driving the Cobra
northbound on the same roadway.
Appellant veered on the roadway on the west side and caused the
Avalanche to straddle the raised asphalt.
He attempted to steer his vehicle back onto the roadway and over steered
in an attempt to get the Avalanche over the raised curb. Because of the over steering, the Avalanche
went into an uncontrolled skid and traveled into oncoming northbound
traffic. The Avalanche struck Bolding’s
Cobra head-on in the northbound lane.
American
Ambulance personnel found appellant face down on the ground behind the
Avalanche. He was transported to Fresno Regional Community Medical Center by
helicopter. Weimer noticed open beer cans
in the back of the Avalanche and a few more open cans on the roadway and in the
dirt next to the roadway. Officers found
Bolding deceased in the front driver’s seat of the Cobra. His body had sustained multiple injuries and
was slumped over toward the passenger side of the front seat. Officials later determined that Bolding died
from blunt force trauma.
Weimer
contacted a second victim, Ramon Fuerte, who was a passenger in the
Avalanche. Fuerte emitted a strong odor
of alcohol, had bloodshot, watery eyes, and appeared to be intoxicated. Fuerte said he was asleep at the time of the
collision and did not know what had happened.
Fuerte said he and defendant were returning from Kettleman City. In response to questioning by Weimer, Fuerte
said appellant had been drinking constantly since the preceding day. Fuerte had a small laceration on the right
side of his face directly behind his eye.
He also had a laceration on his left forearm but declined medical
attention.
Emergency
medical technician J. Mazzaserro arrived at the scene with her partner, J.
Price, shortly after the collision occurred.
Upon arrival, she provided assistance to the occupants of the
Cobra. Mazzaserro declared Bolding
deceased at 4:01 p.m. Price checked on the
passengers of both vehicles and determined that Jamee Bolding, the passenger in
the Cobra, needed more medical attention than the others. According to Mazzaserro, Jamee Lynn Bolding
was not breathing, but she did have a pulse when paramedics arrived. Mazzaserro performed several life support and
first aid procedures on Jamee Bolding, who was eventually airlifted to Fresno Community Regional Medical Center.
At
6:32 p.m., Weimer contacted appellant at the hospital. An attending physician advised Weimer that
appellant has sustained a broken left arm and some minor scrapes on his chest
and stomach area. Hospital staff also
informed Weimer that appellant was still intoxicated. When Weimer finally spoke with appellant, he
could smell a strong odor of alcohol.
Appellant’s eyes were bloodshot and watery, and his speech was
slurred. Appellant initially said he
could not remember anything about the collision. He eventually said that Jack Bolding pulled
into his lane, and he could not miss him.
When Weimer asked about his alcohol consumption before the collision,
appellant said he had consumed about three beers but could not remember any
other details. Hospital personnel took a
blood sample from appellant at about 7:19 p.m. and it yielded a
blood-alcohol content of 0.25 percent.
On
the morning of April 27, 2010, Deputy
Sheriff Perla Trejo contacted appellant at the medical center. Appellant reported that he was traveling
southbound on Highway 269 at 3:00 p.m. on the day of the
collision. Appellant said he and Fuerte
were on their way home from picking onions in the Huron area. Appellant said he had one or two beers around
noon but did not have anything to eat.
Appellant claimed he could not drink heavily because he suffered from
diabetes and leukemia. Appellant said he
was traveling 55 miles per hour when he saw a car move into his lane at a much
faster speed. Appellant said he swerved
to the left to avoid a head-on collision.
Appellant told Trejo, “ ‘If I didn’t move, he would’ve hit
me.’ †Appellant said everything happened
so fast that he did not remember any details about the other car. According to appellant, the damage to his
vehicle was on the front passenger side because he turned to the left to avoid
the collision.
Appellant
said he was ejected from his vehicle and believed the injury to his shoulder
occurred when his shoulder hit the steering wheel at the time of ejection. Upon further questioning by Trejo, appellant
said he was wearing his seatbelt but removed it when he got out of the
vehicle. Appellant said he was very weak
and unable to stand up at the time he got out of the vehicle. He claimed that he has a clear mind and had
not consumed anything to impair his driving.
Appellant admitted there was some alcohol in his system but maintained
it was not enough to impair him.
Appellant also said that he and Fuerte were collecting cans and that is
why there were beer cans in his vehicle.
