Martin-Bragg v.
Filed 8/1/13 Martin-Bragg v. Moore CA2/1
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
KIMBERLY MARTIN-BRAGG,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
IVAN RENE MOORE,
Defendant and Appellant.
B238772
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC459449)
APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court of
County. Richard L. Fruin, Jr.,
Judge. Reversed.
Ivan Rene
Moore, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Thomasina
M. Reed for Plaintiff and Respondent.
___________________________________
>
Ivan Rene
Moore appeals in pro. per. from the superior court’s judgment following trial
on the unlawful detainer complaint of
Kimberly Martin-Bragg seeking forfeiture of a lease and possession of a
property. The judgment, entered January
23, 2012, awarded Martin-Bragg possession of the disputed property, along with
rent of $50,068.34 and rental damages of $57,220.96 for the period from May 1,
2011 to December 31, 2011, plus daily damages of $238.42 per day from
January 1, 2012 until the date of judgment.
Moore
appeals from the judgment on a number of grounds, most notably the trial
court’s refusal to consolidate the unlawful detainer case against him with
another action then pending in the superior court, brought by Moore, seeking
quiet title to the property based on allegations that Martin-Bragg’s title to
the property was actually held in trust for Moore’s benefit. Upon a fragmentary and disorganized record we
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing Moore’s request
to consolidate the unlawful detainer and quiet title actions for trial, and
that Moore was prejudiced by being forced to litigate the complex issue of
title to the property under the summary procedures that govern actions for
unlawful detainer.
BACKGROUND
Martin-Bragg’s
unlawful detainer action
On April
13, 2011, Kimberly Martin-Bragg filed an unlimited unlawful detainer action
against Ivan Rene Moore. (See Code Civ.
Proc., §§ 86, subd. (a)(4); 1161.) The
complaint alleged Martin-Bragg’s ownership of a residential property at 6150
Shenandoah Avenue in the Ladera Heights area of Los Angeles, Moore’s
month-to-month tenancy of the house under a written rental agreement, Moore’s
non-payment of the $7,152.62 monthly rent, his receipt of service of a
three-day notice to pay rent or quit, and Martin-Bragg’s demand for past-due
rent of $50,068.34.
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After an
unsuccessful demurrer, Moore answered in pro. per. on June 20, 2011,
challenging Martin-Bragg’s ownership of the property and right to receive rent
for it. His answer alleged that he and
Martin-Bragg had been long-time domestic partners; that the property at 6150
Shenandoah Avenue is rightfully owned by Moore, a few corporations he uses in
his music business, and Ronald Hills, the corporations’ secretary; that the
property had been in his family long before his relationship with Martin-Bragg;
that title to the property had been held by Mr. Hills, and the property had
been used by Moore over the years as collateral for business loans of over $5
million; and that in 2004 Mr. Hills had transferred title to Martin-Bragg in
trust as a business arrangement for the benefit of Moore and his corporations,
not for Martin-Bragg’s personal use or benefit.
He alleged that he and his corporations had made all payments for the
property’s purchase, maintenance, upkeep, and extensive improvements, and that
Martin-Bragg had made no payments, or had been reimbursed for any payments she
had made. He also alleged that
Martin-Bragg had received large amounts of cash, for which she refused to
account, from a nightclub and radio stations owned and operated in other cities
by Moore and the corporations.
name="_ftnref2" title="">
Moore’s action to
quiet title
On June 22,
2011, Moore filed a verified complaint against Martin-Bragg and others
(L.A.S.C. No. BC464111), seeking quiet title to the 6150 Shenandoah Avenue
property along with other causes of action.
title claim were consistent with his answer to the unlawful detainer
complaint. The complaint alleged also
that Martin-Bragg had provided him with special powers of attorney assuring
that she would not interfere with right to the property; that in reliance on
his relationship with Martin-Bragg he had caused title to the property to be
transferred to her, with the understanding that she would hold it in trust for
him; and that he had since made improvements of over $150,000 to the property.
Denial of motion to
relate and consolidate pending cases
On June 23,
2011, Moore filed ex parte
applications in the unlawful detainer proceeding to shorten time to file a
notice of related cases, and a motion to consolidate the unlawful detainer
proceeding with case number BC464111.
The trial court in the unlawful detainer case denied the unopposed
application on June 27, 2011.
The
unlawful detainer trial commenced on June 30, 2011.
Following
the opening statement on Martin-Bragg’s behalf, Moore renewed his earlier
request to relate the unlawful detainer proceeding with case number BC464111,
the quiet title action, citing Asuncion
v. Superior Court (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 141, and expressing concern that
“once this court makes a ruling†in the unlawful detainer proceeding, “it could
affect the res judicata.â€
name="_ftnref4" title="">
to relate the cases and to consolidate them in the unlawful detainer
court. “Now, if the two are related and
consolidated, I can set the matter for trial probably in August or maybe
July. In that event, you’ll get a
judgment in both cases.†“What concerns
me here,†the court pointed out, “is that there is a challenge to the
plaintiff’s ownership. I understand that
she has a grant deed, but if there were loans subsequent to the grant deed with
the property used as security, it might be evidence that her title was not the
legal title but was held as a trustee.â€
On the
trial’s first day the court heard testimony on the plaintiffs’ behalf from
Martin-Bragg, from Mr. Rile, an expert document examiner, and from Moore, under
Evidence Code section 776. After the
plaintiff rested her case, Moore presented testimony from Mr. Hills, Vijay
Chandran, and Martin-Bragg (under Evidence Code section 776).
The trial testimony
on behalf of Martin-Bragg
Martin-Bragg,
a Los Angeles police officer, testified that Moore had lived in the home at
6150 Shenandoah Avenue since about 2000, before she purchased the
property. Martin-Bragg purchased the
property for $687,000 in April 2004, from Ronald Hills, a colleague of
Moore. She paid a down payment of about
$16,000 from her credit union account.
Sometime earlier she had purchased the house next door, at 6160
Shenandoah Avenue, and she had lived in both houses, “in between the two
properties.â€
Moore and
Martin-Bragg were living together in the 6150 Shenandoah Avenue home until
September 15, 2010, when Martin-Bragg moved out. At that time Moore signed a rental agreement
agreeing to pay monthly rental of $7,152.62 (consisting of the monthly mortgage
payment plus a late fee, “just in caseâ€).
