P. v. Watson

P. v. Watson

Filed 11/4/08 P. v. Watson CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LARRY CHARLES WATSON, Defendant and Appellant.

B200991 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. KA078022)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. George Genesta, Judge. Affirmed.

Dennis L. Cava, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Dana M. Ali, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

A jury convicted Larry Charles Watson of second degree robbery, felony evading a pursuing peace officer with willful and wanton disregard for the safety of others, and misdemeanor resisting and delaying a peace officer in the discharge of his or her duty. The trial court subsequently found that Watson had been convicted of three prior strikes (two of which also qualified as prior serious felony convictions), and sentenced Watson to state prison for a total term of 61 years to life. We affirm.

FACTS

On February 6, 2007, Cynthia Caballero parked her car in front of an apartment building on Arrow Highway in the City of Azusa, and went to the trunk of her car to get some hair color. (She was a hairdresser at the time.) While Caballero was looking in the trunk of her car, Watson parked his car behind Caballero. Watson then got out of his car, walked to Caballeros car, and grabbed her purse from the front seat of her car. When Caballero closed the trunk of her car, she saw Watson with her purse, and she started struggling with him to get her purse back. The struggle continued as Watson returned to his own car, got in the drivers seat, and started driving. Caballero walked along side of Watsons car for a few steps, and then let go of her purse when she realized that Watsons car was picking up speed and moving away.

A resident in a nearby apartment building saw the struggle between Watson and Caballero, and called 911 while the robbery was still in progress. The witness described the robber (a Black male wearing a cap like a baseball cap) and his car (a red Mitsubishi), and provided a partial license plate (5GV). Caballero called 911 immediately after the robbery, and provided a description of the robber (a Black male) and his car (small, red), and provided a partial license plate (5GVS).

Azusa Police Department Detectives Jason Kimes and Andy Rodriguez began an area check immediately after receiving a call reporting a robbery and a description of the suspect and his car. Near Foothill Boulevard and Todd Avenue (about three or four miles south of the robbery), the detectives saw a car that matched the description of the robbers car, being driven by a man Watson who matched the robbers description. The detectives followed Watsons car and broadcast a radio call regarding a possible robbery suspect. Shortly thereafter, additional officers from the Azusa Police Department, including Sergeant Andy Sutcliffe and Officer Mike Bires, each driving a separate marked police car and wearing a formal police uniform, as well as Officer Kyle Bailey, joined the detectives who were following Watsons car.

When Watsons car reached Huntington Drive, he made a U-turn to enter the 210 freeway. At that point, Sergeant Sutcliffe tried to initiate a traffic stop, but Watson sped away and entered the freeway on-ramp. Officer Bires then positioned his car behind the suspects car on the on-ramp, and turned on his emergency flashing red and blue lights as well as the solid red and blue lights (as did the other officers). About a quarter of a mile down the freeway on-ramp, Watson stopped his car, and the officers in pursuit stopped their police cars behind Watsons car. Officer Bires opened his car door, leaned out, and ordered Watson to place his hands on his head. Instead, Watson leaned out of his car, screamed something indiscernible toward Officer Bires, and then sped away. Several police cars again followed behind with their lights and sirens on.

About a half mile from where he first stopped, Watson stopped a second time on the right shoulder of the freeway, and Officer Bires once again asked Watson to put his hands on his head. Watson refused to comply, and once again leaned out his window, yelled at Officer Bires, and started driving back into the freeway followed by several police cars with their lights and sirens on. During the course of an eight-mile pursuit, Watson drove his car at speeds between 70 to 105 miles per hour, weaving between the number two and four lanes on the freeway, and passing other cars on the left and right, committing various Vehicle Code violations. At one point, Watson abruptly turned left from the shoulder of the freeway, across four lanes of traffic, and almost collided into a semi-truck and another car. At another point, Watson abruptly turned right from the fast lane, across four more lanes of traffic, causing his car to swerve sideways. The chase ended when Watson crashed his car into the back of another car.

Trial

In March 2007, the People filed an information charging Watson with the second degree robbery of Cynthia Caballero, evading a peace officer with willful and wanton disregard for the safety of others, and misdemeanor resisting and delaying a peace officer in discharging his or her office (Pen. Code,  211; Veh. Code,  2800.2, subd. (a); Pen. Code, 148, subd. (a)(1).). The information further alleged that Watson had been convicted of three prior strikes (Pen. Code,  667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), two prior serious felonies (Pen. Code,  667, subd. (a)(1), and that he was ineligible for probation based on prior convictions (Pen. Code,  1203, subd. (e)(4).)

At a trial in June 2007, the People presented evidence establishing the facts summarized above. Watson presented testimony from a police officer who transported Watson to the hospital after he was arrested, a physician assistant at the hospital, and a psychiatrist who interviewed Watson the day after he was arrested. The basic thrust of Watsons defense was that he had been under the influence of PCP at the time of the incident involving Caballero and the ensuing police pursuit, and that a person suffering from a drug-induced psychosis could have difficulty perceiving reality and might, for example, run from police without knowing they were police, and might not recognize that his or her acts were dangerous.

The jury rejected Watsons drug intoxication defense, and, on June 15, 2007, returned verdicts finding him guilty as charged. On July 11, 2007, the trial court found the prior conviction allegations to be true, and sentenced Watson as noted at the outset of this opinion.

