In re Vincente O.

In re Vincente O.

Filed 8/7/08 In re Vincente O. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re VICENTE O., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. VICENTE O., Defendant and Appellant.	D051852 (Super. Ct. No. J215-718)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Francis M. Devaney, Judge. Affirmed.

Vicente O. admitted a burglary allegation contained in a wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code,  602) and the juvenile court ordered that he be held jointly and severally liable for restitution to the victims. (All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare & Institutions Code.) Vicente appeals the restitution order arguing that the juvenile court failed to give adequate consideration to the recognized goals of the victim restitution statute. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On the evening of May 17, 2007, Vicente and his two companions, Edwin and Yesenia, burglarized a classroom at Memorial Academy of Learning & Technology. Vicente waited outside while his companions handed items to him. Edwin lit a piece of paper on fire to provide some light, but he dropped the paper after it got too hot to hold and it started a fire. When the fire became too large to contain, all three fled the scene. The owner of the building, San Diego Unified School District, sought restitution in the amount of $120,000 and the school sought restitution in the amount of $19,669 for lost property.

A petition was filed under section 602 charging Vicente with burglary. After Vicente admitted the charge, the juvenile court deferred entry of judgment and placed him on probation. It also held a restitution hearing and ordered that all three minors and their parents be held jointly and severally liable for the restitution sought by the victims. Vicente appeals from the restitution order.

DISCUSSION

The juvenile court must order a minor to pay restitution to a victim who incurred economic loss as a result of the minor's conduct. ( 730.6, subds. (a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (h).) The minor's inability to pay is not relevant ( 730.6, subd. (c)) and the restitution order must be in an amount to fully reimburse the victims for all economic losses incurred "as the result of the minor's conduct for which the minor was found to be a person described in Section 602[.]" ( 730.6, subd. (h).)

"When feasible, the juvenile court shall also identify on the court order, any cooffenders who are jointly and severally liable for victim restitution." ( 730.6, subd. (h)(4).) A joint and several restitution order "means that the defendant (or juvenile) is responsible to make restitution for the full amount of the victim's losses, but that the defendant's obligation shall be reduced by any payments to the victim by other wrongdoers." (In re S.S. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 543, 550.) Restitution may help a minor understand that he has harmed others and that he has a responsibility to make them whole. Such a purpose "would be directly undermined by a rule that each participant in a criminal scheme may be held responsible only for a portion of the overall harm." (Ibid.)

The juvenile court is vested with discretion to allocate responsibility for restitution in a manner that will effectuate the legislative objectives of making the victim whole, rehabilitating the minor, and deterring future delinquent behavior. (In re S.S., supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at pp. 549-550; In re Brittany L. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1387.) Accordingly, restitution is not limited to losses directly caused by the minor; it may include losses caused by conduct the minor partially participated in or conduct the minor aided and abetted. (In re S.S., supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 550.) "That a defendant was not personally or immediately responsible for the victim's loss does not render an order of restitution improper. . . . [T]he question simply is whether the order is reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality." (In re I.M. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1209; see People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1123-1124.) We review a restitution order for an abuse of discretion. (In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1132.)

Vicente contends the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay restitution to the victims for losses caused by the fire because: (1) he did not cause the fire and thus the order will not rehabilitate him; (2) Edwin is responsible for full restitution to the victims and the additional restitution order does not serve to make the victims whole; and (3) the order may encourage future delinquent conduct rather than deter such conduct. We disagree.

Here, in determining whether the victims incurred their damages "as a result" ( 730.6, subds. (a)(1), (h)) of Vicente's conduct, the juvenile court analyzed whether the damages were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the minors' actions. Specifically, the juvenile court noted that although Edwin's separate act caused the fire, he did so to steal as many items as possible and further the burglary. Thus, the court reasoned that all three minors were to have benefited from the act and all minors should bear the consequences of the act. We agree that it was reasonably foreseeable that Edwin's reckless act of burning paper to illuminate the room could cause a fire and result in fire damage to the victims' property. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not abuse its broad discretion when imposing the restitution order because it was reasonably related to Vicente's crime. (In re I.M., supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1209.) We refuse to speculate that the order may encourage future delinquent conduct rather than deter such conduct.

Vicente's contention that the restitution order does not serve to make the victims whole ignores that a recognized purpose of such an order is to make the minor understand that he has harmed a victim and has the responsibility for making that victim whole. (In re S.S., supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 550.) Additionally, imposing a joint obligation "increases the likelihood that the victim will be fully compensated," which "is an important component of the restitution scheme." (People v. Zito (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 736, 744.) Finally, although Vicente argues that his mother does not have the ability to pay the restitution order, that part of the order finding her jointly and severally liable is not at issue in this appeal (In re Jeffrey M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1021) and Vicente lacks standing to raise this argument because he is not aggrieved by this part of the order. (See In re Crystal J. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 186, 189.)

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court's restitution order is affirmed.

McINTYRE, J.

WE CONCUR:

McDONALD, Acting P. J.

IRION, J.

Publication Courtesy of California free legal resources.

Analysis and review provided by Spring Valley Property line Lawyers.

San Diego Case Information provided by www.fearnotlaw.com