The
following day, Trejo contacted Fuerte at his residence. Fuerte said appellant stopped by his home on
the morning of April 24, 2010, and invited him
to join him on a trip to Huron to pick up his paycheck. Fuerte said he had a beer before appellant
picked him up but claimed that appellant was not intoxicated and that he,
Fuerte, felt safe enough to get into appellant’s vehicle. Contrary to his earlier statements to Weimer,
Fuerte said appellant may have consumed one beer before arriving at Fuerte’s
home. After the pair picked up the
paycheck, they went to the Huron home of appellant’s cousin and appellant drank
a 12-ounce can of Coors Light beer.
Appellant and Fuerte spent about one hour in Huron, and then they drove
back home. On their way home, Fuerte
fell in and out of sleep. At one point,
Fuerte heard appellant say, “ ‘A car keeps crossing into our
lane.’ †Shortly after the
collision occurred, Fuerte confirmed that he was wearing his seatbelt but did
not know whether appellant was wearing his.
Fuerte did not believe that appellant was under the influence at the
time of the collision. Trejo sought
clarification of Fuerte’s statement about appellant drinking “constantly.†Fuerte explained that appellant was known to
drink daily and to consume a beer and drive home after visiting with
Fuerte. Trejo said appellant’s drinking
had become a problem with friends to the point where some friends would not
invite him over any longer.
On
March 24, 2011, Weimer contact Ellen Bolding, the mother of Jamee Lynn
Bolding. Ellen reported that her
daughter suffered two skull fractures, a crushed left cheekbone, a broken left
jaw, damage to two front teeth, a broken collarbone, the removal of her left
kidney, an injury to lower back vertebrae which required Jamee to wear a back
brace for 45 days, two broken arms, two broken legs, and double vision.
DISCUSSION
I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE
TERMS OF IMPRISONMENT ON COUNTS 1 AND 2.
Appellant
contends the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive terms of
imprisonment on counts 1 and 2.
In her September
19, 2011, report, the probation officer indicated that appellant was
presumptively ineligible for a grant of probation (Pen. Code, § 1203,
subd. (e)(3)) because he willfully inflicted great bodily injury in the
perpetration of the crime of which he had been convicted. The probation officer found no unusual
circumstances to overcome this rule of presumptive ineligibility. In recommending the state prison sentence,
the probation officer noted: “As to
Counts I and II, pursuant to Rule 4.425(a)(1), the crimes and their objectives
were predominantly independent of each [other] and involved separate
victims. Therefore consecutive
sentencing is being recommended.â€
At the September
26, 2011, sentencing hearing, the trial court read and considered the probation
officer’s report and a letter from appellant to the court expressing remorse
and regret. The court then heard victim
impact statements from Fuerte, Ellen Bolding (the wife of Jack and mother of
Jamee), Kara Bolding (daughter of Jack and sister to Jamee), and Linda Arietta
(sister-in-law to Jack and aunt of Jamee).
Appellant apologized to the Bolding family and asked for their
forgiveness. Defense counsel offered extensive
arguments in support of a grant of probation.
In the event the court declined to grant probation, defense counsel
asked the court to impose concurrent terms of imprisonment on counts 1 and
2. The prosecutor agreed with the
probation officer’s recommendation of a term in
imposed great bodily injury on two separate victims after willfully drinking
alcohol, driving with a passenger, and causing his vehicle to veer into
Bolding’s lane, causing the collision.
The prosecutor argued: “[T]he
consequences of Mr. Nieto’s actions were so horrible and aggravated and deeply
felt and will be permanent to the Bolding family that only the most aggravated
term would be most appropriate to resolve what happened on April 24th, 2010.â€
The court
subsequently found that probation would not be appropriate, even if appellant
was not statutorily ineligible. The
court noted “the circumstances of the offense indicate that Mr. Nieto poses a
significant risk to the lives of the public and his incarceration is necessary
for the safety of society.†The court
went on to weigh circumstances in mitigation and aggravation:
“[T]he circumstances in mitigation include the fact that the
defendant has no prior record, and even though he did plead guilty at the trial
confirmation one day before trial, the Court does consider that an early
acknowledgment of wrongdoing. However,
in this case Mr. Nieto at the time of his apprehension not only denied
culpability but blamed the accident on the victim in this case.
“In looking at the circumstances in aggravation and
mitigation, an element of the crime cannot be used to impose the greater
term. However, the facts surrounding the
charged offense and this case that the defendant veered off the roadway and he
straddled a curb, and then in an attempt, and as pointed out by [the
prosecutor], instead of stopping he over steered to get back over this curb and
that’s when he lost control. That
conduct in and of itself is enough to support a conviction for gross vehicular
manslaughter.
