P. v. Sundown
P
P. v. Sundown
Filed 9/2/10 P. v. Sundown CA2/8
>NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
>
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
SIX
>
|
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
PHOENIX
BAAL-EL SUNDOWN,
Defendant and Appellant.
|
2d
Crim. No. B221939
(Super.
Ct. No. F436983)
(San
Luis Obispo County)
|
Phoenix Baal-El Sundown
appeals from the order declaring him a mentally disordered offender (MDO) and
committing him to the Department of Mental Health for treatment as a condition
of his parole.[1] (Pen. Code, §§ 2960 & 2962 et seq.) He contends that there is not sufficient
evidence to support the trial court's finding that his commitment offense was
caused or aggravated by his severe mental disorder. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2006, appellant and
the victim, a 17-year-old female, met through My Space, on the internet. In January 2007, when appellant was 29 years
old, and the victim was 18 years old, she left Virginia
to join him in California. They lived in a remote area with semiweekly
bus service. Appellant controlled the
victim by keeping her in his sight, preventing her from using the telephone,
and denying her the opportunity to leave the residence, except for a few
occasions when they went to a public library.
He also maintained access to her internet accounts. He became convinced that the victim was cheating
on him because she had communicated with a male friend via the internet. On January 15, 2007, appellant yelled at the
victim, demanded that she admit she was cheating, said he could not stop
thinking about it, called her a "fucking whore," and shook and
grabbed her hard enough to inflict bruises and abrasions on her arm.
On January 17, 2007, as he and the victim walked
to the library, appellant again accused her of being unfaithful. He slapped her and pushed her to the
ground. When he caused a scene at the
library, the librarian asked him to quiet down or leave. The victim told the librarian that she was
scared. The police came to the library
and arrested appellant. He admitted to a
detective that he was jealous because the victim had contact with someone.
Appellant pled guilty to
one count of corporal injury to a spouse and/or roommate (§273.5, subd. (a)),
based on the January 15, 2007,
incident. On February 28, 2007, the court suspended the
imposition of sentence and placed him on formal probation for three years. It later revoked his probation and imposed a
three-year middle term prison sentence.
On June 3, 2009, the Board of Prison Terms (BPT)
determined that appellant was an MDO and committed him to Atascadero State
Hospital (ASH) for treatment. He filed a
petition challenging the BPT determination and waived jury. (§ 2966.). The court conducted a trial, found that
appellant met the criteria for an MDO as defined in section 2962, and denied
the petition.
At trial, Dr. Brandon
Yakush, a staff psychologist
at ASH, testified that he interviewed appellant a few months after the BPT
hearing. He also reviewed appellant's
records and spoke with his treating psychiatrist. After initially attributing appellant's
jealousy to a delusional disorder, Dr. Yakush concluded that appellant suffered
from a schizoaffective disorder of the bipolar type, which encompassed
delusional symptoms, as well as disorganized thinking, hallucinations, and reactive
behavior with minimal provocation.
Appellant displayed several types of delusions: jealous (belief that a partner was cheating
absent objective evidence of cheating); grandiose; persecutory; and erotomanic
(belief that famous people were in love with him or wanted a relationship with
him). His delusional thinking sometimes
triggered paranoia.
Dr. Yakush opined that
appellant suffered from a severe mental disorder that caused or was an
aggravating factor in his domestic violence offense, and that the disorder met
all of the requisite MDO criteria.
Appellant committed the crime as a result of his jealous delusion that
the victim cheated on him although it was impossible for her to do that. His psychotic fears overwhelmed him "to
the point that he lashed out [at] the victim." His conduct was "fueled by his belief
that she was cheating on him, [and his] grandiose belief [delusion] that, how
dare she."
Dr. Yakush described
several black and white photographs that appellant displayed in his room while
on probation. In addition to a
photograph of the victim, there were photographs of other women, many of whom
were naked. Appellant altered many
photographs with red markings from wax or a red marking pen on the women's
breast, crotch, vaginal and/or shoulder areas.
The red markings looked like blood.
One collage included a Lindsay Lohan photograph with trails of red
coming from or dripping onto her body, below a photograph of appellant holding
what looked like a long knife or sword above her upper torso. He told his probation officer that blood
"was" power, a spiritual color for his tribe, and also said that it
purified his blood. Dr. Yakush thought
that the collages and photographs displayed appellant's sexual and violent
fixation involving females. The
committing crime involved violence against his female sexual partner.
Dr. Yakush also referred
to a police report prepared in 2000 following an incident between appellant and
a female coworker at a bar. After he
slapped her on the buttocks, appellant was asked to leave the bar. He responded hostilely, challenged other
people to fight, and later grabbed the victim by the neck and choked her, which
left visible marks on her neck.
