P. v. Ranft

P. v. Ranft

Filed 6/23/06 P. v. Ranft CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LELAND JAMES RANFT, Defendant and Appellant.

A108344 (Mendocino County Super. Ct. No. SCUK-CRCR-04-58792)

Leland James Ranft timely appeals from a judgment sentencing him to 16 years in state prison. On October 14, 2004, a jury convicted him of continuous sexual abuse of his then five-year-old stepdaughter, A.P. (Pen. Code, § 288.5, subd. (a)),[1] three counts of child molestation (§ 288, subd. (a)), and found true an allegation of substantial sexual conduct (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8)). On November 12, 2004, the trial court sentenced Ranft to the upper term of 16 years on the continuous sexual abuse count, and ordered the child molestation counts stricken. Ranft argues on appeal the trial court erred in denying a motion to quash a search warrant authorizing the search of his personal computer for child pornography. He contends there was no probable cause to support the warrant and the officer’s reliance on it was unreasonable. Because we conclude there was probable cause to support the warrant, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

On June 21, 2004, Judge Nelson signed the warrant to search Ranft’s residence for child pornography. In support of the warrant, detective Kevin DeVries submitted a “statement of probable cause.” The first portion of this affidavit described the events leading to Ranft’s arrest for child molestation: “On February 2nd . . . [DeVries was faxed] a copy of a report from Child Protective Services. I reviewed the C.P.S. report then I telephoned Roxanne Ranft, the mother of the possible victim, and explained the situation. Roxanne agreed to bring [A.P.] to the police department immediately. [About 3 hours later], I contacted Roxanne Ranft and her daughter, [A.P.], in the police lobby. I then escorted [A.P.] to the interview room to conduct an interview. During this interview with [A.P.] she disclosed to me that her father had rubbed her ‘sex’ [, A.P.’s] term for vagina. After she disclosed this I re-contacted Roxanne and advised her what [A.P.] had disclosed. Roxanne advised me that [A.P.] had been having numerous ‘yeast infections’ and that her husband may[ be] placing medication on her vagina. I then return[ed] back to the interview room to continue my interview with [A.P.] During further investigation [A.P.] told me that she touches her daddy’s ‘sex’ [, A.P.’s] term for penis. On February 3rd . . . I made contact with Leland Ranft in the lobby of the police department. During my interview with Leland he advised me that he had rubbed medicated cream on [A.P.’s] vagina four or five times. He also admitted he had placed vinegar on [A.P.’s] vagina on one or two occasions. He also admitted that [A.P.] had touched his penis on three occasions. Leland finally admitted that on one occasion he was awaken[ed] from a nap by [A.P.] kissing his penis[;] Leland advised me he is a nud[i]st and sleeps naked. I concluded my interview with Leland . . . Approximately two weeks later I received a warrant for Leland Ranft[’s] arrest for violation of [section 288, subdivision (a)]. I . . . arrested Leland Ranft.”

The second part of DeVries’ affidavit described events which occurred nearly four months after Ranft’s arrest: “On June 8, 2004, I received further information from D.A. Investigator Brian Dressler regarding this case. Dressler informed me that he had received a phone call from Rachael Rafanan[,] the mother of Roxanne Ranft. Rachael informed Brian that Roxanne had told her that she had to reformat the hard drive on Leland[’]s computer due to the fact it had lots of pornography on it. After receiving this information[,] I contacted Rachael Rafanan by telephone and spoke with her regarding the information she had given Brian Dressler. Rachael told me that on the day I arrested Leland, she received a phone call from her daughter Roxanne. Roxanne told Rachael that she needed to reformat the hard drive on Leland[’]s computer due to the fact it has a lot of pornography on it. I ask[ed] Rachael if Roxanne told her what kind of pornography was on the hard drive, such as adult pornography or child pornography. Rachael advised me that Roxanne was not specific in what type of pornography was on the hard drive. Rachael told me [where Roxanne and Leland were living at the time].”

The affidavit concluded: “Based on training and experience it is very common for 288. (a) suspects to download child pornography on their computer hard drive from child pornography websites. [¶] Based on the foregoing investigation, facts stated herein, and my training and experience, I believe the crime of [section 311.3, subdivision (a)[2]] was committed and that evidence of such crime(s) . . . will be found at the locations described in exhibit ‘A’ for the reasons stated above. I request this court issue a warrant to search for such items.”

DeVries attached a separate description of his training and experience, stating he was a detective with the Ukiah police department assigned to investigate child abuse and child molestation as well as other crimes; he had been a police officer for twenty years; he had been involved in about 900 investigations, including for child molestation and had obtained search warrants in these types of cases; and he was a member of the Mendocino County Sexual Assault Response Team, which meets monthly to review investigations involving sexual assault of adults and children.

The “Return to Search Warrant” listed three items seized from Ranft’s residence: (1) a “computer tower;” (2) 22 CDs; and (3) a lap top computer. On August 10, 2004, the trial court denied Ranft’s motion to quash the warrant.

On July 13, 2004, Ranft filed a motion to quash the search warrant and to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant (§1538.5). In the motion, Ranft argued the affidavit in support of the warrant was based on an unsubstantiated opinion that persons charged with violation of section 288, subdivision (a) download child pornography onto their computer hard drives, and there was an insufficient showing that child pornography would be found on Ranft’s computer. On August 10, 2004, the trial court denied the motion to quash. The court found that the portion of DeVries’ affidavit setting forth his training and experience did not indicate he had “the necessary expertise to support his opinion” that “child pornography would probably be found on [Ranft’s] computer.” However, the court concluded DeVries’ opinion was “based on a common sense analysis and [was] reasonable” given his experience as a police officer.