“The level of intoxication was a .25 percent, and this
blood [test] was taken over three hours after his apprehension. No evidence or reasonable inference could be
made that Mr. Nieto had any access to alcohol.
So even without calculating a falling blood alcohol level, Mr. Nieto’s
blood alcohol level was over three times the legal limit. The Court does find that this aggravating
term or this aggravating circumstance substantiates the imposition of the
aggravated term. The Court does find
that this term does serve the interest of justice based on the high degree of
danger the defendant poses to the community.â€
The
court went on to impose the terms of imprisonment, noting as to Count 2: “[F]or
violating Vehicle Code Section 23153(a), that term will run consecutive to
Count 1, and the term is a one-third consecutive term or eight months.â€
C.
Penal Code
section 669 grants the trial court broad discretion to impose consecutive
sentences when a person is convicted of two or more crimes. California Rules of Court, Rule 4.425
(formerly rule 425) provides:
“Criteria affecting the decision to impose consecutive
rather than concurrent sentences include:
including whether or not: [¶] (1)
The crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of each
other. [¶] (2)
The crimes involved separate acts of violence or threats of
violence. [¶] (3)
The crimes were committed at different times or separate places, rather
than being committed so closely in time and place as to indicate a single
period of aberrant behavior.
aggravation or mitigation may be considered in deciding whether to impose
consecutive rather than concurrent sentences, except (i) a fact used to impose
the upper term, (ii) a fact used to otherwise enhance the defendant’s prison
sentence, and (iii) a fact that is an element of the crime shall not be used to
impose consecutive sentences.â€
D.
Appellant
contends all of the factors of California Rule of Court, rule 4.425(a) “point
towards imposition of concurrent terms.â€
He maintains “[t]here was no behavior by Mr. Nieto toward the persons
injured in count 2 [Jamee Bolding and Ramon Fuerte] that was separate from his
behavior toward the person killed in count 1 [Jack Bolding].†!(AOB 10-11)!
He further submits that mitigating factors, such as early acknowledgment
of guilt (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.423(b)(3)) and the lack of a prior record
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.423(b)(1)), predominated as to the question of
whether to impose consecutive or concurrent terms.
Only a single
aggravating circumstances is required to impose consecutive sentences. A trial court has discretion to impose
consecutive sentences where, as here, a single act has resulted in crimes
against multiple victims. (
452, 468-469.) Appellant points out “the
trial court imposed consecutive terms, citing no reasons therefor.†A trial court errs when it fails to state its
reasons for imposing consecutive sentences.
However, a defendant waives this issue by failing to raise it in the
trial court. (People v. Morales (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1084.) Appellant contends he preserved this issue by
requesting the trial court to grant probation or, in the alternative,
concurrent terms of imprisonment.
Assuming the
claim of error has been preserved, we note a failure to state reasons is not
prejudicial error per se. If the error is
harmless, the matter need not be remanded for resentencing. To determine whether a trial court’s error in
making a sentencing choice requires a remand for resentencing, the reviewing
court must determine if it is reasonably probable a result more favorable to
the appealing party would have been reached absent the error. (People
v. Gutierrez (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1634, 1638.) Although the trial court did not expressly
cite the factor of multiple victims in choosing consecutive terms, that factor
was cited in the report of the probation officer, which the trial court read
and considered. Given the factor of
multiple victims, it is not reasonably probable a result more favorable to
appellant would have been reached absent the failure to expressly state reasons
for the imposition of consecutive sentences.
THE ABSTRACT OF JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AMENDED.
Appellant
contends and respondent concedes the abstract of judgment erroneously reflects
the imposition of a three-year enhancement for great bodily injury (Pen. Code,
§ 12022.7, subd. (a) as to count 1.
Respondent
agrees and correctly explains: “The
abstract of judgment reflects that the trial court imposed an enhanced
punishment pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (a), for count
one. [Citation.] The trial court clearly intended to have both
of the enhancements it imposed on appellant, pursuant to Penal Code section
12022.7, subdivision (a), to be imposed for count two. [Citation.]
Therefore, the abstract of judgment is corrected to reflect that the
enhanced punishment pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (a),
was not imposed for count one, but instead was imposed for count two.â€
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed. The superior court
is directed to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect the imposition of
two three-year enhancements pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision
(a) with respect to count 2 and no such enhancements with respect to count
1. The superior court is further
directed to transmit certified copies of the amended abstract to all
appropriate parties and entities.
Poochigian, J.
victim Jamee Bolding and the other related to victim Ramon Fuerte.
