In re Anna L.

In re Anna L.

Filed 8/20/08 In re Anna L. CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re ANNA L., A Person coming under the Juvenile Court Law LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANNA S., Defendant and Appellant. ANNA S., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Real Party In Interest.

B203495 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK67020) B207679 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK67020)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Sherri Sobel, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Sherri Sobel, Juvenile Court Referee. Petition denied.

Sharon S. Rollo, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Law Offices of Katherine Anderson and Victoria Doherty for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent Superior Court.

Raymond G. Fortner, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel and Aileen Wong, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent and Real Party in Interest.

_

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Prior Appeal

Anna S. (Mother) is the mother of Anna L. (Anna). In February 2007, when Anna was 15 years old, DCFS filed a petition seeking to establish dependency jurisdiction. For approximately three years prior to DCFS intervention, Anna had been staying with her older sister Gloria and Glorias husband Armando during the week. In January 2007, Mother brought Anna back to live with her full time and refused to allow her to have contact with Gloria or Armando. Mother contacted DCFS and made numerous allegations regarding Gloria and Armando, including that Anna had been kidnapped, forced to live with them, and treated as a slave. She also accused Gloria and Armando of using marijuana, breeding dangerous dogs and plotting against her. Anna and Gloria denied all these allegations. DCFS later learned that before Anna went to stay with Gloria and Armando, Mother had had spells during which she stared at the wall and refused to interact with Anna. She would also occasionally be found crying in the streets in the early morning hours. Since bringing Anna back home, Mother had isolated Anna from contact with others and called police to report, falsely, that Anna was suicidal. Anna had run away twice and threatened to do so again. After a contested jurisdictional hearing on March 21, 2007, the court found true the following allegation: [Mother] has demonstrated a history of mental and emotional problems including irrational incoherent bizarre behavior which renders [her] unable to provide [Anna] with appropriate care and supervision in that in 2007[,] she alleges that [Anna] is unsafe in the home of [Gloria]. Such mental and emotional problems of [mother] endanger[] [Annas] physical and emotional health and safety and place[] the child at risk of physical harm, and damage.

Once jurisdiction was resolved, the court held a contested dispositional hearing and found by clear and convincing evidence that return [of Anna to Mother] would create a substantial risk of danger to the physical or emotional well-being of [Anna] and [there were] no reasonable means to protect [Anna] without removal from [Mother]. The order was based in part on a report from clinical psychologist Alfredo E. Crespo, Ph.D., who had evaluated Mother on March 5, 2007 and concluded that appellants beliefs concerning Gloria and Armando were likely the result of an underlying delusional disorder. In its dispositional order, the court ordered individual counseling for Mother and conjoint counseling with Anna when appropriate. The court also granted Mother two monitored visits with Anna per week and further stated [Mothers] visits will begin in a therapeutic setting.

Mother appealed the jurisdictional/dispositional orders, raising three primary contentions: (1) the allegations of the petition did not state a basis for juvenile court jurisdiction; (2) substantial evidence did not support the jurisdictional findings or the decision to remove Anna from Mothers care; and (3) the court improperly delegated the power to control visitation to a therapist. By opinion and order dated February 8, 2008, we affirmed. We concluded that although the petition may have lacked specificity, Mother forfeited the contention by failing to raise it below and the trial courts ruling made clear that Mothers history of mental and emotional problems which caused her, among other things, to suffer from delusions concerning Gloria and Armando formed the basis for jurisdiction. We further concluded that the jurisdictional and dispositional findings were supported by the evidence of Mothers delusional beliefs concerning Annas safety and Annas mental state, together with her past behavior - crying for no reason, staring vacantly and refusing to interact - and her attempts to isolate Anna from contact with others. Finally, with respect to the improper delegation of the power to control visitation, we were assured by respondent that the courts order conferred no discretion on the therapist to deny visitation. We were also informed that subsequent orders and findings by the court in September and October 2007 had rendered the March 21, 2007 visitation order moot.

B. Six-Month Review

In September 2007, while the first appeal was pending, the court held the six-month review hearing required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.21, subdivision (e).^[1] At that time, the caseworker reported Mother had cooperated with the case plan by completing a parenting education program and participating in psychotherapy. Appellants therapist, Dr. Rigoverto C. Briceno, reported that Mothers participation in psychotherapy had been good, and that she was motivated to address the issues for which she was referred and appear[ed] capable of providing a safe and nurturing home environment for [Anna]. In an interview with the caseworker, Mother said she still felt Gloria was manipulating [Anna] to live with her for financial gain and was sure Anna was being mistreated. The caseworker expressed concern that despite the therapy Mother continues to report that her daughter Anna is not happy, and is mistreated in her sister/caregivers household. DCFS recommended against returning Anna to Mother, noting, inter alia, the persistence of Mothers irrational beliefs, the recommendation of Annas therapist and the fact that [t]he risk level for emotional abuse remains high for this family.