Martin-Bragg
denied having agreed that the property could be encumbered as part of a trust
for Moore’s benefit, and no such trust document has been recorded on the
property. Moore paid—or was supposed to
pay—the mortgage and all expenses on the property, since he was using it for
his business and recording equipment.
Martin-Bragg
admitted that she had signed documentation for a $5 million loan from Wachovia
Bank to Moore and herself, as well as Moore’s corporations, which she said was
intended to be used to pay her what Moore then owed her. The loan encumbered the 6150 Shenandoah
Avenue property, in which she and Moore were then living, but not the next door
property she owned at 6160 Shenandoah Avenue.
Martin-Bragg said that she had signed a power of attorney authorizing a
pledge of the 6150 Shenandoah Avenue property to Wachovia Bank, but providing
also that Moore was given no equity in the property. Moore’s corporations made the payments on the
Wachovia Bank loan, and Martin-Bragg was not responsible to the bank for
payments.
Mr. Rile, a
document examiner, testified on Martin-Bragg’s behalf that the signature on the
lease agreement, Exhibit 3, appeared to be Moore’s.
Called as
an adverse witness, Moore testified that neither the purported signature on the
lease agreement (Exh. 5), nor a number of the comparison signatures used by the
document examiner, were his. He believed
that some of the signatures Mr. Rile had used for comparison, on checks and
other documents, had been done by others—including Martin-Bragg—without and
sometimes with his authorization. Moore
confirmed that a lien on the 6150 Shenandoah Avenue property secured a $5
million bank loan.
The court
admitted into evidence the five exhibits proffered by Martin-Bragg:
The grant deed for the 6150 Shenandoah Avenue property (Exh.
1), a buyer’s closing statement (Exh. 2), the rental agreement for the property
(Exh. 3), a notice to pay rent or quit (Exh. 4), and a forensic report (Exh. 5)
including the grant deed of the 6150 Shenandoah Avenue property to
Martin-Bragg.
The
plaintiff then rested her case.
Defendant Moore’s
case in chief
Mr. Hills
testified to his 37-year association with Moore in the music business, and his
status as secretary of Moore’s corporations since 1992. His services for the corporations had
included writing songs, producing music, and handling the recording business at
the 6150 Shenandoah Avenue house. Title to
the 6150 Shenandoah Avenue property had been in his name since 1999 or 2000,
when Moore’s mother (now deceased) had transferred it to him, without payment,
in connection with promotional transactions in which they were then
involved. Title was placed in his name
because his own home was being used as collateral for the project’s financing.
Mr. Hills
testified also about the resolution of the Bobby Watson case (which was the
subject of Moore’s request for judicial notice in the trial court), in which
he, Martin-Bragg, Moore, and others, had been sued to recover upon Moore’s
interest in the 6150 Shenandoah Avenue property upon a claim of fraudulent
transfer. The thrust of that testimony
was that the lawsuit had alleged that title to the 6150 Shenandoah Avenue
property had been transferred to Martin-Bragg without consideration in order to
frustrate Moore’s creditors, and that Moore had been forced to pay a $280,000
settlement in order to clear the title.
Mr. Hills
testified that he received no payment for his transfer of the property to
Martin-Bragg in April 2004. Title to
both of the Shenandoah Avenue properties had been placed in his name in trust
for the benefit of Moore’s music, and he had transferred them to Martin-Bragg
with that same understanding. He would
not have transferred them to her without that understanding. He testified that he did not receive and had
never seen the $48,000 check that Martin-Bragg had produced, purporting to be
the proceeds from Martin-Bragg’s purchase of the 6150 Shenandoah Avenue
property.
Mr. Hills
identified an Affidavit and Declaration (Exh. 6) representing that Martin-Bragg
holds the 6150 Shenandoah Avenue property in trust for Moore, and that Moore
has the right to encumber the property, consistent with Moore’s representations
to the bank. Both Martin-Bragg and Moore
had signed the Affidavit and Declaration in Mr. Hills’ presence, apparently in
March 2009.
Mr. Vijay
Chandran, a banker and financial adviser, testified that he had been the banker
at Wachovia Securities and Wachovia Wealth Management who had structured the $5
million loan to Moore and his corporations.
He testified that Martin-Bragg is “not responsible for any of that
loan.â€
According to Mr. Chandran, the $5
million credit facility had originally been provided in about 2003, and had
been modified and amended a number of times over the years, most recently
between 2008 and 2009 as Moore’s business interests changed. In connection with the loan the bank had
required both Mr. Hills and Martin-Bragg to execute documentation to convey to
the bank their security interests in the 6150 Shenandoah property, or to obtain
Moore’s guaranty of those interests. He
understood from his conversations with Martin-Bragg at the time that she
claimed no interest in the 6150 Shenandoah Avenue property, but she wanted her
other assets segregated to protect them from anything having to do with the
loan. Wachovia Bank (now Wells Fargo
Bank) still holds security interests in the property.
The 6150
Shenandoah Avenue property had also been subject to a lis pendens in favor of a
judgment creditor, which the bank had required Moore to clear before it
extended the loan. The documentation
regarding the property’s ownership had been reviewed and handled by others at
the bank, not by Mr. Chandran.
Martin-Bragg
testified under Evidence Code section 776 that she had ended her domestic
partner relationship with Moore when she had asked him to repay funds she had
loaned to him and his corporations. “We
had an agreement. You [Moore] were going
to pay. I mortgaged my property in order
to loan the corporation the money. You
were going to be responsible for paying that note.†“You and the corporations signed the
I.O.U.s.†“$2 million I’ve loaned this
man to get this business going. I signed
for these loans because he was supposed to pay me my money. When the money came from the loans, no money,
nothing.â€
promissory note dated October 18, 2009 (Exh. 7) (purportedly the amended
$5 million loan document) does not indicate her responsibility for the loan,
nor do Exhibits 11, 12, or 13 identify her in any capacity; but said she has
other loan documents that do.
