Conservatorship of Peterson

Filed 1/26/09 Conservatorship of Peterson CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(San Joaquin)

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Petitioner claims the trial court erred in not awarding her interest on an amount the court had ordered the objector to pay her. We agree and reverse the trial courts order.

FACTS

This matter is the conclusion of litigation that arose in 1998 when David Peterson, now deceased, was injured at work. He and his wife, petitioner Jeri Peterson, sought to remedy their injuries pursuant to a workers compensation claim and a lawsuit against various third-party tortfeasors. Because the employers workers compensation carrier was insolvent, California Insurance Guarantee Association (CIGA), objector, paid the workers compensation benefits. CIGA also intervened in the tort action to seek reimbursement of the benefits it had paid.^[1]

In 2001, petitioner was appointed conservator of David and his estate.

That year, petitioner and CIGA reached a settlement. Under that agreement, petitioner agreed, among other matters, to pay CIGA a certain percentage of Davids net recovery in the tort case and to credit CIGA for a certain amount of payments made on Davids behalf. Petitioner transferred those payments to CIGA in 2003.

David Peterson died in February 2004.

Subsequently, petitioner came to believe she had overpaid CIGA under the terms of their settlement. She petitioned the probate court for reimbursement. On August 27, 2004, the court granted petitioners petition. It ordered CIGA to refund $333,553.00 less 25% of sums CIGA incurred for medical expenses it had paid on behalf of David from October 29, 2003, to the time of his death.

CIGA appealed the trial courts decision to our court. On October 31, 2005, we affirmed the trial courts order. (C047907.)

CIGA did not pay the principal amount due under the trial courts 2004 order until over a year after our decision, and not until first being served by petitioner with an order for debtors examination dated April 26, 2007. In June 2007, CIGA paid $257,072.19, an amount agreed upon by the parties as representing the principal amount ordered by the court, $333,553, less 25 percent of sums CIGA had paid for Davids medical expenses, or $76,480.81. The parties agreed the court would determine the issue of postjudgment interest.

The trial court heard petitioners claim for postjudgment interest and ultimately denied it. The court denied interest because there was [n]o sum certain contained in [the] prior order.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner appeals from the trial courts order, claiming the court erred by not awarding postjudgment interest on its 2004 reimbursement order. She claims the court was mandated to award interest under either Code of Civil Procedure section 685.020 as interest on a money judgment, or Civil Code section 3287 as interest on damages that were certain, or capable of being made certain, as of the day of the 2004 order.

CIGA asserts the trial court correctly denied interest. It argues the 2004 order was too indefinite and uncertain to be enforced. There was nothing in the court record, it claims, upon which the court could have determined the amount of the 25 percent offset. It also claims interest was not available under Civil Code section 3287 because that statute allegedly applies only to prejudgment interest.

Even if petitioner is entitled to interest, CIGA claims she has not established the amount of interest to which she is entitled. It asserts that determining the amount it paid in medical expenses is difficult, and reasonable minds could differ on whether some of its expenditures would qualify as medical expenses.

We disagree with each of CIGAs arguments. Petitioner was entitled to interest under either Code of Civil Procedure section 685.020 or Civil Code section 3287. The judgment was sufficiently definite to be enforced and damages were capable of being made certain as of the date of the order.

Under the California Constitution, interest attaches generally to judgments for an amount of money, regardless of the nature of the suit or the status of the judgment debtor. (Cal. Const., art. XV, 1; Code Civ. Proc., 685.010; see Harland v. State of California (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 839, 842.)^[2] Interest commences to accrue on the money judgments date of entry. (Code Civ. Proc.,  685.020.)^[3]

Money judgments are sufficiently certain for purposes of execution and postjudgment interest where the judgment contains a precise formula by which the exact amount may be definitely ascertained. (Pinecrest Productions, Inc. v. RKO Teleradio Pictures, Inc. (1970) 14 Cal.App.3d 6, 13 (Pinecrest Productions).) This is so even where the records necessary for applying the formula are in the debtors possession. (National Farm Workers Service Center, Inc. v. M. Caratan, Inc. (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 796, 811-812.)

Here, the amount of damages was capable of being made certain upon the date of the order. The orders precise formula, applied to the records in CIGAs possession, resulted in a definite amount of damages on which interest could be calculated.

Interest is also awarded under Civil Code section 3287 when damages are certain or capable of being made certain by calculation, and when the right to recover vests on a particular day.^[4] Interest is calculated from that day except for any time the debtor is prevented from paying the debt by law or by action of the creditor. (See Stein v Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 565, 573.)

Although Civil Code section 3287 authorizes prejudgment interest, usually in breach of contract cases, nothing in its terms prevents it from also justifying an award of postjudgment interest if the judgment is the act by which damages become certain or capable of being made certain. A judgment debt differs in no manner from a simple contract debt. . . . (Pinecrest Productions, supra, 14 Cal.App.3d at p. 12.) The judgment thus can make the amount of damages certain as of the date of entry and thereby trigger Civil Code section 3287.

The entry of the courts order imposed on CIGA an obligation to pay damages in an amount that was capable of being determined on that day. Interest would thus accrue from that date under Civil Code section 3287.

CIGA claims the 2004 order is too indefinite to be enforced, citing Kittle v. Lang (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 604, 612-613. In that case, the appellate court refused to enforce a money judgment that required the defendant to return to the plaintiff any and all sums he held on plaintiffs behalf. The reviewing court ruled the judgment was too indefinite to be enforced.

Here, the order is not indefinite. It awards a specific amount of money subject to an offset determined by a specific formula. Kittle does not apply.

CIGA claims the amount it paid under the order was not based on the actual amount of medical expenses it incurred on behalf of David, but rather was based on a number it presented to discuss settlement. The facts belie this assertion.

While the original case was pending on appeal, counsel for CIGA in an e-mail gave to counsel for petitioner a printout of the recent payments. By my calculations, they add up to $305,923.25. (Italics added.)

$305,923.25 is the exact figure the parties used to calculate the amount CIGA owed under the 2004 order. The offset provided under the order was for 25 percent of Davids medical expenses paid by CIGA. Twenty-five percent of $305,923.25 is $76,480.8125, or, rounded to the nearest tenth, $76,480.81. This is the exact amount of the offset CIGA took under the award: $333,553.00 (the principal amount ordered by the court) less $76,480.81 equals $257,072.19, the amount CIGA refunded to petitioner.

Under these circumstances, CIGA cannot honestly claim the amount of the judgment could not be determined. It already made that determination with no difficulty and with no objection from petitioner.

DISPOSITION

The order denying interest on the 2004 order is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court. The trial court shall issue an order awarding interest to petitioner at the annual rate of 10 percent from August 24, 2004, on the principal amount of $257,072.19. Costs on appeal are awarded to petitioner. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)

NICHOLSON , Acting P. J.

We concur:

ROBIE , J.

CANTIL-SAKAUYE , J.

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^[1] CIGA is an association established by insurance carriers, as required by statute, to pay statutorily-defined claims made against insolvent insurers. (Ins. Code,  1063 et seq.)

^[2] Code of Civil Procedure section 685.010 states: Interest accrues at the rate of 10 percent per annum on the principal amount of a money judgment remaining unsatisfied. (Code Civ. Proc.,  685.010, subd. (a).)

^[3] The statute reads in relevant part: [I]nterest commences to accrue on a money judgment on the date of entry of the judgment. (Code Civ. Proc.  685.020, subd. (a).)

^[4] That statute reads in relevant part: Every person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in him upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover interest thereon from that date . . . . (Civ. Code,  3287, subd. (a).)