P. v. Miller

P. v. Miller












Filed 1/6/12 P. v. Miller CA4/2






NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS



California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.



IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RONALD EUGENE MILLER, Defendant and Appellant.

E052774 (Super.Ct.No. BAF10000278) OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Jeffrey Prevost, Judge. Affirmed with directions.
Donald L. Harris, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and Meredith S. White, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant and appellant Ronald Eugene Miller pled guilty to unlawful possession of Vicodin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)); in return, the prior prison term allegation was stricken, and defendant was placed on formal probation pursuant to Proposition 36 for a period of 36 months. On appeal, defendant contends (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea; and (2) the laboratory analysis fees must be reduced because they were in excess of authorized law. We agree with the parties that the laboratory analysis fees must be reduced, but reject defendant’s remaining contention.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 26, 2010, a felony complaint was filed charging defendant with unlawful possession of Vicodin. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a).) The complaint further alleged that defendant had suffered one prior prison term. (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b).)^[1]
At the time of his arraignment, pursuant to a negotiated plea, defendant pled guilty to the charge; in exchange, the prior prison term allegation was stricken and defendant was granted probation pursuant to Proposition 36. At the hearing, defendant indicated that he had a full opportunity to discuss his plea, his rights, and consequences of pleading guilty with his attorney. He also noted that he had a full opportunity to discuss with his attorney the benefits and requirements of Proposition 36 probation. Defendant also acknowledged that he could be sentenced to the maximum of three years in state prison for failing to successfully complete Proposition 36 probation, and that he was entering a plea because he had in fact committed the conduct alleged in the complaint. In response to the court’s inquiry of whether defendant had any questions, defendant responded in the negative. After accepting defendant’s plea, the court found that defendant understood his rights and had entered into the plea freely, voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
On August 2, 2010, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming that “[d]ue to [his] unstable mental state during [his] arraignment, [he] didn’t fully understand the consequences of [his] plea,” and that due to his mental health instability, his plea was not freely and voluntarily entered into, because he was not given his medication while in custody. In support, defendant attached two handwritten notes from his treating doctor, who stated that he had been treating defendant for bipolar disorder and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), and that without his medication, defendant’s judgment is impaired.
A hearing on defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea was held on August 4 and September 8, 2010. At that hearing, defendant testified and claimed that he had been taking prescribed medication of Adderall and Lamictal for the last 10 years. He stated that he was not given his medication while in custody for four days and that his mind was all over the place at the time he pled guilty. Defendant explained that Adderall helps him with his ADHD and helps him “be in the here and now,” and “grasp things more clearly,” since “[i]t slows down [his] brain a lot.” Without his medication, defendant asserted, he cannot process information or understand “a stinkin’ thing,” but acknowledged he understood what his wife was charged with. He asserted that he spoke with his attorney and signed paperwork but did not understand what he signed. Defendant admitted that he had been in court before, had signed other paperwork before, had pled guilty about three or four times before, and knew what he was signing in the past. He further acknowledged that he knew his wife was pleading guilty and going to prison; that he was given an offer by the district attorney’s office; that he had accepted the offer; that he had signed the plea form; and that no one had forced him to sign the plea form or plead guilty. However, he claimed that he did not know what he was doing because he was not on his medication and “not in a proper frame of mind.” Without his medication, defendant reiterated that his decision making and judgment is impaired, but acknowledged he “already kind of kn[e]w the system per se,” and that he had at times voluntarily made the choice to get off his medication because he felt fine.
Defendant’s trial counsel, Deputy Public Defender Juanita Mantz, also testified. Attorney Mantz testified that she had reviewed the plea form in detail with defendant, and that they had discussed his defenses, as well as his legal and constitutional rights. Defendant indicated to her that he wanted the Proposition 36 probation. Attorney Mantz further stated that she and defendant reviewed the section of the plea form regarding whether or not defendant was under the influence of any drugs or alcohol or if defendant had been promised anything. Attorney Mantz did not specifically ask defendant whether he was being treated for any psychiatric afflictions or whether or not he was taking any psychiatric medication; however, she noted that if a defendant appears to not understand what she is explaining to him or her, she will ask the defendant about his or her mental health. She did recall defendant being a “bit agitated,” but explained that most of her clients are anxious to get out of custody. She also remembered that she and defendant had an in-depth discussion about the case because there was an issue in the police report; that defendant appeared to understand what she was telling him; that they had discussed the defenses; and that defendant was fully advised of his consequences in pleading guilty.
Following argument from counsel, the trial court took the matter under submission so that it could conduct a bit more research.
On September 10, 2010, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that defendant’s free will was not overborne and that his testimony showed that he is “bright, intelligent, and articulate.” The court noted that defendant had requested his medication; that defendant was without his medication for at least four days; and that defendant may have been going through withdrawals. The court further stated that it had no doubt defendant suffered from some “debility as suggested by the diagnoses” of defendant’s doctor, however, the doctor’s note did not demonstrate “with respect to a medical conclusion that [defendant] is incapable of understanding the nature and consequences of a criminal charge against him or his plea thereto or specifically the particular consequences of entry into the Proposition 36 program that was the disposition in this particular matter.”
II
DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because substantial evidence shows that without his medication he was unable to exercise free and clear judgment as to what he was signing or to fully appreciate the terms of his plea bargain. We disagree.