When
Martin-Bragg’s testimony deteriorated into a volley of accusations between the
parties, the trial court concluded that “I’m sort of through with this.†“We’re not going to finish this case today.â€
The court
then addressed the state of the evidence.
“The issue is whether or not Ms. Bragg owns 6150 Shenandoah,†and there
is evidence on both sides. “The rental
agreement certainly is signed by Moore†(as Ms. Moore and Mr. Rile had
testified), and “[t]he grant deed supports her title.†However, some further documents are needed,
“given the relationship between the parties and the fact that the seller of the
property claims he got no money†from the sale.
The court asked Martin-Bragg to produce escrow instructions that say to
whom money was paid, and loan documents showing that she had borrowed to pay
off any mortgage and to pay additional money to the seller. “Now, if, in fact, the only money that Ms.
Bragg put into the house was the $16,000 that she borrowed from the L.A.P.D.
credit union, then I wonder what’s going on.â€
Expanding
on the evidence, the court explained: “It seems to me what’s really going on
here is a very involved commercial relationship between the two, and she’s
trying to save whatever assets are in her name so that she can sell those
assets or rent those assets in order to get paid back some of the money that
she’s loaned to Moore and his companies.â€
The court went on: “I’d also like
to have a title report. This is not a
standard unlawful detainer action. And I
don’t think I should oust Moore of possession given that he has extensive
recording equipment and has paid for remodeling without the clearest or at
least sufficient evidence that the property belongs to Ms. Bragg.†After again noting that the evidence of title
“cuts both ways,†the court concluded “This is a mess, and unless it’s clear, I
probably shouldn’t give a U.D. [judgment].
Probably what I should do is relate the other case to me and try both
cases together in August.†“In other
words, I can bring the other case here and we can have a really early trial.â€
Although
Moore may be “trying to create a lot of problems†by naming other parties in
his quiet title action, “this property lends itself to raising those
problems because . . . . it’s been used
as a piggy bank to obtain money for the
operation of the corporations, and Ms. Bragg has been part and parcel of that
procedure.â€
Counsel for
Martin-Bragg questioned whether the court could consider whether Martin-Bragg
held title to the property in trust:
“Well, is that really proper in an unlawful detainer? . . . because in an unlawful detainer you’re
not supposed to examine title issues beyond the deed, as far as I’m concerned.†The court acknowledged the quandary: “Well, maybe we ought to terminate this right
now, because you’re correct, title is not an issue in [an] ordinary unlawful
detainer. But if there’s a suspicion
that the power of the court is being used to oust someone from possession when
there is a contest about title, usually the judge will not act to give the U.D.
judgment.â€
Moore’s renewed
request for consolidation of the pending cases
Following
the court’s suggestion that it could relate the pending cases for unlawful
detainer and quiet title and try both cases together in the next month, Moore
renewed his request for consolidation:
“I do agree with the court that you should merge the two cases because
it is an issue of title. With the res
judicata involved in this case and the other issues that are apparent, it needs
to be adjudicated with both of the cases.â€
But the court did not consolidate the pending cases, noting that the
quiet title action involved other defendants and other claims as well.
The court
set two hours on Monday morning, July 11, 2011, for completion of the unlawful
detainer trial. The consolidation issue
remained unresolved.
The TRO barring the
unlawful detainer trial’s continuation, and Martin-Bragg’s ex parte motion to
set aside the TRO
On July 11,
2011, the trial court in Department 15 (where the unlawful detainer trial was
pending), was met with a ruling from Department 85 of the Superior Court
granting Moore an ex parte temporary restraining order against the unlawful
detainer trial’s continuation (apparently in light of the pending quiet title
issue in case number BC464111). Judge
Fruin in Department 15 therefore suspended the unlawful detainer trial, and
adjourned until August 1, 2011, “due to the ruling before Hon. Chalfant.†It ordered the parties to report that result
to Department 85.
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At the July
13, 2011 TRO hearing in Department 85, Martin-Bragg explained that the unlawful
detainer trial in Department 15 remained uncompleted because “the judge did
decide to take up the issues that Mr. Moore had raised in regards to
ownership.†She represented that the
unlawful detainer trial was “addressing all the issues that Mr. Moore had put
in this motion to consolidate. All the
issues are being addressed by Judge Fruin.â€
The trial court responded: “I
don’t know that he can do that in an unlawful detainer case.†After hearing Moore’s objections to trial of
the issue of title in the unconsolidated summary unlawful detainer proceeding,
the court recessed the proceedings in order to call Judge Fruin.
After
reconvening in Department 85, Judge Chalfant explained that Judge Fruin told
him that the plaintiff had not yet rested in the unlawful detainer trial
(although the record shows otherwise).
According to Judge Chalfant, “[Judge Fruin] believes that the scope of
his proceeding, what he was trying to determine anyway was both legal and
beneficial ownership of the property.â€
Judge Fruin said “that’s both probably what he should do and he is going
to do it, is that he is going to reconsider consolidation and consolidate the
two cases. And he wants me to dissolve
the TRO.â€
With that,
the court then granted Martin-Bragg’s request to dissolve the TRO. The court suggested that the parties “walk
downstairs†to talk to Judge Fruin about “what should be done, but I’m telling
you he has said he’s going to consolidate the two cases, essentially reconsider
your motion.â€
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In
Department 15, Judge Fruin and the parties discussed the “proposal†that the
court relate and consolidate the cases for trial. However, when Moore suggested that some
discovery would be required (which he thought could be done “quickly and
expeditiouslyâ€), the court interrupted with “another proposal,†that “I
complete the U.D. trial and stay the judgment on the U.D. trial until we do the
second trial.†But the court denied
Moore’s request for either consolidation or expedited discovery, saying “I
don’t plan to delay this case for so-called discovery,†because “[a] U.D.
action is entitled to priority,â€
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and Martin-Bragg should provide him with documents in her possession upon
request.
