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Filed 5/12/17 P. v. Kale CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Placer)
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THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
REBECCA ANN KALE,
Defendant and Appellant.
C081489
(Super. Ct. No. 62105921)
Appointed counsel for defendant Rebecca Ann Kale has filed an opening brief that
sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record and determine
whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d
436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to
defendant, we affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
On July 31, 2014, defendant pleaded no contest to grand theft by false pretenses
(Pen. Code, § 487)1 with a loss greater than $100,000 (§ 1203.045, subd. (a)), and

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Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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presentation of a false claim (§ 72). Six additional counts of presentation of a false claim
and one count of conspiracy (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)) were dismissed with a waiver pursuant
to People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754. On August 12, 2014, in accordance with the
plea agreement, the trial court placed defendant on probation for five years and ordered
her to serve 365 days in custody. Defendant agreed to resign her employment from the
Placer County Sheriff’s Office, dismiss the pending workers’ compensation claim against
the Placer County Sheriff’s Office, and not to file any further workers’ compensation or
employment-related lawsuits against the Placer County Sheriff’s Office.
A contested restitution hearing was held on November 19, 2015.
The evidence showed that Placer County In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS) is a
state program run through the county and intended to assist disabled people and keep
them from needing a higher level of care. IHSS was providing defendant’s former
husband and codefendant, Erick Kale (Kale), “protective supervision” services from early
2004 to August 2010. This allowed defendant to bill 283 hours per month for services
she provided to Kale. During this time period it was reported that, due to his injuries,
Kale could not be left alone and suffered many symptoms requiring assistance. In July
2010, after a home visit review, Kale was taken off protective supervision status and his
authorized hours were reduced to 62.6 hours per month.
An investigation began in 2010. Surveillance showed Kale doing errands and
chores during 2010 and 2011. He also drove often. Neighbors reported regularly seeing
Kale tending to livestock, clearing, gathering and burning brush, climbing ladders,
pruning trees, and mowing lawns. On March 8, 2011, Kale was seen driving and was
interviewed by investigators.
During the interview, Kale reported that during the 2008 to 2010 time period,
defendant had hand surgery and therefore he had to take care of his daughters and things
around the house. He reported that during this time he did the cleaning, cooking, and
yard work. He admitted that between October 2006 and March 2007, he did not have a
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service provider. When asked, Kale admitted to exaggerating his symptoms to gain
services.
Linda Dickerson, an accountant-auditor for Placer County, Health and Human
Services Department testified that after the investigation by IHSS, it was concluded that
Kale did not qualify for any services and all payments to defendant were an
overpayment. A total of $187,354 was paid to defendant by IHSS for services for Kale.
That total amount included $27,375.13 of “shared costs,” which were paid by the
recipient and required by the Medi-Cal system. Accordingly, the county was seeking
only $159,978.87 in restitution.
Defendant testified and claimed she was the provider of services for Kale, who she
claimed suffered a traumatic brain injury in 1997. The couple separated in 2006, and
divorced in July 2009, but she continued to live with Kale after their divorce because he
could not live alone.
She testified Kale had speech problems, deficits on one side of his body, memory
issues, and a seizure disorder. She took him to all his doctor appointments, organized his
medications, made sure the home was safe, did all the laundry, cooking, cleaning, and
helped him get dressed. They originally applied for services through IHSS in 2004, and
they received services until 2011. Kale initially received protective supervision, which
maxed at 283 hours per month. Defendant claimed IHSS did not inform her that
protective supervision required her to provide 24-hour care for Kale until 2010. Until
then, she believed she was only required to provide services to Kale during the time she
was being paid.
In July 2010, defendant and Kale received notice that the hours of support had
been reduced to 62.6 hours per month. Defendant argued that because Kale was still
authorized for 62.6 hours at that time, the restitution should not include all payments
made, but merely what was greater than the authorized 62.6 hours.
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The trial court expressly rejected defendant’s argument in its written order of
restitution, noting the investigation was not complete in July 2010, and once it was
finished and the full extent of the exaggeration was discovered, it was determined no
services would have been authorized. The court concluded as follows:
“The court finds that the county has made a prima facie showing of loss for
restitution and that the defendants have not disproved the amount of loss. Although the
county continued to provide some benefits in July 2010, the evidence indicates that the
full extent of the fraud was not discovered until after the interview with Mr. Kale on
March 8, 2011. For the foregoing reasons, both defendants are ordered to pay restitution
to Placer County in the amount of $159,978.40, jointly and severally.”
Defendant appeals from the order of restitution.
DISCUSSION
Defendant was advised by counsel of the right to file a supplemental brief within
30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days have elapsed, and
we have received no communication from defendant. Having undertaken an examination
of the entire record, we find no arguable error that would result in a disposition more
favorable to defendant.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
DUARTE, J.
We concur:
/s/
NICHOLSON, Acting P. J.
/s/
MAURO, J