Prior to the six-month review hearing, Mother had been permitted a single visit with Anna, on August 21, 2007, in the office of Dr. Briceno. After the visit, Anna complained that Mother had gotten angry and yelled at her.^[2] Anna also reported that Mother had lied during the session by continuing to insist Gloria was not treating Anna well and wanted to take care of Anna for financial reasons and by denying being brought to the therapy session by Annas uncle whom Anna had previously accused of inappropriate behavior. Anna reported to the caseworker she became agitated and angered after the session and hurt and upset over the things Mother said about Gloria. Anna told the caseworker she did not want any contact with Mother. Annas therapist, Tiffany Yip, prepared a written report which stated: According to [Anna], [her] recent visitation with mother was negative. [Mother] made inappropriate, hurtful comments to [Anna], leading [Anna] to feel distressed and unsafe. [Anna] states that she doesnt want to see mother in any setting for visitations at this point, and feels that it would

re[-]traumatize her. It is my impression that in the best interest of [Anna], [Anna] is not ready for any type of visitation with her mother at this time.

At the hearing on September 19, 2007, the court found that return of Anna to Mothers care would create substantial risk of danger to the physical or emotional well-being of the child, stating that [Mothers] position is exactly the same as it was when the case came in, which is absolutely contrary to every bit of information that we have, both from the child and from her adult sister . . . [she] hasnt changed anything. . . . [S]he has some delusion[s] regarding the relationship between Anna and the adult sister, which is the only place Anna wants to live. The court nevertheless ordered six more months of reunification services. The court also ordered the caseworker to prepare a report explaining why the conjoint therapy session was held with Dr. Briceno rather than Yip, and suspended visitation pending: (1) a report from Dr. Briceno concerning his impression of the first conjoint therapy session; (2) an update from Annas therapist regarding contact of any kind with the mother; and (3) a recommendation concerning whether conjoint therapy should be with a neutral therapist. These reports were to be received by the next court date, which the court scheduled for October 19. Mother appealed this order.

C. Status Hearings

1. October 19, 2007 Status Hearing

While appeal from the order of September 19, 2007 was pending, the court held a status hearing on October 19, 2007. Prior to the hearing, Dr. Briceno reported that at the conjoint counseling session on August 21, Mother had made negative comments regarding Glorias motivation for keeping Anna but did not yell or scream at Anna and did not act in a threatening manner towards her. Dr. Briceno stated that Anna appeared reluctant to participate in family psychotherapy and recommended that the conjoint session be monitored by someone other than him or Annas therapist, Yip. Yips report reiterated that Anna, although making progress, did not want to see Mother. Yip concurred that Anna was not ready for any type of visitation. The court issued an order which stated: The only therapist to be involved in this matter is to be [Annas] therapist and that she has the discretion to begin conjoint counseling between the minor and the mother if that person believes it would be appropriate. The court set a further status hearing for December 20.^[3]

2. December 20, 2007 Status Hearing

Prior to the December 20 hearing, the parties reported that a second conjoint therapy session between Mother and Anna took place on November 21, 2007. After that session, Annas therapist reported that Anna felt emotionally overwhelmed and very agitated. Anna said she did not want to have further conjoint sessions or any visitation with Mother until she felt ready. At the hearing, the court issued an order which stated: Mother is to now have therapeutic visits with the minor when the minors therapist deems it appropriate.

D. 12-Month Review Hearing

The report prepared for the April 24, 2008, 12-month review hearing indicated that one final conjoint therapy session had been held on February 22, 2008. According to Yip, rather than discussing her relationship with Anna, Mother focused on Gloria and repeatedly spoke of her in negative terms, saying that Gloria had brainwashed Anna. When Anna tried to discuss Mothers past behavior, appellant avoided [taking] responsibility for any of her behaviors. Anna later told Yip that Mother had mixed up facts and dates of events. She also said that Mothers lying and denial of events and persistence in talking negatively about [Gloria] were the reasons she did not want to have conjoint sessions or visitation with appellant. Yip informed the caseworker that Anna was adamant about not returning to [appellants] care and supervision.