The court
tentatively set resumption of the unlawful detainer trial for about a week
hence, on July 21, 2011, ordering counsel for Martin-Bragg to provide the court
and Moore with two days’ advance confirmation of that date; and trial would
otherwise resume on August 1, 2011 (the date that had been set on July 11,
2011). However, on July 21, a number of
circumstances (another proceeding involving both parties), then a bankruptcy
automatic stay relating to one of the corporations), resulted in additional
continuances, ultimately to December 16, 28 and 29, 2011.
At one of
the scheduling hearings during that period, on December 13, 2011, the court
reasserted that “I’m going to determine title in this action. I’m not going to relate the two cases here or
consolidate them.†The unlawful detainer
trial must proceed, the court explained, because it has priority and because
the property is threatened with foreclosure for nonpayment of the mortgage.
On December
15, 2011, Moore filed an ex parte application for a continuance of the trial
until December 22, 2011, on the ground that he would be unavailable on December
16, 2011, and identifying 16 witnesses who would be unavailable until after January
2, 2012.
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Trial resumes
Trial
resumed on Friday, December 16, 2011, with Moore present “via Court Call.†Although the court’s minutes reflect no
ruling, the court apparently permitted Martin-Bragg to reopen her case-in-chief
for additional testimony from Mr. Rile, the document examiner, and the
identification of two reports prepared during the trial recess, dated October
28, 2011 (Exh. 15), and November 3, 2011 (Exh. 16).
of the December 16 proceedings, nor of the continued trial proceedings on
December 28, 2011.
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On December
29, 2011, the trial proceedings began with Moore’s motions to dismiss (which
the court denied after hearing argument), and for the court to recuse itself
for bias and prejudice (which the court denied without hearing argument).
After
initially refusing to permit Moore to present further testimony from Mr. Hills
and other potential witnesses, the court permitted Mr. Hills to testify that
the crux of the Bobby Watson case (in which he and Martin-Bragg were defendants
along with Moore and others) was the claim of the judgment-creditor plaintiff
that Moore was in fact the owner of the 6150 Shenandoah Avenue property; and
the case had been settled because Moore indeed was the rightful owner of the
property. Mr. Hills testified that the
6150 Shenandoah Avenue property had been used as collateral for loans to the
corporations Moore used in his recording business, and had been used as an
asset of the corporations and of Moore, including as collateral for the $5
million Wachovia Bank loan. Martin-Bragg
had never had any ownership interest in the corporations, and had never claimed
any such interest.
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Mr. Hills
testified that he had not received escrow closing documents for the sale of the
property to Martin-Bragg, nor the $48,000 payment for the property, and he had
never signed any escrow documents for that transaction.
Moore,
called on his own behalf, testified about the formation, use, and ownership of
the corporations and about a number of properties—including the 6150 Shenandoah
Avenue property—owned and operated by and for his music business
enterprises. He testified that
Martin-Bragg had signed documents permitting encumbrances to be placed on the
6150 Shenandoah Avenue property to secure the Wachovia Bank loan, and she had
willingly renewed the loan documentation in order to permit the 6150 Shenandoah
Avenue property to be used as security, as long as no other properties in which
she held title were involved.
Moore
testified that after the court in the Bobby Watson case had announced its
ruling that Moore owned the property, Moore paid a substantial settlement in
the fraudulent-transfer claim, at the Wachovia Bank’s insistence. Martin-Bragg again signed for increases of
the encumbrance on the 6150 Shenandoah Avenue property when Moore paid another
$250,000 for an FM translator in order to simulcast his FM radio broadcast to
another radio station, and when he purchased a Louisville, Kentucky radio
station for $1.4 million. Using the
80-channel recording console and related equipment at the 6150 Shenandoah
Avenue house, Moore, his corporations, and others, used the 6150 Shenandoah
Avenue house to make and edit sophisticated audio and video recordings, as well
as to edit movie soundtracks and commercials for his radio stations.
Moore
testified that he had never been Martin-Bragg’s tenant, and that she had never
asked him to pay rent.
He
testified on many other subjects concerning transactions with Martin-Bragg,
including her claim that he owed her $2.3 million; his belief that she had
pilfered about $80,000 in Louisville, Kentucky nightclub cash receipts; and the
invalidity of corporate documents showing Martin-Bragg as corporate president
of Rene Moore Music, authorizing a loan and loan payments to her, and showing
her ownership of one of the corporations.
A recent appraisal of the 6150 Shenandoah Avenue property (Exh. 101)
showed its value to be $880,000, and Moore believed the property to be worth
even more. He offered other documents,
including a deed of trust purporting to show Mr. Hills’ interest in the
property in 2008.
Moore
testified that in 2000 he had signed and had notarized an affidavit of
registered domestic partners, which Martin-Bragg said she would register with
the state to make them registered domestic partners. In their relationship it was Martin-Bragg who
maintained the documents. Moore has seen
her copy and paste to modify documents many times.
Moore was
present and witnessed Martin-Bragg sign the Affidavit and Declaration between
Moore and Martin-Bragg, which was given to the bank to show that the property was held by her in
trust. Moore was unable to locate the
original of the Affidavit and Declaration showing that Martin-Bragg held title
to the property in trust for him.
There were
never liens on the property for Martin-Bragg’s benefit. All the liens were consistent with the
development of the business. Mr. Hills
was involved to protect his investment, because he had put money into the
business, without promissory notes, based on trust and oral agreements.
On cross
examination Moore admitted that in the Bobby Watson case he had signed a
declaration under penalty of perjury saying that he does not own the 6150
Shenandoah property, and has not owned any property since 1988 or 1989. By that he meant that he owned no property in
his name, although he did own interests in some properties in the name of the
corporations or Mr. Hills. He testified
that he did not sign the Addendum to Domestic Partnership Agreement (Exh. 37),
which purports to relinquish rights to the 6150 Shenandoah Avenue property),
and the signature on it does not appear to be his.
Moore
denied manipulating signatures in order to create the signature page on Exhibit
6, the Affidavit and Declaration, and denied that in 2006 the court in another case had found that he had
forged his deceased mother’s name on a deed to real property, or that he had
forged his former attorney’s name.
Following
some further testimony from Martin-Bragg on these subjects, and after Moore
renewed his claim of prejudice due to his inability to obtain discovery, the
trial court received a number of
documents in evidence, and ended the trial without final arguments.
