Filed 5/11/17 P. v. Mauricio CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MICHAEL ANGEL MAURICIO,
Defendant and Appellant.
B269064
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA088962)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Affirmed.
Joanna McKim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Kathleen A. Kenealy, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Margaret E. Maxwell, Shawn
McGahey Webb and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________________
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In November 2006, then 17-year-old defendant and
appellant Michael Mauricio participated in two separate, gangrelated
drive-by shootings that resulted in multiple deaths.
In January 2010, a jury convicted Mauricio of three counts of first
degree murder, and found true firearm and gang benefit findings
attached to all three counts. The trial court thereafter sentenced
Mauricio to three consecutive terms of life without the possibility
of parole (LWOP) for the murders, plus three consecutive
indeterminate terms of 25 years to life for the findings that a
principal had personally discharged a firearm causing death.
In late 2011, we affirmed the judgment with modifications to
certain fees (see People v. Mauricio (Nov. 28, 2011, B224505)
[nonpub. opn.]), and, in early 2012, the Supreme Court denied
Mauricio’s petition for review (see People v. Mauricio (Feb. 29,
2012, S199094) [nonpub. order]).
Then, beginning around mid-2012, and continuing to the
present day, significant case law developed on the subject of
juvenile sentencing by way of such cases as Miller v. Alabama
(2012) 567 U.S. 460 (Miller), People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th
262 (Caballero), People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354
(Gutierrez), and People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261
(Franklin). As this case law developed, Mauricio’s case returned
to our court on a number of occasions to address his sentence,
given the fact that he committed his murders when he was a
minor. (See People v. Mauricio (May 30, 2013, B224505)
[nonpub. opn.]; and People v. Mauricio (Aug. 25, 2014, B224505
[nonpub. opn.].)
Ultimately we affirmed Mauricio’s murder convictions, and
remanded his case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing
with directions to the trial court to take into consideration Miller
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and Gutierrez in determining if LWOP sentences or other
sentences should be imposed. (People v. Mauricio (Aug. 25, 2014,
B224505 [nonpub. opn.].) Mauricio’s present appeal is his fourth,
and follows the trial court’s new sentencing hearing.
FACTS
In October 2014, our court issued the remittitur following
the opinion in People v. Mauricio (Aug. 25, 2014, B224505).
In December 2015, Mauricio filed a comprehensive “Brief in
Support of Resentencing,” plus exhibits and a declaration from
his trial counsel stating the results of counsel’s investigation of
Mauricio’s background. The materials included an investigator’s
report that summarized statements from Mauricio’s family
members, including his mother and father, as well as statements
from friends and neighbors. Further, the materials included a
“Psychosocial History” prepared by a social worker. The brief
identified the Miller factors that must be taken into consideration
for juvenile sentencing, and argued that the trial court should
sentence Mauricio to a single term of 25 years to life.
On December 9, 2015, the trial court conducted the new
sentencing hearing. At that time, the court indicated that it had
reviewed trial counsel’s papers, and then addressed Mauricio’s
sentence in light of the Miller factors. The court reduced
Mauricio’s sentences to three consecutive terms of 25 years to life,
one for each first degree murder conviction, plus three
consecutive terms of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement
findings attached to the counts.
Mauricio filed a timely notice of appeal.
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DISCUSSION
I. Miller
Mauricio contends his sentence of 150-years-to-life is the
“functional equivalent” of an LWOP sentence, and that, as such,
it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the federal
and state constitutions, and violates Miller. We disagree.
In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that
“the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that
mandates [a LWOP sentence] for juvenile offenders.”
(Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 469, italics added.) But Miller also
expressly stated that it was “not foreclosing” a sentencing court’s
ability to impose a LWOP term on a juvenile homicide offender
without violating the Eighth Amendment when, in the
sentencer’s discretion, the circumstances warrant such a
sentence. (Ibid.)
