P. v. Bumpus
P
P. v. Bumpus
Filed 9/2/10 P. v.
Bumpus CA3
NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE
DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
>
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THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
PATRICK BUMPUS,
Defendant and Appellant.
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C063862
(Super.Ct.No.
08F02069)
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After responding to a
report of gunshots fired and three men running through an apartment complex,
deputy sheriffs detained Ladon Zeigler, who matched the description of one of
the men seen running. Zeigler was
sweating profusely and was out of breath.
A person approached, reported that his apartment had been broken into
while he was sleeping, and described the suspects who fled when he chased them.
Defendant Patrick Bumpus was
found walking behind the apartment complex.
The victim positively identified defendant as one of the men who
committed the burglary.
Defendant entered a
negotiated plea of no contest to first
degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) and admitted he had a prior serious
felony conviction for assault with a
firearm. Consistent with the plea
agreement, he was sentenced to the stipulated middle term of four years,
doubled because of his prior serious felony conviction. The trial court granted his request for a
certificate of probable cause. (Pen.
Code, § 1237.5.)
On appeal,
defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his Marsden motion (People
v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (hereafter Marsden)), seeking to obtain new
appointed counsel prior to entering his plea.
We shall affirm the judgment.
DISCUSSION
I
The trial
court conducted a Marsden hearing at
the request of defendant’s mother. Defendant
complained that there were “some things” his appointed attorney, Sandra
DiGiulio, should have, but had not, done.
When the court asked for examples, defendant said that Zeigler, who was
arrested with defendant, was a person who “should be involved in the case
that’s not.” Zeigler had not been
“questioned to [defendant’s] liking because he could open a lot of light on
this case.” Defendant also noted that
Raymond Owens should be a witness because he gave a statement and the
prosecutor would see there was another person who had admitted some involvement
in the offense. After saying, “Those are
my main issues,” defendant had nothing else to add when the court so
inquired.
Attorney
DiGiulio explained that Zeigler had been charged as a codefendant,
but the charges against him were dropped and the prosecutor had Zeigler on his
list of witnesses against defendant.
DiGiulio had considered Owens as a witness for the defense but decided
against it because other evidence, including defendant’s statements to Owens,
“may come out if Mr. Owens hits the stand” and his testimony “is likely
to do more damage to [defendant’s] case than help his case.” DiGiulio also stated “[defendant] is aware
that I personally have been out to the scene several times and canvassed the
scene. I’m in contact with just about
every single witness on the District Attorney’s list. I’ve talked to all of them with the
exception of one, but my investigator has talked to that witness. [¶] We have
done a lot of investigation and a lot of work in this case since I’ve had the
case, not to mention what was done by the previous two attorneys on this
case that [defendant] is very well aware of all the work we have put in to
it.”
When the court asked whether defendant had any more comments,
defendant said he did not believe that his attorney spoke with the burglary
victim, whom defendant identified as “one of the main witnesses.” Defendant stated, “I need to fight for my
life and there isn’t - I have to feel comfortable with somebody fighting
for my life and I have to make sure -”
In denying the motion, the court said it was “not convinced that
this lawyer is not working as hard as she can for you.”
After
the Marsden hearing, the parties
informed the court that they were discussing a plea agreement. The parties later reached an agreement, and
defendant stated he wanted to take the deal.
After asking defendant about the plea agreement and advising him
of his rights, the court accepted defendant’s plea and admission, finding
that he “knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily” entered his waivers and his
plea.
Defendant
now claims the trial court did not conduct an adequate inquiry into his
complaints about counsel’s failure to interview particular witnesses.
The
People correctly point out that defendant’s opening brief does not claim that
his plea was not intelligently and voluntarily made or that his counsel’s
advice regarding the plea was erroneous.
Therefore, defendant is precluded from raising his challenge to the
court’s inquiry at the Marsden
hearing because the asserted error does not implicate the legality of the
proceedings. (People v. Lovings (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1311;
> People v. Lobaugh (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d
780, 786.)
Only
in his reply brief does defendant assert that his plea was “not voluntary and
intelligent,” citing statements he made in his request for a certificate of
probable cause. However, the record
of the plea does not support his assertion. When defendant entered his plea, he
confirmed that he understood the charges, defenses, his rights, and the
consequences of his plea. Although the
entry of plea hearing reflects defendant was upset and the court was concerned,
he wanted to go forward with his plea.
When defendant twice stated, “This ain’t right, man,” the court said it
would not allow the plea if it were not freely and voluntarily made. Defendant replied that he was “scared to
death” but confirmed that no promises were made other than those stated on the
record. Although he said that he felt
pressured to enter the plea because of the long sentence he would otherwise
face, he confirmed that he had not been threatened to do so. He then entered his plea and confirmed that
he was doing so freely and voluntarily.
In any event, defendant’s claim of error lacks merit.
A defendant is entitled to the discharge of appointed counsel
and substitution of another attorney if the trial court’s inquiry reveals that
“the first appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation
[citation] or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an
irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to
result.” (People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 854, criticized on
another ground in People v. Crayton (2002)
28 Cal.4th 346, 364-365.)
Here,
the trial court made an adequate inquiry and there was no abuse of discretion
in denying the Marsden motion. (People
v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 431.)
Defendant’s
complaints were about defense counsel’s alleged failure to interview
witnesses. However, counsel stated that
all witnesses on the prosecutor’s list had been interviewed, that
she had a tactical reason for not calling Owens as a witness for the
defense, and that the prosecution would have Ziegler testify against
defendant. According to defendant, the
victim of the burglary had not been interviewed by defense
counsel-a claim that is inconsistent with counsel’s statement that all
the prosecution witnesses had been interviewed.
The trial court was entitled to believe defense counsel and to
disbelieve defendant. (
>People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684,
696.)
In sum, the trial
court adequately aired and considered defendant’s complaints at the
>Marsden hearing and concluded that defendant’s
plea was not affected by inadequate representation or an irreconcilable
conflict with counsel. There was no
error.
II
Pursuant
to this court’s miscellaneous order No. 2010-002, filed March 16, 2010, we deem defendant to have raised
the issue of whether amendments to section 4019 apply retroactively to his
pending appeal and entitle him to additional presentence credits. We conclude that the amendments do apply to
all appeals pending as of January
25, 2010. (See
>In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745;
People v. Doganiere (1978) 86
Cal.App.3d 237, 239-240; People v. Hunter
(1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 389, 393.)
However, the amendments to section 4019 do not operate to modify
defendant’s entitlement to credit because he had a prior conviction for a
serious felony.
clear=all >
(Pen. Code, §§ 1192.7, subd.
(c)(31), 4019, subds. (b), (c); Stats. 2009, 3d Ex. Sess., ch. 28, § 50.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is
affirmed.
SCOTLAND , P. J.
We concur:
BLEASE , J.
HULL , J.
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