Entry of judgment and
statement of decision
The trial
court entered judgment in Martin-Bragg’s favor on January 23, 2012, giving
possession of the property at 6150 Shenandoah Avenue to Martin-Bragg and
granting her damages against Moore totaling $112,772.96, plus costs and
attorney fees. In a six and one-half
page statement of decision the court found that Moore occupied the house at
6150 Shenandoah Avenue under a written agreement to pay rent to Martin-Bragg;
that he had never paid rent; that he was served with a statutory three-day
notice to pay rent or quit; and that he failed to pay the required rent.
The
statement of decision expresses the court’s acceptance of Martin-Bragg’s
version of the events, and rejection of Moore’s testimony, on credibility
grounds. It recounts findings that Moore
and Martin-Bragg had been unregistered domestic partners from May 2002 until
January 1, 2011; that Moore, and a number of corporations he controls, own
interests in radio stations in other states; that Moore lived in and operated
his music business at the 6150 Shenandoah Avenue property; and that
Martin-Bragg, a Los Angeles police officer and licensed real estate agent,
lived next door at 6160 Shenandoah Avenue.
Martin-Bragg
purchased the 6150 Shenandoah Avenue property in April 2004, from Mr. Hills, a
colleague of Moore in his music business.
Six years later, in September 2010, Moore signed a rental agreement for
the property, specifying monthly rent of $7,152.62. Moore continued living in and using the
premises for his business; he and his corporations continued to make the
mortgage and tax payments for the property (sometimes with checks drawn by
Martin-Bragg, who was a signatory on the corporations’ accounts); and he (or
his corporations) obtained bank loans using the property as collateral, with
Martin-Bragg’s consent and with her signatures.
He paid no rent to Martin-Bragg.
The
statement of decision addressed the central defense pleaded by Moore: that Martin-Bragg holds title to the property
in trust for Moore, his corporations, and Mr. Hills; and that Martin-Bragg has
no beneficial interest in the property.
With respect to that defense, the court itemized its findings that the
grant deed transferring the property to Martin-Bragg was signed by Mr. Hills;
Martin-Bragg’s evidence established that she had in fact obtained loans from a
credit union and a third-party lender in order to complete the purchase; and
that copies of the escrow documents that Martin-Bragg said the escrow company
had sent to her and to Mr. Hills (although unsigned and unauthenticated by an
escrow officer), establish that the property’s purchase by Martin-Bragg was
conducted through a third-party escrow.
The trial
court found also that the May 6, 2006, “Affidavit and Declaration†was a
fabrication,
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and that in an earlier declaration filed in another action, Moore had denied
under oath that he had any ownership interest in the 6150 Shenandoah Avenue
property. The court concluded that
“Defendant’s 2006 declaration, therefore, defeats any assertion the defendant
now makes that he always has held an undocumented interest in the 6150
Shenandoah property.â€
The trial
court concluded that Moore’s nonpayment of rent after the September 2010 rental
agreement entitled Martin-Bragg to possession of the property. The judgment grants “restitution and
possession of the premises†to Martin-Bragg, and rent from January 1, 2012 to
the date of judgment. Although the
judgment does not explicitly grant “title†to Martin-Bragg, the trial court
explicitly tried the issue of title in its determination that Martin-Bragg was
entitled to possession; and its statement of decision explicitly rejects
Moore’s claim that he or his corporations are the property’s true owners.
Moore’s
timely appeal does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
trial court’s findings, but lists nine claims of error that he contends require
reversal of the judgment and remand for a new trial.
therefore reverse the judgment and remand for retrial without consideration of
his remaining claims.
DISCUSSION
Trial Of The Issue Of
Title To The Property In The Summary Unlawful Detainer Proceeding Abused The
Trial Court’s Discretion
Moore
contends that the trial court’s refusal to consolidate the unlawful detainer
proceeding with his pending action for title to the subject property resulted
in improper and prejudicial determination of “complex and complicated property
ownership issues and rights in an unlawful detainer action.†The record confirms that he was prejudiced by
the procedure adopted by the trial court.
In unlawful
detainer proceedings, ordinarily the only triable issue is the right to
possession of the disputed premises, along with incidental damages resulting
from the unlawful detention. (
(2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1297; Friedman et al., Cal. Prac. Guide:
Landlord-Tenant (The Rutter Group 2012) ¶ 8:4, p. 8-1). Ordinarily, issues respecting the title to
the property cannot be adjudicated in an unlawful detainer action. (Drybread
v. Chipain Chiropractic Corp. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1072; Friedman,
enjoyed by litigants in ordinary actions is deemed necessary in order to
prevent frustration of the summary proceedings by the introduction of delays
and extraneous issues. (
227; Vasey v. California Dance Co.
(1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 742, 747.)
However,
the trial court has the power to consolidate an unlawful detainer proceeding
with a simultaneously pending action in which title to the property is in
issue. That is because a successful
claim of title by the tenant would defeat the landlord’s right to
possession. (Friedman et al., Cal. Prac.
Guide: Landlord-Tenant, supra, ¶¶
8:5:1, 8:409.1, pp. 8-2, 8-142.) When an
unlawful detainer proceeding and an unlimited action concerning title to the
property are simultaneously pending, the trial court in which the unlimited
action is pending may stay the unlawful detainer action until the issue of
title is resolved in the unlimited action, or it may consolidate the
actions. (Id., ¶ 7:268, p. 7‑58.15.) If it does neither, and instead tries the
issue of title under the summary procedures that constrain unlawful detainer
proceedings, the parties’ right to a full trial of the issue of title may be
unfairly expedited and limited. If
complex issues of title are tried in the unlawful detainer proceeding, the proceeding
loses its summary character; defects in the plaintiff’s title “are neither
properly raised in this summary proceeding for possession, nor are they
concluded by the judgment.†(
158, 160; Wood v. Herson (1974) 39
Cal.App.3d 737, 745; Gonzales v. Gem Properties,
Inc. (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 1029, 1033-1035.)