Dr. Briceno reported that Mother continued to present[] as being very motivated to address the issues for which she was referred and that Mother want[ed] to have continued family psychotherapy visits with her daughter in order to address their possible reunification. He stated that her treatment had focused on her need to not make negative assertions regarding her older daughter that [do] not appear to be supported by any evidence, . . . her emotional symptoms related to her continued separation from her daughter, and her feelings regarding her daughter appearing to not want to be returned with her. The caseworker reported that Mother had not made sufficient progress in that she continued to allege for no rational reason that Anna was unsafe or mistreated in Glorias home. Anna reported she did not feel safe with Mother. The caseworker recommended six more months of services.

At the hearing, counsel for Anna informed the court that Anna was consistent in her desire to stay with Gloria where she felt safe and nurtured. Anna was emotionally distressed by the prospect of having conjoint therapy sessions with Mother and did not believe the sessions should continue because Mother continue[d] to minimize the problems in the past and continue[d] to fail to take responsibility for her actions. Counsel for Anna asked the court to terminate reunification services rather than provide an additional six months of services as recommended by DCFS. The fathers attorney joined in the request.

The court found that Mother had a psychotic fixation that [Gloria], whom [Anna] loves and feels safe with, . . . is using her to get money from the department and continues to assert that [Gloria] is a danger to [Anna]. Accordingly, the court found that Mother had not made significant progress in resolving the problems which led to the removal and that return of Anna to Mothers care would create a substantial risk of danger to the physical or emotional well-being of the minor. The court further found that reasonable services had been provided. The court also concluded there was no reasonable possibility that Anna would be returned to Mother by the time of the 18-month review, which was at that point four months away. The court terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing on August 21, 2008. The court also ordered one hour of visitation per month between Mother and Anna in the office of Annas therapist. Mother filed a petition seeking writ review of the April 24 order.

DISCUSSION

A. Appeal of September 19, 2007 Order (Six-Month Review Hearing)

1. Mothers Contentions

At the six-month review hearing, the juvenile courts task is (1) to order the return of the child to the physical custody of his or her parent unless it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the return of the child. . . would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child or (2) if the child is not returned, to determine whether reasonable services that were designed to aid the parent or legal guardian in overcoming the problems that led to the initial removal and the continued custody of the child have been provided or offered to the parent or legal guardian; and (3) to order that such services be initiated, continued, or terminated. ( 366.21, subd. (e).)

Here, the court found at the six-month review hearing that return of Anna to Mothers care would create a substantial risk of danger to the physical or emotional well-being of the child because of the persistence of her delusions and then ordered that all visitation be temporarily suspended due to the heated and unpleasant conjoint session on August 21. Mother contends that the court abused its discretion in suspending visitation and that substantial evidence does not support its finding regarding danger to Anna were she to be returned to Mothers custody.

2. Suspension of Visitation

Section 362.1 provides that reunification plans must provide for visitation between the parent or guardian and the child and that [v]isitation shall be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child. Citing this statute and a number of cases in which appellate courts have warned against providing no visitation (see In re David D. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 941, 954) or handing too much discretion over visitation to DCFS (see In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1008-1009), the minor (see In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 48-49), or the minors therapist (see In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310, 317-318; In re Donnovan J. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1477-1478), Mother contends the courts order suspending visitation for 30 days constituted an abuse of discretion.

Mothers contention that a suspension of visitation invariably represents an abuse of discretion is incorrect. Although the statute directs the court to provide visitation that is as frequent as possible, any visitation ordered must be consistent with the well-being of the child. ( 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A).) No visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child. (Id., subd. (a)(1)(B).) Suspension of visitation is appropriate where there is a possibility of physical injury or emotional harm to the child. (In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1005; In re Daniel C.H. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 814, 838; see also In re Nicholas B. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1138 [recognizing that showing of detriment would justify suspension of visitation, but finding abuse of discretion under circumstances of the case]; In re Luke L. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 670, 678 [same].)

The September 19, 2007 order did not violate section 362.1s dictates. The September 19 order suspended visitation based on the reports of a disastrous conjoint session between Mother and Anna on August 21 and possible adverse psychological consequences to Anna. Anna stated that she was agitated and angered after the session and hurt and upset over the things Mother said about Gloria and wanted no further contact with Mother. Annas therapist said the session caused Anna to feel distressed and unsafe. The therapist expressed concern that another visit would cause Anna to be re[-]traumatize[d] and advised the court that Anna was not ready for any type of visitations with her mother at this time. On the same date it suspended visitation, the court set a hearing to re-examine the issue within 30 days, when additional reports could be received from the therapists, including Dr. Briceno. The record filed in connection with the consolidated writ confirms that the court received new evidence and re-assessed visitation on October 19 and again on December 20. As the court was clearly seeking neither to halt all visitation or to abdicate control over visitation to a third party, the September 19 order did not represent an abuse of discretion.

