Michaels v. Turk
Michaels v
Michaels v. Turk
Filed 1/6/12 Michaels v. Turk CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE
DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
PETER MICHAELS,
Petitioner,
v.
PEGGY TURK,
Respondent.
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G044435
(Super. Ct.
No. 06P000504)
O P I N I O
N
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Appeal from an order of
the Superior Court
of Orange
County, Richard G. Vogl, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal.
Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.
J. Scott Bennett for
Petitioner.
Peggy Turk, in pro.
per., for Respondent.
*
* *
Petitioner
Peter Michaels appeals from the court’s June 21, 2010 order denying
petitioner’s request to restore, to the court’s calendar, his June 6, 2008
order to show cause (OSC) seeking to modify his child support obligation to
respondent Peggy Turk for their son.[1]
We affirm the court’s order.
FACTS
On June 6, 2008, petitioner filed an OSC to modify
his monthly child support obligation of $2,500.
After
multiple continuances, the matter came on for hearing on May 4, 2009.
Petitioner requested a continuance because he had not received certain
discovery from respondent and because he needed time to retain an
attorney. Commissioner Craig E. Arthur
denied petitioner’s continuance motion.
But Commissioner Arthur gave petitioner the choice of: (1) proceeding on the June 2008 OSC as
scheduled, or (2) taking the OSC off calendar, subject to it being restored
with “the same retroactivity” if
petitioner filed a motion to restore it to the court calendar within 90
days. Petitioner chose to have the June
2008 OSC taken off calendar, subject to restoration. Accordingly, on May 4, 2009, the court declared a mistrial and, at
“[p]etitioner’s request,” ordered the June 2008 OSC to be taken off calendar
subject to its restoration upon petitioner’s filing of a motion within 90 days.
The 90th day of the
restoration grace period fell on a Sunday,
August 2, 2009. Accordingly,
the last day on which petitioner could file a motion and maintain his claimed
retroactivity was the following day, Monday,
August 3, 2009. (See
Code of Civ. Proc., §§ 12a [“If the last day for the performance of any act
provided or required by law to be performed within a specified period of time
is a holiday, then that period is hereby extended to and including the next day
that is not a holiday”], 135 [“Every full day designated as a holiday by
Section 6700 of the Government code . . . is a judicial holiday”]; Gov. Code, §
6700 [Every Sunday is a holiday].)
On August 4, 2009, Petitioner filed an OSC seeking to
restore his June 2008 OSC to the court’s calendar and to hear the underlying
OSC to modify child support (the restoration OSC). Thus, he filed his restoration OSC one day after the expiration of the 90-day
restoration grace period provided by the court.
A hearing date of October 15,
2009, was set to hear petitioner’s restoration and modification
request.
Quite unbelievably, the
August 2009 restoration OSC was not ruled upon until June 21, 2010, not because it was set for hearing
that day, but because the issue came up in a status conference. The nature of the proceeding before the court
on June 21 is not altogether clear, as no minute order appears in the record,
nor does the docket reflect any minute order having been prepared on that
date. We do have a reporter’s
transcript of a hearing on April 12 in which a status conference date of June
21 was set, along with an order signed by the court (by now Comm. Richard G.
Vogl) titled “Tentative Decision of the Court on Submitted Matter,” which
recited a tortured history of the proceedings in this case.
The “Tentative Decision
of the Court on Submitted Matter” also contained the following recitation as it
relates to the status of the June 2008 OSC:
“The child support modification issue came on regularly before Comm.
Arthur on May 4, 2009, and as to that OSC, the court ordered the matter off
calendar subject to a restoration upon filing of a motion within 90 days. [¶] Ninety days from May 4, 2009 would be August 4, 2009.[[2]] [¶] On August
4, 2009, Petitioner did file a request to modify the child support.[[3]] The matter was set for hearing for October
15. [¶] But on October 15, 2009, no order was made for child
support.[[4]] [¶] It would seem, therefore, that after Oct. 15, 2009, the child support
issue was not pending.” The “Tentative
Decision of the Court on Submitted Matter” concluded, “This is not a final
ruling.”