DISCUSSION

Watson contends his robbery and evading convictions (counts 1 and 2) must be reversed because the trial court refused his request to instruct the jury with the following pinpoint instruction:

In determining whether the circumstantial evidence supports a finding that the defendant did or did not have the required intent or state of mind [for robbery and/or evading], you may consider any of the following evidence:

1. The effects of PCP intoxication upon mental processes, andwhether the evidence supports a finding consistent with the lack of required intent or state of mind.

2. The hallmark symptoms of PCP intoxication, and whether [the] defendant exhibited any of those symptoms.

3. Any medical . . . diagnosis of [the] defendant being under the influence of PCP.

4. Any police officers conclusion that the defendant was under the influence of PCP. (Italics added.)

We disagree.

I. The Applicable Rules Governing Jury Instructions

A trial court is required to instruct a jury on the general principles of law which are relevant to the issues raised by the evidence in a given case. (People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 115.) A pinpoint instruction explains the relationship between particular evidence and the elements of an offense, and is not required absent a defendants request. (See People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119-1120; People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 197; People v.Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 558.)

Although neither party has cited us to a case directly stating the appropriate standard of review when a defendants appeal challenges a trial courts refusal to give a pinpoint instruction, we accept the Peoples position that a claim of instructional error predominantly involves a questions of law, and that, as such, any such claim should be reviewed de novo. (Cf. People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 733 [addressing issue of instructions on a lesser offense].) What is certain, however, is that, when a trial court has erred in refusing to give a pinpoint instruction, the error is reviewed under the harmless error standard articulated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (See People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 886-887.)

II. Error Analysis

We reject Watsons contention that the trial court erred by refusing to give his requested pinpoint instruction on PCP intoxication.

Watsons pinpoint instruction largely duplicated the trial courts standard instruction regarding evidence of voluntary intoxication. (CALCRIM No. 3426.) Within the standard instruction, the trial court expressly told the jurors that they could consider evidence of Watsons voluntary intoxication in deciding whether [he] acted with the specific intent or mental state required in counts 1 and 2. Within the same instruction, the trial court further directed the jurors that, for robbery, the prosecution had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Watson acted with the intent to permanently deprive Caballero of her property, and that, if the prosecution did not meet this burden, the jurors were required to find him not guilty. The trial court instructed the jury with similar language in connection with the offense of evading. We see nothing in Watsons arguments on appeal to convince us that the trial courts standard instructions on voluntary intoxication were insufficient. A court does not err in failing to give special instructions that are duplicative or repetitious. (People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1134.)

Watsons reliance on People v. Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d 1103 is a bit off the mark. The issue in Saille was whether a trial court is required to give a pinpoint instruction on voluntary intoxication in the absence of a defendants request, and the answer from the Supreme Court was no. (Id. at pp. 1119-1120.) The issue in Watsons current case is beyond the Saille context. In Watsons current case, he did in fact request a pinpoint instruction on voluntary intoxication, and, hence, the issue is whether the trial court properly refused to give the instruction. As we have explained, we see no error in the trial courts ruling because the issue highlighted by Watsons pinpoint instruction was already covered by other instructions.

Apart from instructional duplication, we agree with the trial court that Watsons proffered pinpoint instruction was argumentative. Watsons pinpoint instruction did more than merely explain to his jurors the role that evidence of PCP intoxication could play when they were determining whether or not he had the required specific intent for robbery and/or evading. Indeed, Watson wanted his jury to be instructed to the effect that they could consider whether the evidence of his PCP intoxication supported a finding consistent with the lack of required intent or state of mind. In our view, Watsons pinpoint instruction came precipitously close to inviting the jury to rule in his favor on the intent issue. Given the language in which Watsons pinpoint instruction was framed, we agree with the trial courts assessment that the instruction could have misled jurors by emphasizing the evidence of PCP intoxication vis-vis an absence of specific intent, over the other evidence vis-vis the presence of specific intent. In sum, we agree with the trial court that Watsons attempt to focus on PCP intoxication was something for argument rather than [an instruction]. Argumentative instructions such as this are properly denied. (People v. Wright, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 1135-1138.)

III. Harmless Error Analysis

Assuming the trial court erred in refusing to give Watsons pinpoint instruction, we find the error harmless. In our view, the evidence of the robbery overwhelmingly showed a deliberative offense. Watson parked his car, took advantage of Cabelleros distraction, took her purse from her car, then struggled to retain possession of the purse as he made his way to his own car and escaped. This evidence does not show an instantaneous, smash-and-grab incident which he may have been committed without any intent to keep Caballeros purse.

We view the evidence of the evading offense much the same. The evidence in our view showed that Watson entered a freeway, stopped, yelled back at officers, then fled, then stopped and yelled at the officers again, then fled again, driving for eight miles, until the pursuit ended when he crashed his car. We are not convinced by Watsons arguments that it is reasonably probable that, had his pinpoint instruction been given, the jury would have reached a different decision on the question of whether he appreciated the danger he posed during the police pursuit.

Finally, we reject Watsons argument that we should review the instructional error under the constitutional harmless error standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24. The trial courts refusal to give Watsons pinpoint instruction did not violate his right to a fair trial, and did not deny him the opportunity to present his chosen defense. Indeed, the thrust of Watsons defense was his claim that he did not have the required specific intent or mental states for the offenses of robbery and/or evading because his PCP intoxication blocked him from forming those required mental states. Nothing was hidden from the jury and nothing was removed from the jurys consideration. There was no constitutional error.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BIGELOW, J.

We concur:

COOPER, P. J.

FLIER, J.

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