3. Finding of Detriment

Mother next contends that the courts finding of detriment if Anna were returned was unsupported. On appeal from a determination that the minor will suffer detriment if returned to the physical custody of the parent, we review the record for substantial evidence in support of the finding. (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 763.) In conducting such review, we must indulge in all reasonable inferences to support the findings of the juvenile court and must review the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile courts orders. (In re Daniel C.H., supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 839.)

Mother contends that because she was complying with the plan and received a favorable report from Dr. Briceno concerning her progress, the court could not make the requisite finding of detriment. However, the evidence concerning appellants progress was mixed. The caseworker reported that Mother continued to believe without having a basis in reality that Gloria was manipulating and mistreating Anna and that Anna was not happy in her sisters household. Anna reported that Mother continued to make comments and engage in behavior that made her feel distressed and unsafe. Annas therapist reported that Anna was not ready even for visitation with Mother. Reports of fear or intense emotional stress from the minor at the prospect of return to the parent can justifying a finding of detriment. (See, e.g., In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 974-975 [minors expression of fear and desire not to return to fathers custody, combined with the opinion of the social worker that returning [minor] would have an adverse effect on his emotional well-being provided substantial evidence of substantial risk of detriment to [minors] well-being]; In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 581 [finding of detriment supported by minors testimony he feared father because of past physical abuse and would be uncomfortable in his presence even if accompanied by a third party].) The fact that Mother was complying with the reunification plan by attending therapy sessions did not require the court to find that Anna was no longer in danger. A parents compliance with the reunification plan is to be considered by the court[,] but . . .  is not determinative. (In re Dustin R. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1143.) The court must also consider the parents progress and . . . capacity to meet the objectives of the plan . . . . (Ibid.) Here the court specifically found that the mothers position is exactly the same as it was when the case came in. The courts finding of detriment was supported by substantial evidence.

B. Writ Petition for Review of April 24, 2008 Order (12-month Review Hearing)

1. Mothers Contentions

At the 12-month review hearing, as at the six-month review hearing, the court is required to order the return of the child to the physical custody of his or her parent unless it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the return of the child . . . would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child and resolve whether reasonable services were provided or offered. ( 366.21, subd. (f).) The court must also consider whether to continue the reunification period for up to six months, which it should do only if it finds that there is a substantial probability that the child will be returned to the physical custody of his or her parent or legal guardian and safely maintained in the home within the extended period of time or that reasonable services have not been provided to the parent or legal guardian. (Id., subd. (g).)

At the 12-month review hearing on April 24, 2008, the court found that return of Anna to Mothers custody would create a substantial risk of detriment and that reasonable reunification services had been provided. Against the recommendation of the caseworker, it terminated further services, concluding there was not a substantial probability that Anna would be returned within six months should reunification be extended. In the writ petition, Mother contends (1) the court abused its discretion in delegating visitation authority to Annas therapist; (2) the court erred in finding that reasonable reunification services had been provided; and (3) the court prematurely terminated reunification services.

2. Discretion Over Visitation

As discussed, section 362.1 generally requires the juvenile court to provide visitation between parents and dependent children which is as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child, and a court abuses its discretion if it gives absolute discretion to decide whether visits will take place to a therapist. (In re S.H., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at pp. 317-318; In re Donnovan J., supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 1477.) Mother contends the court abused its discretion in delegating decisions concerning visitation to Annas therapist.

The order under review - the order issued at the April 24, 2008, 12-month review hearing - provides that future visitation is to take place once per month in the offices of Annas therapist. It does not vest discretion in the therapist. In challenging the discretion vested in Annas therapist, Mother is likely referring to the orders issued at the October 19, 2007 and December 20, 2007 status hearings, which stated, respectively, that conjoint therapy sessions would begin when Annas therapist believe[d] it would be appropriate and deem[ed] it appropriate. As respondent points out, however, Mother did not request review of those orders and they have become final.^[4] (See In re Julie M., supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at pp. 46-47 [by failing to appeal dispositional orders under which visitation could not take place unless minors consented, mother waived any complaint she may have regarding the [disposition] plan]; John F. v. Superior Court (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 400, 405 [A challenge to the most recent order entered in a dependency matter may not challenge prior orders for which the statutory time limit for filing an appeal has passed.].)