Penal Code section 1018 allows the trial court to grant a defendant’s request to withdraw his or her plea of guilty or no contest before judgment if good cause is shown. “Mistake, ignorance or any other factor overcoming the exercise of free judgment is good cause for withdrawal of a guilty plea. [Citations.] But good cause must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. [Citations.]” (People v. Cruz (1974) 12 Cal.3d 562, 566.) For the sake of judicial economy and final resolution, “[g]uilty pleas resulting from a bargain should not be set aside lightly.” (People v. Hunt (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 95, 103 (Hunt).)
We review the trial court’s ruling on the motion for abuse of discretion and adopt the trial court’s factual findings if substantial evidence supports them. (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 585.) Abuse of discretion is found only if the trial court has exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner resulting in a manifest miscarriage of justice. (People v. Shaw (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 492, 496.) When “conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence,” we adopt the inference that supports the trial court’s ruling. (Hunt, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d at p. 104.) When the evidence itself is conflicting, “the trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed.” (People v. Grgurevich (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 806, 811.)
This case is analogous to those cases where defendants have unsuccessfully attempted to change their pleas based on some internal emotional or mental state. For example, in People v. Caruso (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 624, 636 (Caruso), the defendant contended that he pled guilty “when he was in a state of mental distress, including fear, anxiety, and other emotional factors which prevented him from exercising calm, deliberate, and intelligent judgment.” Likewise, a malarial condition that caused the defendant to be in “a very confused state in which he remembered almost nothing of the hearing at which he pleaded guilty” was insufficient to support a plea withdrawal motion in People v. Ottenstror (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 104, 106.
Here, defendant claims he did not understand the plea agreement because without his medication, his concentration was adversely affected. Although the record shows that defendant’s concentration may have been affected, this does not mean he did not understand the plea or that he did not voluntarily, knowingly, intelligently, and freely enter into the plea. Indeed, as the trial court noted, the record shows that defendant is bright, intelligent, and aware of the criminal justice system. Defendant’s treating doctor provided a note stating that defendant was being treated for bipolar disorder and ADHD and that without his medication, his judgment is impaired; however, the doctor did not indicate that the lack of medication affected defendant’s ability to understand a plea agreement. Moreover, defendant, who is not new to the criminal justice system and had pled guilty on numerous prior occasions, acknowledged that he was given an offer by the district attorney’s office; that he had accepted the offer; that he had signed the plea form; and that no one had forced him to sign the plea form or plead guilty. He admitted that he knew the criminal justice system and that he had at times voluntarily made the choice to get off his medication because he felt fine. The trial court reasonably concluded that defendant’s extensive criminal history together with his ability to recall old information indicated that he did in fact understand the nature and consequences of his plea.
Defendant’s trial counsel’s testimony also shows that defendant understood the plea and entered into it freely, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Counsel testified that she had reviewed the plea form in detail with defendant and that she had discussed his defenses, as well as his legal and constitutional rights. Defendant informed trial counsel that he wanted Proposition 36 probation. Counsel also noted that defendant appeared to understand the plea agreement, the nature of the charges, his defenses, his constitutional rights, and the consequences of pleading guilty. Although trial counsel recalled defendant being a “bit agitated,” she explained that most of her clients are anxious to get out of custody. She also remembered that she and defendant had an in-depth discussion about the case; that defendant appeared to understand what she was telling him; that they had discussed the defenses; and that defendant was fully advised of any consequences in pleading guilty.
Defendant’s claim otherwise was supported only by his self-serving testimony at the hearing and in his declaration in support of his motion. The trial court was not required to accept defendant’s self-serving testimony and one-sided claims. (Hunt, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d at p. 103) “[T]he trial court as the trier of the fact, is the judge of the credibility” of all witnesses. (Caruso, supra, 174 Cal.App.2d at p. 636.) The trial court had a unique opportunity to observe defendant’s behavior and interact with defendant throughout the proceedings. We can only review the cold record, which is precisely why the trial court is vested with broad discretion in deciding withdrawal motions. Additionally, the fact that defendant bargained for and received probation in exchange for his guilty plea, tends to show that he exercised free judgment in entering his plea. (See People v. Brotherton (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 195, 203 [plea to a lesser offense tended to show exercise of free judgment].)
The trial court properly found that defendant had in fact knowingly and intelligently entered into the plea. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea.
B. Laboratory Analysis Fees
Defendant also asserts, and the People correctly concede, that his laboratory analysis fees must be reduced by $22 because they were in excess of the assessments authorized by law. We also agree.
At sentencing, the trial court ordered defendant to pay a total of $190 for laboratory analysis fees pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11372.5 with penalty assessments imposed thereon. Health and Safety Code section 11372.5 provides for a $50 laboratory analysis fee for each separate enumerated offense, including a violation of section 11350, subdivision (a), of the Health and Safety Code.

The authorized assessments on the $50 laboratory analysis fees are as follows: Penal Code section 1464 sets forth a mandatory state penalty assessment of $10 for every $10 fee or fine imposed (here $50). Government Code section 76000 sets forth a mandatory county penalty assessment of $4.60 for every $10 fee or fine imposed in Riverside County (here $23). Penal Code section 1465.7 sets forth a mandatory state surcharge of $2 for every $10 (here $10). Government Code section 70372 sets forth the mandatory state court construction penalty of $5 for every $10 (here $25). Government Code section 76104.6 sets forth the mandatory fingerprinting penalty of $1 for every $10 (here $5). Finally, Government Code section 76104.7 sets forth additional mandatory penalty for the state’s identification fund of $1 for every $10 (here $5). Accordingly, the total penalty assessments are $118 plus the $50 laboratory fee, which is $168.
The laboratory analysis fee, including the associated assessment fines, should therefore be reduced to $168, rather than $190.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to reduce the laboratory analysis fee, including the assessments, to $168 under Health and Safety Code section 11372.5. The superior court clerk is directed to amend the April 26, 2010 minute order so as to reflect this modification. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

RICHLI
Acting P.J.

We concur:



KING
J.



CODRINGTON
J.