The trial
court in this case recognized that Moore’s action for title in case number
BC464111 raised the issue whether title to the property was held by
Martin-Bragg as a security interest or in trust for the benefit of Moore’s
music business. The parties’ trial
testimony tended to confirm the court’s initial concern about the complexity of
the issue of title. Martin-Bragg claimed
title by purchase of the property from Mr. Hills in 2004, for consideration. But Mr. Hills testified that he had held
title to the property that he had received from Moore’s (now deceased) mother,
without payment. He denied having
received any payment for his transfer of the property to Martin-Bragg, and
testified that his title—and Martin-Bragg’s—was held in trust for Moore and his
business entities. Moreover,
Martin-Bragg produced no signed escrow documents confirming her payment of
consideration for the purchase, and she could show no proof that Mr. Hills had
received the $48,000 or any other proceeds from the escrow. Martin-Bragg had made no payments on the
property’s encumbrances, nor for its maintenance or improvement (all of which
had been paid by Moore and his companies).
Moore’s banker testified that the property was encumbered as security
for a $5 million credit facility in Moore’s favor.
As the
court recognized, at that point the evidence respecting title to the property
“cuts both ways,†suggesting “a very involved commercial relationship between
the two, and she’s trying to save whatever assets are in her name so that she
can sell those assets or rent those assets in order to get paid back some of
the money that she’s loaned to Moore and his companies.†“There’s a lot more than meets the eye in
this case,†and “before I would issue a U.D. judgment, . . . I want to be
pretty clear that this property belongs to her as a grant deed and not simply
as security for all the money that she’s loaned to him and his
corporations.†The property had “been
used as a piggy bank,†raising the question “[i]s this a true landlord-tenant
relationship or is this in actuality a business operation which has been
mortgaged to provide loans to Moore’s business?â€
As such,
the court recognized that title issue was complex and not subject to summary
trial proceedings. “This is a case with
a lot of issues in it. It’s not a
standard U.D. . . .†If Moore’s action
for title were meritorious, it would defeat Martin-Bragg’s right to
possession. In other words,
Martin-Bragg’s right to possession could not be determined without first
determining the issue raised by the quiet title claim. “Probably what I should do is relate the
other case to me and try both cases together in August,†early trial, the court
suggested. And when counsel for
Martin-Bragg questioned whether the court could consider the issue of title at
all, the court confirmed that “maybe we ought to terminate this right now,
because you’re correct, title is not an issue in an ordinary unlawful detainer. But if there’s a suspicion that the power of
the court is being used to oust someone from possession when there is a contest
about title, usually the judge will not act to give the U.D. judgment.â€
However,
the trial court also recognized that consolidation of the unlawful detainer
proceeding with Moore’s quiet title action could change the nature of the
action. The unlawful detainer law’s
provisions for summary determination of the right to possession would be lost
if the lawsuit were to be transformed into an ordinary action at law involving
complex issues of title to the property.
“[A]n action for unlawful detainer can co-exist with other causes of
action in the same complaint,†it has been held, but only “so long as the
entire case is treated as an ordinary civil action, not as a summary
proceeding.†(Lynch & Freytag v. Cooper (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 603, 608.)
Instead of
treating the unlawful detainer as an ordinary civil action rather than as a
summary proceeding, however, the trial court did the opposite. It instead insisted upon a summary trial of
the parties’ dispute as to title, without the discovery and preparation that
the law affords for ordinary civil actions.
“The
California wrongful detainer statutes were ‘. . . enacted to provide an
adequate, expeditious and summary procedure for regaining possession of real
property wrongfully withheld by a tenant.
[Fn. omitted.] The rights and
remedies afforded a landlord by the statutory provisions are given in lieu of
his common law rights and remedies which included the right to enter and expel
the tenant by force. [Citations.] The enactment of such statutory procedures is
supported by the strong public policy of preserving the peace [citation] as
well as the recognition of the unique factual and legal characteristics of the
landlord-tenant relationship.
[Citation.] . . . .’†(
Cal.App.3d 991, 995, quoting Childs v.
Eltinge (1973) 29 Cal.App.3d 843, 853.)
These
reasons form the constitutional justifications for the summary nature of
unlawful detainer actions, and the limitations on the issues that may be raised
by a defendant in such proceedings. (
S.Ct. 862.) In that case the United
States Supreme Court held that the summary procedures of an Oregon forcible
entry and wrongful detainer statute were justified by the nature of the
landlord-tenant relationship, and when applied in that narrow context they
afford the tenant due process. “There
are unique factual and legal characteristics of the landlord-tenant
relationship that justify special statutory treatment inapplicable to other
litigants. . . . [U]nless a judicially
supervised mechanism is provided for what would otherwise be swift repossession
by the landlord himself, the tenant would be able to deny the landlord the
rights of income incident to ownership by refusing to pay rent and by
preventing sale or rental to someone else. . . . Speedy adjudication is desirable to prevent
subjecting the landlord to undeserved economic loss and the tenant to unmerited
harassment and dispossession when his lease or rental agreement gives him the
right to peaceful and undisturbed possession of the property. Holding over by the tenant beyond the term of
his agreement or holding without payment of rent has proved a virulent source
of friction and dispute,†and a state is “well within its constitutional powers
in providing for rapid and peaceful settlement of these disputes.†(Id.
at pp. 72-73.)
However,
the Supreme Court did not approve the application of these justifications
outside of the context of routine cases in which the tenant has failed to pay
rent or has held over after the tenancy has expired, “and the issue in the
ensuing litigation is simply whether he has paid or held over.†(Lindsey
v. Normet, supra, 405 U.S. at pp.
64-65.) “The constitutionality of these
summary procedures is based on their limitation to the single issue of right to
possession and incidental damages. (
157 Cal.App.3d at pp. 995-996.) Although
California now permits the adjudication of substantially more defenses in
unlawful detainer proceedings than simply the payment of rent,
the rule in this state is that because trial courts are afforded express
statutory discretion to extend the unlawful detainer law’s expedited pleading
timetable for good cause, the statute’s truncated time to respond to an
unlawful detainer complaint does not deprive the defendant of due process of
law. (Deal v. Municipal Court, supra,
157 Cal.App.3d at pp. 997-998.)
The trial
court in this case recognized that under these settled principles, Moore was
entitled to interpose his claim of equitable ownership of the 6150 Shenandoah
Avenue property as a defense to Martin-Bragg’s claim of unlawful detainer. His quiet title claim related directly to the
issue of possession; if he were to prevail on that claim, the result would be a
judgment entitling him to retain possession of the premises. (See Deal
v. Municipal Court, supra, 157
Cal.App.3d at p. 995.)