Although the October 19, 2007 and December 20, 2007 orders which appeared to afford unfettered discretion over visitation to Annas therapist are not directly reviewable, the visitation afforded Mother during the period preceding the April 24, 2008 order is not free from scrutiny. Prior to terminating reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing to consider termination of parental rights, the juvenile court must find that reasonable services were provided to the parent. ( 366.21, subd. (f); In re Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 971.) In Mothers petition for review of the April 24, 2008 order which terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing, she contends based on the infrequency of visitation, that reasonable reunification services were not provided. Accordingly, we address whether appropriate visitation was provided in the context of our review of the courts finding concerning the reasonableness of reunification services. (See In re David D., supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at pp. 953-954 [juvenile courts earlier order suspending all visitation between mother and children precluded finding at 12-month review hearing that reasonable services had been provided].)

3. Reasonableness of Reunification Services

As we have said, Mother challenges the courts finding at the 12-month review hearing that reasonable reunification services were provided. Such a finding must be made upon clear and convincing evidence. (In re Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 971.) When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or order is challenged on appeal, even where the standard of proof in the trial court is clear and convincing evidence, the reviewing court must determine if there is any substantial evidence - that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value - to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. [Citations.] (Ibid., quoting In re Jasmine C. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 71, 75.) Under the substantial evidence test, we construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the juvenile courts findings regarding the adequacy of reunification plans and the reasonableness of DCFSs efforts. (In re Julie M., supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 46.) When applying the substantial evidence test, however, we bear in mind the heightened burden of proof. [Citation.] Under this burden of proof, evidence must be so clear as to leave no substantial doubt. It must be sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind. [Citation.] (In re Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 971, quoting In re Monica C. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 296, 306.)

Services will be found reasonable if the Department has identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult . . . . (In re Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at pp. 972-973, quoting In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414.) Courts have stressed that [v]isitation is a necessary and integral component of any reunification plan (In re S. H., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 317), critical to promotion of the parents interest in the care and management of their children (In re Luke L., supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 679). A finding that reunification services offered to a parent were reasonable may be overturned where visitation, although included in the disposition order or reunification plan, was never provided. (In re David D., supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at pp. 953-954.) There is no meaningful distinction between a case in which no [reasonable] reunification plan was ever developed and a case in which a plan was developed but not implemented during most of the reunification stage. (Id. at p. 954.) Where the minor is reluctant to visit, and family therapy is needed to promote visitation, such therapy may be critical to reunification. (Id. at p. 972.)

Here, Anna was afraid of Mother due to her odd behavior and delusional beliefs and was disinclined to visit her from the start. The courts dispositional order requiring a period of individual therapy for both to be followed by conjoint therapy was appropriate under the circumstances. The first attempt at a conjoint session, which took place in August 2007 after Mother had completed seven individual therapy sessions, ended disastrously. The court held additional hearings to evaluate what had occurred and attempted to deal with the problems that arose. Although the orders issued at the October 19 and December 20 status conferences may have vested excessive authority in Annas therapist, the therapist did not exercise that authority by preventing conjoint sessions from taking place. Two more conjoint sessions were held. Although the total number of conjoint sessions was small, there is no indication that additional sessions would have improved the situation. Despite the regular individual therapy sessions provided by DCFS to Mother to alleviate the problems that led to the finding of jurisdiction, Mother was unable to let go of her obsession concerning Gloria or make an attempt to deal with her relationship with Anna. The court was not required to force the parties into further unfruitful conjoint therapy sessions. Under the circumstances, the courts finding regarding the reasonableness of reunification efforts was supported by the evidence.

4. Additional Reunification Services

Mothers final contention is that an additional six months of reunification services should have been provided. Under the statute, the court is to extend the reunification period an additional six months only if it finds that there is a substantial probability that the child will be returned to the physical custody of his or her parent or legal guardian and safely maintained in the home within the extended period of time or that reasonable services have not been provided . . . . Here, the court found that despite the therapy Mother had undergone, no progress had been made in the preceding 12 months with respect to Mothers fixation on Gloria and her delusional beliefs concerning Annas security in Glorias household. Mothers continued expressions of erroneous beliefs concerning Annas safety and her refusal to address her relationship with Anna supported the finding. Accordingly, the court could reasonably conclude that an additional six months would serve no purpose despite the caseworkers recommendation.

DISPOSITION

The judgment in case number B203495 is affirmed. The petition for writ in case number B207679 is denied.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

MANELLA, J.

We concur:

EPSTEIN, P. J.

WILLHITE, J.

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^[1] All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

^[2] Gloria, who was outside the therapists office during the session, confirmed hearing a verbal altercation which included Mother screaming at Anna.

^[3] There are no transcripts from the October 19 or December 20 status hearings in our record.

^[4] As neither party provided a transcript of the status hearings, there is, in addition, no indication in the record that Mother challenged those orders at the time they were made.