In re A.W.
Filed 12/3/13 In re A.W. CA2/4
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In
re A.W.,
a
Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
B242188
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NJ26304)
THE
PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
A.W.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
County, John C. Lawson, II, Judge. Affirmed.
Susan L. Ferguson, under appointment
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General,
Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Analee J. Brodie, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A.W. appeals from an order of wardship
pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 following the juvenile
court’s finding that he committed the crime of
section 242, a misdemeanor. Appellant
contends the evidence is insufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
On May 21, 2011, around 5:00 p.m., Vanessa Caro was riding her bicycle
on the Los Angeles River bike path in the City of Long Beach.
She was wearing headphones while she rode. As she rode around a curve, she was knocked
down by a fishing line that was stretched across the path. The line hit Caro in the upper lip and caused
her to fall off her bicycle. Caro’s lip
was scratched and her bicycle handle was damaged in the incident.
Caro saw about four teenaged boys on one
side of the path and one or two on the other side. She got her pepper spray, told them not to
leave, and called 911. Several of the
boys ran away. Caro initially testified
that appellant was holding the fishing line in his left hand and that he threw
it down and ran away when she saw him. However,
she subsequently stated that he did not run away.
Appellant’s version of the incident
was that he was trying to stop his friends from stretching the fishing line
across the bike path. He testified that
he was walking along the river with a friend, Ricky, when they saw two other
school friends, Brandon and Joseph. Brandon found some fishing line on the
ground and told Ricky to tie it to a pole beside the path.
Brandon thought it would be funny to hit
people with the line, but appellant told him not to do it because someone could
get hurt. Ricky tied the line to a pole
on one side of the path, and Brandon went to the other side of the path
and held it, pulling it tight across the path.
Appellant saw Caro coming from about five feet away. He told Brandon and Ricky to put the line
down, but Brandon started laughing.
Appellant saw that Caro was coming
pretty quickly, and he did not want her to get hurt, but he did not know what
to do. He decided to hold the line up,
and he waved at her to go under the part that was higher. He tried telling her to go under the higher
side, but she did not hear him because of her headphones. After Caro hit the line, Ricky and Brandon
ran away.
Appellant stayed and tried to explain
to Caro that he was trying to help, but she yelled at him and showed him her
pepper spray. Appellant stayed and
waited for the police.
A petition was filed under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 602, alleging that appellant committed the crime of
battery in violation of Penal Code section 242, a misdemeanor. At the adjudication hearing, Caro and
appellant testified to the facts set forth above. The juvenile court found the allegations of
the petition true and sustained the petition.
The court declared appellant a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 602) and placed him home on probation. Appellant filed a timely
Appellant contends that the evidence
is insufficient to sustain the juvenile court’s finding that he committed
battery. He argues that his testimony
established that he was trying to prevent his friends from harming Caro and
thus lacked the intent to commit a “willful and unlawful use of force or
violence upon the person of another.â€
(Pen. Code, § 242.)
The standard of review of an
insufficiency of the evidence claim is the same in juvenile cases as in adult
criminal cases: “we review the whole
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to decide whether
substantial evidence supports the conviction, so that a reasonable fact finder
could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
[Citations.]†(
537, 540.) “‘We must presume in support
of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably
deduce from the evidence [citation] and we must make all reasonable inferences
that support the finding of the juvenile court.
[Citation.]’ [Citations.]†(In re
Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1089.)
Battery is a general intent crime. (People
v. Lara (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107.)
“This necessarily excludes criminal liability when the force or violence
is accomplished with a ‘lesser’ state of mind, i.e., ‘criminal negligence.’ As with all general intent crimes, ‘the
required mental state entails only an intent to do the act that causes the harm
. . . .’ [Citation.] Thus, the crime of battery requires that the
defendant actually intend to commit a ‘willful and unlawful use of force or
violence upon the person of another.’
[Citations.] In this context, the
term ‘willful’ means ‘simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act . . .
.’ ([Pen. Code,] § 7, subd. 1.)
“‘Reckless conduct alone does not
constitute a sufficient basis for . . . battery . . . .’ [Citation.]
However, if an act ‘“inherently dangerous to others†. . . [is] done
“with conscious disregard of human life and safety,†the perpetrator must be
aware of the nature of the conduct and choose to ignore its potential for
injury, i.e., act willfully. If these
predicates are proven to the satisfaction of the trier of fact, the requisite
intent is . . . established by the evidence.
[Fn. omitted.]’ [Citation.]†(Lara,
supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at pp.
107-108.)
Appellant contends that his testimony
that he was trying to prevent harm to Caro was undisputed and in fact corroborated
by Caro’s testimony. He points out that Caro
hit the line on her upper lip, corroborating his testimony that he was
attempting to lift the line high enough for her not to be hurt. He also argues that the fact that he did not
attempt to flee, as the other boys did, supports his claim of innocence. He argues that his testimony regarding the
incident establishes that he did not have the requisite intent to commit a
“willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of
another.†(Pen. Code, § 242.)
On appeal, “‘[w]e do not reweigh
evidence or reevaluate a witness’s credibility.
[Citation.]’ [Citations.]†(People
v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 210.)
Thus, although appellant testified that he was raising the fishing line
in order to avoid harming Caro, we defer
to the juvenile court’s determination regarding the weight to be given to his
testimony. Caro testified that appellant
was holding the fishing line, which was stretched across the bike path. The juvenile court could reasonably deduce
from Caro’s testimony that appellant was holding the fishing line with the
requisite intent.
Similarly, appellant’s decision to
remain at the scene may be construed as evidence of his innocence, but it also
may be, as Caro testified, that he was afraid because of her pepper spray. We again defer to the juvenile court’s credibility
determination.
Construing the record in the light
most favorable to the judgment, we conclude that Caro’s testimony is sufficient
to support the juvenile court’s finding.
The order of wardship is affirmed.
WILLHITE,
J.
We concur:
EPSTEIN, P. J.
SUZUKAWA, J.