While at ASH, appellant
was paranoid and delusional about females in the unit stalking him. He did not follow his psychiatric treatment
and refused to take medication voluntarily.
He exhibited hostility to staff and threatened them. Dr. Yakush attributed appellant's hostile,
aggressive and disproportionate reactions to his disorder.
Appellant testified that
he had a schizoaffective
disorder, bipolar type, and that it was a severe mental disorder. He said he would take medication for his
disorder. He acknowledged that he had
prepared and submitted a document to Spin magazine (Spin document). The Spin document included sexually explicit
references to several female celebrities.
Appellant also testified that he has not had contact with the victim
since the date of the offense, did not know her location, and did not
anticipate having any future contact with her.
In addition, he testified that he had not had contact with the
celebrities shown in the photographs or referenced in the Spin document, and
did not anticipate having any future contact with them.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends that
there is not sufficient evidence that his severe mental disorder caused or was
an aggravating factor in his commitment offense. We disagree.
"In order to
qualify an MDO for commitment, the trial court must make a finding that the
prisoner meets six statutory criteria.
(§ 2962, subds. (a)-(d)(1).)
Among them, the court must determine whether the prisoner's severe
mental disorder was one of the causes or an aggravating factor in the
commission of the crime for which he was sentenced to prison. (§ 2962, subd. (b).)" (People
v. Green (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 907, 911.)
"The purpose of the
MDO law is to protect the public by identifying those prisoners who would pose
a danger to society upon release due to their mental disorder. [Citation.]" (People
v. Martin (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 970, 974.)
"We review the court's finding on an MDO criterion for substantial
evidence, drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all conflicts, in
favor of the judgment.
[Citations.]" (
>Id. at p. 975.) Substantial evidence in this context, just as
in a criminal case, means "evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value to support the [court's] finding.
[Fn. omitted.]" (
>People v. Beeson (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th
1393, 1398; People v. Miller (1994)
25 Cal.App.4th 913, 919-920.) We cannot
determine the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. (People
v. Clark
> (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1082-1083.)
In challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence that his severe mental disorder caused or at least
aggravated the commitment offense, appellant claims that Dr. Yakush
"conceded the mistaken belief that a wife or girlfriend is 'cheating,'
even despite the lack of any evidence to that effect, is hardly unusual in
domestic violence cases, and so cannot be accurately described as a 'delusion'
or a symptom of a mental disorder."
(Original underlining omitted.)
The record, including the page cited by appellant, belies his
claim. Dr. Yakush testified as follows
with respect to beliefs about cheating in domestic violence cases: "Men frequently do bad things because
they think their wives are cheating on them.
This rises to a much higher degree
of psychotic thinking than the average D.V. situation. We have an individual . . . who, against
everything objective - having her not leave the house, . . . not answer the
phone, not letting people see her, only escorting her to the library himself,
not letting her out of the house unless he was with her, and then having access
to her internet accounts, My Space . . . .
This girl couldn't cheat, essentially, and he still believes she was
cheating to the point that he assaulted her on two occasions." (Italics added.)
Appellant also argues
that "even if [his] mistaken belief regarding his girlfriend's infidelity
could be accurately characterized as a delusion, and even if that belief could
. . . be considered materially worse than usual in light of the lack of
evidence of such unfaithfulness, there was no indication that appellant's
mental disorder otherwise included the type of 'jealousy' delusion that
allegedly caused or contributed to his commitment offense." He adds that "Yakush failed to testify
as to a single instance, other than the [January 15] commitment offense, in
which appellant displayed the type of 'jealousy' delusion that he claimed
caused or aggravated that offense."
This argument fails also. Dr.
Yakush described another instance in which appellant's jealous delusion
manifested itself, on January 17, when he slapped the same victim after she
refused his demand to admit that she had been cheating on him. Further, appellant's commitment offense was
caused or aggravated not only by a jealous delusion, but also by a grandiose
delusion, as Dr. Yakush explained:
Appellant's conduct was "fueled by his belief that she was cheating
on him, [and his] grandiose belief [delusion] that, how dare she." His psychotic fears overwhelmed him "to
the point that he lashed out [at] the victim." A reasonable trier of fact could conclude
that appellant's mental disorder (including his jealous and grandiose
delusions) was at least an aggravating factor in the commission of the domestic
violence offense.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
COFFEE,
J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P.J.
PERREN, J.
Linda
D. Hurst, Judge
Superior
Court County
of San Luis Obispo
Gerald J. Miller, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr.,
Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C.
Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Keith H. Borjon, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, Sharlene A. Honnaka, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Publication courtesy of San
Diego free legal advice.
Analysis and review provided by Santee Property line attorney.
San Diego Case Information
provided by www.fearnotlaw.com
id=ftn1>
[1] All statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise stated.
|