It does not follow, however,
that by pleading his claim to title as a defense to unlawful detainer (while
simultaneously asserting his claim to title in a separate action), Moore
necessarily acceded to the summary and expedited procedures of unlawful detainer
with respect to that issue, or waived his right to the statutory procedures
that apply to trial of complex issues of title.
His timely requests for consolidation of the unlawful detainer with the
action for quiet title sought the opposite result, as the trial court
recognized. The fact that Moore pleaded
his title to the property as an affirmative defense to the unlawful detainer
action did not constitute his consent to have his claim heard under the summary
unlawful detainer procedures. (
Cal.App.3d 1044, 1050.)
The trial
court in this case initially declined to order consolidation of the unlawful
detainer with the action for title expressly because that would delay the
unlawful detainer proceeding for discovery, thereby compromising Martin-Bragg’s
right to the expedited summary procedures of the unlawful detainer law. “I don’t plan to delay this [unlawful
detainer] case for so-called discovery.â€
However, the court also recognized that the key issue to be tried was title: “whether or not Ms. Bragg owns 6150
Shenandoah.†And although the trial
court advised Judge Chalfant in Department 85 that it would consolidate the
unlawful detainer and quiet title cases, the court then declined to do so. As the court later explained, “I’m going to
determine title in this [unlawful detainer] action. I’m not going to relate the two cases here or
consolidate them. The title action does
not have a priority. It provides for the
usual discovery procedures. And I think
that consolidating that action with this one would simply delay the trial.â€
The trial
court’s concern about loss of the summary procedures to which unlawful detainer
plaintiffs are entitled was justified; it undoubtedly had discretion to
fashion conditions and limitations to protect and preserve
those legislatively imposed benefits to the extent possible. However, that discretion did not permit it to
wholly disregard Moore’s legitimate need for, and right to, time to prepare and
to obtain reasonable discovery in advance of trial of the admittedly complex
issue raised by the parties’ conflicting claims of ownership, or to require
that those complex issues be tried within the summary procedures designed for
straightforward unlawful detainer claims.
(Lynch & Freytag v. Cooper,
supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 609 [“It
would obviously be unfair to require the defendant-tenant to defend against
ordinary civil actions under the constraints of the summary procedure in
unlawful detainer actionsâ€]; Deal v.
Municipal Court, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 996; see Lindsey v. Normet, supra,
405 U.S. at pp. 64-66 [summary unlawful detainer procedures are
constitutionally acceptable as long as they are applied to straightforward
issues of possession and incidental damages].)
The
reasoning applied in a number of other decisions is instructive, though not
controlling in this circumstance. In
a lending company filed a municipal court unlawful detainer action based on
title obtained through what it asserted was a foreclosure sale of the
property. The property’s homeowners
filed a superior court action alleging that the lender had obtained the deed
through fraud. The appellate court held
that the court in which the civil action for title was filed should “retain
jurisdiction over the matter so long as substantive issues of ownership remain
to be litigated.†(Id. at p. 147.) That result
was required—even though it had the effect of compromising the summary nature
of the unlawful detainer action—because due process precluded the homeowners’
eviction without having the opportunity to adjudicate the affirmative defenses
of fraud, which, if proved, would demonstrate their right to ownership and
possession. (Ibid.)
In
sued for unlawful detainer the defendants filed an answer claiming that the
plaintiff’s trustee’s deed had been obtained by fraud, and filed a separate
action based on that claim. The
appellate court held that because the defendants were entitled to litigate
their right to title in the fraud action, the trial court was required to stay
execution of its unlawful detainer judgment, upon reasonable conditions for the
protection of both parties’ interests, pending the appeal. (Id.
at pp. 1047-1050.)
In
Cal.App.4th 354, the plaintiff sought unlawful detainer against a religious
society and several priests who were in
possession of disputed church properties. The plaintiff claimed a right to possession
of the properties by virtue of his appointment as pastor of the religious
entity that held title as a corporation sole.
The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s treatment of the unlawful
detainer action as an ordinary civil
action for declaratory relief rather than applying the summary procedures
that apply to unlawful detainer proceedings, and its entry of summary judgment
for the defendants on the merits.
Although “unlawful detainer is intended to afford an expeditious remedy
for obtaining possession of premises wrongfully withheld,†the court explained,
“the summary remedy of an unlawful detainer action was not the proper vehicleâ€
to litigate the complex issues of title in that matter. (Id.
at p. 364, fn. 7.)
Each of
these cases reflect the courts’ recognition that when complex issues of title
are involved, the parties’ constitutional rights to due process in the
litigation of those issues cannot be subordinated to the summary procedures of
unlawful detainer. (Lindsey v. Normet, supra,
405 U.S. at pp. 64-66 [summary unlawful detainer procedures are
constitutionally acceptable when they are applied to straightforward issues of
possession and incidental damages]. By
failing to determine whether and how Moore’s rights and needs might be balanced
with Martin-Bragg’s legitimate interests in the matter’s prompt resolution, and
instead proceeding to try the complex issue of the parties’ rights to title of
the property within the confines of the summary procedures that apply only to
straightforward determination rights to possession, the court abused its
discretion.
title="">
Moore’s
rights are not foreclosed because he asserted his ownership of the property,
“putting the issue before the court and actually litigating title matters fully
as an affirmative defense†in the unlawful detainer action, contrary to
Martin-Bragg’s argument on appeal. (
pp. 1047-1050 [defendants who pleaded right to title both as affirmative
defense in unlawful detainer proceeding and as plaintiffs in separate fraud
action are entitled to trial of title issue in fraud action].) The record shows that although Moore was willing
to litigate the issue of title, he objected to doing so under the summary
procedures that apply to unlawful detainer proceedings, without having the
opportunity for reasonable discovery of documents and preparation that can be
completed “quickly and expeditiously.â€
It has been
held that an adjudication of title in an unlawful detainer proceeding can be
affirmed when the defendant has acceded to the summary nature of the trial, and
has had a full and fair opportunity to present his evidence bearing on the
issue of title. (Wilson v. Gentile (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 759, 761.) That rule does not apply here, however,
because the record does not establish either that Moore acceded to the summary
procedures, or that he had a full and fair opportunity to present his evidence
bearing on the issue of title. (See
[unlawful detainer judgment obtained under summary procedures is not res
judicata on the question of title obtained by fraud]; Asuncion v. Superior Court, supra,
108 Cal.App.3d at p. 144 [summary unlawful detainer action is not suitable for
trial of complicated ownership issues].)
