Evans v. Merced County Sheriffs Dept.

Evans v. Merced County Sheriffs Dept.

Filed 8/13/08 Evans v. Merced County Sheriffs Dept. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

JAMAR JAMES EVANS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MERCED COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT et al., Defendants and Respondents.

F054104 (Super. Ct. No. 150409) OPINION

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced County. Ronald W. Hansen, Judge.

Jamar James Evans, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

James N. Fincher, County Counsel, and James E. Stone, Deputy County Counsel, for Defendants and Respondents.

-ooOoo-

Plaintiff Jamar James Evans appeals to this court for the second time as a result of actions he has filed that are based on a single incident. The trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend. We will affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

In April 2005 Evans was in the county law library when he developed a need to use the restroom. Apparently, there are no restroom facilities in the library, so Evans proceeded to the nearby courthouse to use the restroom. Evans was searched when he entered the courthouse, the details of which are unclear. What is clear is that Evans felt the search was inappropriate.

Evans filed an action alleging various causes of action related to this incident, naming as defendants the Merced County Sheriffs Department, the deputy sheriff who conducted the search, and two of the deputys supervisors (defendants).^[1] Defendants demurred to the complaint. The trial court, after providing Evans with several opportunities to amend his complaint, eventually sustained the demurrers without leave to amend. Evans appealed.

We affirmed, concluding that Evans had failed to state a cause of action and had not demonstrated that he could have rectified the deficiencies in the complaint had he been granted leave to amend. (Evans v. Merced County Sheriffs Department et al. (Dec. 12, 2006, F049621 [nonpub.] (F049621).) In our discussion regarding whether Evans should have been granted leave to amend, we stated, The facts pled by Evans possibly, and we stress the term possibly, could support a cause of action for tort recovery. Evanss failure to present his claim as required by the California Government Tort Claims Act precludes such recovery. The trial court undoubtedly concluded that further leave to amend would be fruitless. Under the facts of this case, including Evanss complete failure to address this issue in a substantive manner in his briefs, we conclude there was no abuse of discretion. (F049621, supra.)

Evans read the first sentence of the above quoted portion of our opinion as instructions to guide him in his action against defendants. He served the county with an Amendment to Claim for Personal Injuries on December 22, 2006, which the county deemed null and void since the appeal was final. Evans then filed a second action on June 18, 2007, seeking recovery of damages, naming the same defendants and alleging the same facts as the original action. The trial court sustained defendants demurrer without leave to amend. Evans appeals.

DISCUSSION

There are two obvious grounds on which the trial court could have relied to sustain defendants demurrer, either of which was sufficient. First, Evanss complaint establishes that he served a notice of claim on the county over 18 months after the incident. The California Government Tort Claims Act requires anyone making a claim for money damages against a public entity to file a signed claim within six months of the accrual of the cause of action. (Gov. Code,  905, 910, 911.2.) An injured party may not bring an action against a public entity or its employees unless he or she has complied with the claim presentation requirements. (Id.,  945.4, 950.2.) Since Evans presented his claim well outside of the six-month period, his action was barred.

The second ground on which the trial court could have based its ruling is the doctrine of res judicata. Res judicata describes the preclusive effect of a final judgment on the merits. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them. Under the doctrine of res judicata, if a plaintiff prevails in an action, the cause is merged into the judgment and may not be asserted in a subsequent lawsuit; a judgment for the defendant serves as a bar to further litigation of the same cause of action. [] A clear and predictable res judicata doctrine promotes judicial economy. Under this doctrine, all claims based on the same cause of action must be decided in a single suit; if not brought initially, they may not be raised at a later date. Res judicata precludes piecemeal litigation by splitting a single cause of action or relitigation of the same cause of action on a different legal theory or for different relief. [Citation.] A predictable doctrine of res judicata benefits both the parties and the courts because it seeks to curtail multiple litigation causing vexation and expense to the parties and wasted effort and expense in judicial administration. [Citation.] (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896-897, fn. omitted.)

Evanss second action presents the same cause of action merely alleging a different legal theory of recovery. The action clearly is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. This is the ground on which the trial court relied. It did not err in doing so.

Defendants urge us to conclude this appeal is frivolous and issue sanctions against Evans. (Code Civ. Proc.,  907; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a).) The basis for defendants frustration is obvious. The action plainly does not have any merit. Evans misread our prior opinion and filed an action barred by thedoctrine of res judicata and failed to comply with the Government Tort Claim Act, a fact pointed out in our prior opinion. Under these circumstances, we conclude the action is frivolous within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 907 and issue sanctions in the amount of $100, to be paid to defendants.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Defendants shall recover their costs and sanctions in the amount of $100.

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CORNELL, Acting P.J.

WE CONCUR:

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DAWSON, J.

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KANE, J.

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^[1] Dustin DeWitt, Jim Pacheco, and John Burk.