At
the June 21, 2010 status
conference, Commissioner Vogl made the order that petitioner challenges in this
appeal. Commissioner Vogl found the
issue of modification was not pending,
either pursuant to the June 2008 OSC, or the August 2009 restoration OSC; there
was no OSC concerning modification on the calendar.[5] Commissioner Vogl noted that Commissioner
Arthur had not prepared any final
order on the August 2009 OSC.
DISCUSSION
As petitioner’s sole
argument on appeal, he asserts he filed his August 4, 2009 OSC “within the permitted 90 day
period.” He correctly notes Code of
Civil Procedure section 12 provides:
“The time in which any act provided by law is to be done is computed by
excluding the first day, and including the last, unless the last day is a
holiday, and then it is also excluded.”
When the days are counted in that fashion, the 90th day falls on Sunday, August 2, 2009. Accordingly, the law permitted Petitioner to
file his request on the next court day, August
3, 2009. (Code Civ. Proc., §
12a.) Petitioner asserts he tried to
file his OSC on August 3, 2009,
but the pertinent court department was closed.
But his record reference for this assertion is only the argument of his
counsel. He cites no evidence of that
fact, and none appears in the appellate record.
Even if that were true, there is no explanation of why he could not have
filed his papers with the counter clerk.
And even if the filing counter was closed on a regular court day (which
we doubt), rule 2.210 of the California Rules of Court requires the clerk’s
office to provide a drop box for filing between 8:30 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. and
that documents deposited in the drop box up to and including 4:00 p.m. are
deemed deposited for filing on that day.
Petitioner cites Code of Civil Procedure section 12b, which defines
“holiday” to include a day when a “city, county, state, or public office, other
than a branch office, is closed for the whole of any day,” and argues that the
department being dark when he attempted to file means it was a court
holiday. Nonsense. There is no evidence that either the
department, or the clerk’s counter, was “closed for the whole of [the]
day.”
At
bottom, when petitioner appeared on May
4, 2009, for the hearing on his modification OSC, he was not
prepared to proceed, despite the matter having been pending for nearly one
year. The court, in an apparent act of
mercy, not compelled by any law of which we are aware, ruled that petitioner
could restore his OSC to the court’s calendar by renoticing it within 90
days. Petitioner simply failed timely to
take advantage of the court’s mercy. The
court correctly found petitioner failed to restore his June 2008 OSC to the
court calendar within the 90-day period established by Commissioner Arthur’s May 4, 2009 order.
DISPOSITION
The order is
affirmed. Respondent is entitled to her costs on appeal.
IKOLA,
J.
WE CONCUR:
ARONSON, ACTING
P. J.
FYBEL, J.
[1] According
to his notice of appeal, petitioner appeals from the court’s September 8, 2010 order denying his motion for reconsideration of the
court’s June 21, 2010
order. However, the majority view, with
which we concur, is that a denial of a motion for reconsideration is not
appealable. (Tate v. Wilburn (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 150, 158-159; Powell v. County of Orange (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1573, 1575.) Nonetheless, we deem petitioner’s appeal to
be from the June 21, 2010 order (as requested in his opening brief), which
order is appealable as a post judgment order under Code of Civil Procedure
section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2).
(An Oct. 2006 judgment required petitioner to pay child support to
respondent for their son.)
[2] As
noted above, the 90th day was actually August 2, which, because it fell on a
Sunday, was extended by law to August 3.
[3] The
OSC also requested the restoration of the June 2008 OSC to the calendar.
[4] This
was undoubtedly true because at a contempt hearing scheduled for August 14, 2009, Commissioner Arthur had advanced the hearing on the
August 4 OSC to October 13. The
appellate record does not contain any information about what happened on
October 13. It is nevertheless the case
that the court did not rule on either the request to restore the June 2008 OSC
or the underlying modification request in October.
[5] In
his April 2009 tentative ruling, Commissioner Vogl had stated August 4, 2009 was the 90th day of the refiling period. But at the hearing, Commissioner Vogl explained he had not used a calendar and had “shot
from the hip,” whereas the County of Orange had “pulled the calendar and counted the number of
days.”
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