At trial, DeVries testified the police seized Ranft’s computer hard drive and numerous CDs. These were turned over to a computer crimes task force. A detective working for the computer crimes task force testified that when he copied and examined the hard drive and CDs, he recovered child pornography. The child pornography included about a dozen images of young girls engaging in sexual activity with adult males, as well as videos showing the same. Several still photographs of children engaged in sexual activity with adults were admitted into evidence and shown to the jury over defense counsel’s objection.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review.

“We summarize the relevant legal principles governing an appellate challenge to the validity of a search warrant and the search conducted pursuant to it. The question facing a reviewing court asked to determine whether probable cause supported the issuance of the warrant is whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding a fair probability existed that a search would uncover wrongdoing. (Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 238-239 [Gates]; [citation].) ‘The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’ (Illinois v. Gates, supra, at p. 238 . . . .) . . . ‘In determining the sufficiency of an affidavit for the issuance of a search warrant the test of probable cause is . . . whether the facts contained in the affidavit are such as would lead a man of ordinary caution or prudence to believe, and conscientiously to entertain, a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused.’ [Citation.] The magistrate’s determination of probable cause is entitled to deferential review. (Illinois v. Gates, supra, at p. 236 . . . ; [citation].)” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1040-1041 (Kraft); see also Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 236 [“A magistrate’s ‘determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.’ ”]; U.S. v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 914 (Leon) [There is “a strong preference for warrants” and “ ‘in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fall’ ”].)

II. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying the Motion to Quash.

Ranft argues there was no probable cause for the warrant because the information in the affidavit that Ranft had been charged with child molestation and that he possessed pornography was not “a substantial basis for probable cause to believe he also possessed child pornography” in violation of section 311.3, subdivision (a). We conclude the information in the affidavit established probable cause.

“[P]robable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. It merely requires that the facts available to the officer would ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief,’ [citation], that certain items may be contraband or . . . useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false. A ‘practical, nontechnical’ probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required.” (Texas v. Brown (1983) 460 U.S. 730, 742.) “To establish probable cause, one must show a probability of criminal activity; a prima facie showing is not required. Also, ‘[t]he evidence must be seen and weighed as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.’ ” (People v. Von Villas (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 175, 217 (Von Villas).)

The affidavit described in detail the facts leading to Ranft’s arrest for child molestation. It also described DeVries’ training and experience as a police officer. Most importantly, the affidavit described the evidence which apparently triggered the application for the warrant: on the day Ranft was arrested for child molestation, his wife called his mother-in-law to say she “needed to reformat the hard drive” on Ranft’s computer because it had “a lot of pornography on it.”[3] Ranft’s mother-in-law told DeVries that Ranft’s wife did not specify whether it was adult or child pornography.

Ranft’s argument on appeal boils down to his assertion that information his computer contained “other pornography does not lead to the conclusion he must also have child pornography, as well.” In particular, he asserts “there was nothing to tie possession of any pornography by [Ranft] to any sexual abuse of a child” and “[n]either is any substantial link between pornography and child pornography a matter of general knowledge.” We do not base our conclusion on such a tie or link, but on the inferences reasonably drawn from the facts in DeVries’ affidavit. (Von Villas, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at pp. 217-218 [“in determining the sufficiency of an affidavit in support of a search warrant, . . . inferences or deductions apparent to trained law enforcement officers may be considered”].)

The wife’s statement provided more information than simply Ranft had pornography. The timing of the statement (the day of Ranft’s arrest) and the context (a call to her mother about needing to delete the pornography) supported a “ ‘strong suspicion’ ” the pornography was child pornography. (Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1041.) The timing and context suggest Ranft’s wife was concerned the pornography on Ranft’s computer could be used against him in connection with his child molestation charge. It was reasonable to assume Ranft’s wife knew child pornography, as opposed to adult pornography, would be incriminating because it would show Ranft was sexually attracted to children. As the trial court aptly observed in denying Ranft’s motion to quash, DeVries’ conclusion that there was child pornography was “based on a common sense analysis and [was] reasonable given the experience of the officer and the factual averments presented in the affidavit.” (Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at pp. 235-236 [“many warrants are – quite properly, [citation] – issued on the basis of nontechnical, common-sense judgments”].) There was no issue that the facts or statements in the affidavit were false or misleading. Thus, the statement by Ranft’s wife, coupled with Ranft’s arrest for molesting his stepdaughter, provided “a substantial basis for concluding a fair probability existed that a search” of Ranft’s computer would uncover child pornography. (Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1040.)

Because we conclude the affidavit established probable cause, we need not reach Ranft’s argument regarding the “good faith exception” to the exclusionary rule set out in Leon, supra, 468 U.S. 897.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

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Parrilli, J.

We concur:

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McGuiness, P. J.

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Siggins, J.

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[1] All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

[2] Section 311.3 criminalizes the production, creation, or replication of child pornography. The statute provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of sexual exploitation of a child if he . . . knowingly develops, duplicates, prints, or exchanges any representation of information, data, or image, including but not limited to, any film, filmstrip, photograph, . . . computer hardware, computer software, computer floppy disc, data storage media, CD-ROM, or computer-generated equipment or any other computer-generated image that contains or incorporates in any manner, any film or filmstrip that depicts a person under the age of 18 years engaged in an act of sexual conduct.” (§ 311.3, subd. (a).)

[3] The trial court found in denying the motion to quash that “[i]t wasn’t until later when the police received information from the defendant’s mother in-law that the officer’s attention focused on the computer as potential evidence of a violation of Penal Code section 311.3(a) . . . .”