P. v. Dawkins

P. v. Dawkins

Filed 8/28/08 P. v. Dawkins CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GEORGE RICHARD DAWKINS, Defendant and Appellant.

B199609 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA315498)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Charlaine F. Olmedo, Judge. Affirmed.

Rachel Lederman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Dana M. Ali, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Defendant and appellant George Richard Dawkins appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial that resulted in his conviction for unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle. He was sentenced to a prison term of five years.

Dawkins contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the People failed to prove the registered owner did not consent to Dawkinss driving the vehicle. We disagree, and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Facts.

Rosalva Guzman was the owner and exclusive driver of a white 1999 Toyota Camry automobile. Her father, Santiago Guzman, was the registered owner, but had given her the car in approximately 2003 or 2004.

On the morning of January 15, 2007, the Camry was parked in front of the Guzman residence on West 47th Street in Los Angeles. At approximately 7:30 a.m., Rosalva[1]was getting ready to leave for work. She turned on the Camrys ignition but then reentered her residence to retrieve a sweater, leaving the car running. As Rosalva went inside, her brother Marcos Guzman left the house and observed the Camry speeding away, with Dawkins driving. Marcos followed the Camry and telephoned Rosalva. Rosalva walked outside and confirmed that her car was missing. Marcos telephoned police.

Marcos continued to follow the Camry and relayed its movements to the 911 operator. Marcos noticed that every time the Camry came to a stop, Dawkins would search the arm rest console or glove box. Dawkins parked the car in a residential area and rifled through the interior. As he was heading to the trunk, police arrived and arrested him. Marcos identified him at the scene, and at trial.

Rosalva did not know Dawkins and had never seen him until she was taken by police to the location where her Camry was parked. She had never given him, or anyone else, permission to drive her car that morning. Likewise, Marcos did not know Dawkins and had not given him permission to drive or take Rosalvas car.

Dawkins presented no evidence.

2. Procedure.

Trial was by jury. Dawkins was convicted of unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a)). He admitted serving nine prior prison terms within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced Dawkins to the midterm of two years, plus three one-year section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements, for a total term of five years in prison. It imposed a restitution fine, a suspended parole restitution fine, and a court security assessment. Dawkins appeals.

DISCUSSION

Dawkins urges that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, because [n]o evidence was offered at trial to show that appellant did not have the registered owners consent to drive the car. This contention lacks merit.

When determining whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction, our role on appeal is a limited one. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) We review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 504; People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 496; People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 667.) We draw all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment. (People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 640; People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) Reversal is not warranted unless it appears that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction]. [Citation.] (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331; People v. Zamudio, supra, at p. 357.)

Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) provides that a person is guilty of a crime if he or she drives or takes a vehicle not his or her own, without the consent of the owner thereof, and with intent either to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner thereof of his or her title to or possession of the vehicle, whether with or without intent to steal the vehicle. (People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 26.) Thus, to prove violation of the statute, the People must show, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that the defendant lacked the owners consent. (People v. Clifton (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 195, 199.)

Here, the evidence was sufficient to prove this element. Rosalva testified that her father had given her the car several years before; she was the exclusive driver of the car; she did not know Dawkins; and she had not given him permission to drive the vehicle. From this testimony the jury could have readily concluded that Rosalva was the owner, and neither she nor anyone else with an ownership interest had given Dawkins permission to drive the car.

The fact that Rosalva had not registered with the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) as the Camrys owner does not require a finding of insufficiency. (People v. Clifton, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at p. 201.) Clifton is instructive. There, the court concluded the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for violation of Vehicle Code section 10851 even though the subject Pontiac was not registered to the victim, Guerrero. Guerrero testified that he had purchased his Pontiac from another man, but had not yet transferred the car into his own name. The defendant stole the car keys, pink slip, and car from Guerreros house. (Id. at p. 198.) On appeal, the defendant contended the evidence was insufficient because the victim had no indicia of ownership of the Pontiac.

People v. Clifton, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d 195, rejected this argument. For purposes of Vehicle Code section 10851, the records of the DMV did not necessarily and conclusively establish the vehicles true ownership. The victims testimony that he was the owner, had purchased the car from the registered owner several months prior to the theft, and had sole possession of the car from the date of purchase until the time of the unlawful taking, was uncontroverted. This uncontroverted testimony, without more, [was] sufficient to support an implied finding of ownership of the . . . Pontiac at the time of the taking. [Citations.] Consequently, the mere fact Guerrero was not the registered owner of the vehicle at the time of the theft does not fatally undermine his otherwise uncontradicted assertion of ownership. Nor does the failure of the transferor and transferee to strictly comply with the Vehicle Code transfer procedures preclude the prosecution under Vehicle Code section 10851. (Id. at p. 201.)

The same is true here. No evidence contradicted Rosalvas testimony that her father had given her the car several years before, and that she was the exclusive driver at the time of the theft. Her testimony, standing alone, was sufficient to prove ownership and lack of consent to Dawkinss use of the car.

People v. Rodgers (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 531, cited by Dawkins, is distinguishable. In Rodgers, the defendant was convicted of unlawfully taking or driving a Chevrolet. The Peoples case rested on the testimony of the vehicle owners husband. The husband testified that the Chevrolet belonged to his wife, and that he had parked the locked car in a garage on a Saturday and returned to find it missing the following Monday. The defendant was found driving the car months later. The defendant testified that a lady friend had loaned him the car, telling him it had been loaned to her by another female friend who was in the hospital. (Id. at p. 533.) The cars owner did not testify, nor was her absence explained. There was no evidence regarding her whereabouts or activities, what arrangements she had made for use of the car, whether she or others had keys for the car, or whether the garage where the car had been locked belonged to her, her husband, or neither. So far as the evidence show[ed], she could have given her consent to defendants use of the car. (Ibid.) Under these circumstances, Rodgers concluded the evidence was insufficient to show the defendant was driving the car without the owners consent. (Id. at p. 534.) Here, in contrast, as we have explained the evidence showed Rosalva was the owner and exclusive driver of the car and had not given Dawkins permission to drive it.

Dawkins complains that in no case has the definition of a vehicle owner been expanded to include someone like Ms. Guzman, who merely had use of the car. This argument fails. Rosalva testified that father had given the vehicle to her, establishing that she was the owner. As explained in People v. Clifton, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at page 200,the fact Rosalva was not the registered owner is immaterial, because for purposes of Vehicle Code section 10851, the records of the DMV are not conclusive. In sum, there was no evidentiary deficiency.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ALDRICH, J.

We concur:

CROSKEY, Acting P. J.

KITCHING, J.

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[1] For ease of reference, we sometimes hereinafter refer to members of the Guzman family by their first names.