Miller identified several factors that a sentencing court
must take into consideration in exercising discretion whether to
impose a LWOP term on a juvenile homicide offender: (1) the
juvenile offender’s age at the time he or she committed the
incarcerating crime and the “hallmark features” of a person of
such age, including immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to
appreciate risks and consequences; (2) the juvenile’s family and
home environment; (3) the circumstances of the homicide offense,
including the extent of the juvenile offender’s participation in the
crime and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected
him; (4) whether the juvenile offender might have been charged
and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies
associated with youth, for example, his inability to deal with
police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or
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his incapacity to assist his own attorneys, and (5) “the possibility
of rehabilitation.” (Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at pp. 477-478.)
For purposes of discussion only, we assume Mauricio is
correct that his current sentence amounts to the “functional
equivalent” of a LWOP sentence. (Caballero, supra, 55 Cal.4th at
pp. 267-268.) We disagree with Mauricio that the trial court
violated Miller in imposing the “functional equivalent” of a
LWOP sentence without adequately considering the Miller
factors discussed above. The reporter’s transcript of the new
sentencing hearing, reviewed in its entirety and not for isolated
comments, demonstrates that the trial court considered the
Miller factors when it imposed Mauricio’s current sentence.
We simply disagree with Mauricio that the court overly focused
on the nature of his crimes, to the exclusion of other Miller
factors. Mauricio’s trial counsel made a comprehensive and
professional showing for a Miller examination, and the trial court
considered the materials presented, and made a reasoned
sentencing choice. No more is required under Miller.
II. Franklin
Even if we were to assume some sentencing shortcoming
under Miller occurred, we find that reversal and remand for
resentencing would not be required in light of Franklin.
In Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261, our Supreme Court
held that SB 260 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.), in enacting section 3051,
rendered moot a claim that a trial court had imposed a lengthy
mandatory sentence on a juvenile offender in violation of Miller.
(Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 278-282.) Franklin explains
that SB 260 affords juvenile offenders an opportunity for a parole
hearing by at least their 25th year of incarceration, and that this
parole eligibility cap supersedes a mandatory sentence imposed
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by the trial court, meaning “no Miller claim arises.” (Id. at
pp. 277-280.)
While Mauricio correctly notes that Franklin expressly
limited its mootness holding to juvenile offenders who have been
sentenced to lengthy mandatory terms (Franklin, supra, 63
Cal.4th at p. 280), the Third District Court of Appeal in People v.
Cornejo (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 36 recently held that Franklin’s
mootness analysis logically extends to Miller claims where a
juvenile offender has received a lengthy sentence that is part
mandatory and part discretionary. We find Cornejo’s reasoning
sound, and, for that reason, find that Mauricio’s claim of Miller
sentencing error would be moot had we not found above that
there was no Miller error.
III. Remand for a Franklin Hearing is not Required
Mauricio contends his case should be remanded to the trial
court under Franklin to afford him an opportunity to make a
record of his characteristics and circumstances at the time of the
crimes that will be available at a future youth offender parole
hearing. We find such a remand to be unnecessary in light of the
facts of this case.
In Franklin, after concluding that Miller claims are moot in
light of the passage of SB 260, the Supreme Court added the
following: “It is not clear whether Franklin had sufficient
opportunity to put on the record the kinds of information that
sections 3051 and 4801 deem relevant at a youth offender parole
hearing. Thus, although Franklin need not be resentenced . . . ,
we remand the matter to the trial court for a determination of
whether Franklin was afforded sufficient opportunity to make a
record of information relevant to his eventual youth offender
parole hearing.” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284.)
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Here, it is clear that Mauricio had an opportunity and
exercised that opportunity �"�" at the time of his new sentencing
hearing �"�" to present and preserve information of the nature
contemplated by Franklin. Mauricio’s trial counsel presented a
comprehensive and commendable compilation of relevant
materials that included summaries of statements from Mauricio’s
parents and a number of family members, neighbors and friends,
as well as a Psychosocial History prepared by a social worker.
The statements from Mauricio’s parents and family members
provided information about his upbringing, including that he was
born to a drug-addicted mother, and grew up in a gang infested
area. Further, there were also statements attesting to Mauricio’s
character. Mauricio’s opening brief does not explain what further
information could be presented on remand at a Franklin hearing.
For all of these reasons, Mauricio has not persuaded us that
remand for a Franklin hearing is warranted.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BIGELOW, P.J.
We concur:
RUBIN, J.
SORTINO, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.