In
purported to adjudicate the defendant’s claim of title in a summary unlawful
detainer proceeding. The unlawful
detainer plaintiff then asserted the unlawful detainer judgment as res judicata
requiring dismissal of the dispossessed defendant’s separate action for title. The court of appeal held that res judicata
could not apply, because the record was inadequate to establish that the
unlawful detainer defendant had received a full adversary hearing on the issues
involved in his subsequent suit claiming fraud in the acquisition of title to
the property. (Id. at pp. 1033, 1036.) “The
summary nature of unlawful detainer proceedings suggests that, as a practical
matter, the likelihood of the defendant’s being prepared to litigate the
factual issues involved in a fraudulent scheme to deprive him of his property,
no matter how diligent defendant is, is not great. . . . Investigation and
discovery are not always available to a defendant who must face the time
element of unlawful detainer proceedings provided in Code of Civil Procedures
sections 1167, 1179a.†(
108 Cal.App.3d at p. 147 [court in which action for title is filed should
“retain jurisdiction over the matter so long as substantive issues of ownership
remain to be litigated.â€)
Much like
the case of Gonzales v. Gem Properties,
Inc., in this case after the court had denied his requests for
consolidation, Moore attempted to assert his own title and to refute
Martin-Bragg’s evidence of her title to the property. But the summary procedures that apply to
unlawful detainer precluded him from obtaining the discovery that ordinarily is
afforded to litigants in civil actions concerning claims of title, even upon
abbreviated and expedited terms. Moore’s
initial attempt to obtain consolidation of the cases had come just three days
after his answer was filed in the unlawful detainer proceeding, but just a week
before the June 30, 2011 commencement of the unlawful detainer trial. It was denied on June 27, 2011, too late as a
practical matter to commence any meaningful discovery in the unlawful detainer
case. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2024.040,
subd. (b)(1) [discovery in summary proceedings for possession of property to be
completed on or before fifth day before date set for trial].) Moore’s requests for even limited discovery
concerning the documents that the court identified as critical to the issue of
title were denied, admittedly because the court “assumed that you were trying
to delay the trial.â€
name="_ftnref24" title="">[24]
The cases
cited above are consistent in holding that adjudication of complex issues of
title to property should not be forced to adhere to the strictures that apply
to summary proceedings for unlawful detainer.
(Lynch & Freytag v. Cooper,
supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 609 [“It
would obviously be unfair to require the defendant-tenant to defend against
ordinary civil actions under the constraints of the summary procedure in
unlawful detainer actionsâ€]; Asuncion v.
Superior Court, supra, 108
Cal.App.3d at p. 147 [court hearing action for title should “retain
jurisdiction over the matter so long as substantive issues of ownership remain
to be litigatedâ€]; Berry v. Society of
St. Pius X, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th
at p. 364, fn. 7 [summary remedy of unlawful detainer action is not proper
vehicle for litigation of complex issues of title]; see Lindsey v. Normet, supra,
405 U.S. at pp. 64-66 [summary unlawful detainer procedures are
constitutionally acceptable when applied to straightforward issues of
possession and incidental damages].) The
trial court nevertheless ultimately refused to address the issue of title
outside of the summary unlawful detainer proceeding.
The factual
record on which the trial court based its judgment was undoubtedly sufficient
to support its findings; Moore has not contended otherwise in this appeal. But the record does not establish that Moore
received a full adversary hearing on the issues involved in his suit for title
to the property. Nor was he permitted to
engage in reasonable discovery to obtain evidence in his defense and to support
his claim to ownership of the property at trial. We do not hold that trial courts must in all
cases grant applications for consolidation of an unlawful detainer proceeding
with a pending quiet title action, no matter how straightforward the issues,
and no matter what the circumstances.
With or without consolidation of the cases, trial courts have available
options to address plaintiffs’ legitimate rights and need for protection from
unjustified delay of the unlawful detainer proceeding, while still affording
reasonable opportunities for discovery and to prepare for trial of complex
issues relating to the property’s title.
The trial court has discretion, for example, to sever and separately try
the issue of title to the property, while assuring the availability of fair
compensation to the plaintiff for any delay in acquiring possession. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1170.5, subd. (c) [court
may order defendant to pay contract rent into court during delay of trial for
defendant’s benefit].)
There is no
certainty that any evidence Moore might have obtained in
| Description | Ivan Rene Moore appeals in pro. per. from the superior court’s judgment following trial on the unlawful detainer complaint of Kimberly Martin-Bragg seeking forfeiture of a lease and possession of a property. The judgment, entered January 23, 2012, awarded Martin-Bragg possession of the disputed property, along with rent of $50,068.34 and rental damages of $57,220.96 for the period from May 1, 2011 to December 31, 2011, plus daily damages of $238.42 per day from January 1, 2012 until the date of judgment. Moore appeals from the judgment on a number of grounds, most notably the trial court’s refusal to consolidate the unlawful detainer case against him with another action then pending in the superior court, brought by Moore, seeking quiet title to the property based on allegations that Martin-Bragg’s title to the property was actually held in trust for Moore’s benefit. Upon a fragmentary and disorganized record we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing Moore’s request to consolidate the unlawful detainer and quiet title actions for trial, and that Moore was prejudiced by being forced to litigate the complex issue of title to the property under the summary procedures that govern actions for unlawful detainer. |
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